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Congress’s Power over Military Offices 
Zachary S. Price* 
Although scholars have explored at length the constitutional law of office-
holding with respect to civil and administrative offices, parallel questions 
regarding military office-holding have received insufficient attention. Even 
scholars who defend broad congressional authority to structure civil 
administration typically presume that the President, as Commander in Chief, 
holds greater authority over the military. For its part, the executive branch has 
claimed plenary authority over assignment of military duties and control of 
military officers. 
This pro-presidential consensus is mistaken. Although the President, as 
Commander in Chief, must have some form of directive authority over U.S. 
military forces in the field, the constitutional text and structure, read in light of 
longstanding historical practice, give Congress extensive power to structure the 
offices, chains of command, and disciplinary mechanisms through which the 
President’s authority is exercised. In particular, much as in the administrative 
context, Congress may vest particular powers and duties—authority to launch 
nuclear weapons or a cyber operation, for example, or command over particular 
units—in particular statutorily created offices. In addition, although the 
Constitution affords presidents removal authority as a default means of 
command discipline, Congress may supplant and limit this authority by 
replacing it with alternative disciplinary mechanisms, such as criminal penalties 
for disobeying lawful orders. 
By defining duties, command relationships, and disciplinary mechanisms in 
this way, Congress may establish structures of executive branch accountability 
that promote key values, protect military professionalism, and even encourage 
or discourage particular results, all without infringing upon the President’s 
ultimate authority to direct the nation’s armed forces. These conclusions bear 
directly on recent legislative proposals to vest authority over cyber weapons, 
force withdrawals, or nuclear weapons in officers other than the President. They 
also enable a potent critique of the Supreme Court’s recent insistence on a 
“unitary” executive branch in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection 
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Bureau, and they shed new light on broader separation-of-powers debates over 
executive-branch structure, conventions of governmental behavior, the civil 
service’s constitutionality, and Reconstruction’s historical importance. 
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Introduction 
Recent events have highlighted office-holding’s importance as a 
constraint on modern presidents. By vesting authorities in subordinate offices 
rather than the presidency, Congress may place friction between presidential 
desires and policy outcomes, even when the officer in question is subject to 
at-will removal. Doing so may help maintain agency adherence to legal 
requirements, ensure fidelity to agency statutory missions, and enable 
political enforcement of norms and conventions regarding appropriate 
conduct. Although examples of these effects stretch across American history, 
President Donald Trump’s failure to fire a special prosecutor investigating 
his presidential campaign provides a salient recent illustration: Because the 
power to hire and fire special counsels belonged to the Attorney General, not 
the President, Trump likely could have ousted the prosecutor only by firing 
the Attorney General (or Acting Attorney General), but doing so would have 
risked political backlash.  
Congressional authority over offices—its power to vest duties in 
subordinate offices and structure the executive branch—thus appears 
practically important, as indeed scholars of administrative law have long 
recognized. Yet despite extensive debate over relative presidential and 
congressional authority with respect to regulatory policy and administrative 
governance, parallel questions regarding military functions have received 
insufficient attention. Even scholars who take broad views of congressional 
authority in the administrative context have typically assumed that the 
President, as Commander in Chief, must have plenary authority over military 
functions.1 For its part, the executive branch, in legal opinions, signing 
 
1. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 769 
(2008) (arguing that “the text, as reinforced by historical practice, makes a strong case for at least 
some variant of a ‘unitary executive’ within the armed forces, particularly as to traditional functions 
in armed conflicts”); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 738 (2007) (“Unlike army generals, who may be 
commanded, the heads of departments the President appoints and the Senate confirms have the 
responsibility to decide the issues Congress has committed to their care—after appropriate 
consultation, to be sure—and not simply to obey.”). Scholars with broader views of presidential 
authority of course share this view. See, e.g., John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 
2280 (2009) (presuming that “[e]ven if inferior officers refused to carry out presidential orders, the 
 
PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/21 12:56 PM 
494 Texas Law Review [Vol. 99:491 
statements, and other documents across multiple administrations, has 
asserted remarkably broad theories of presidential command authority. Based 
on its asserted view that “[i]t is for the President alone, as Commander-in-
Chief, to make the choice of the particular personnel who are to exercise 
operational and tactical command functions over the U.S. Armed Forces,”2 
the executive branch has claimed authority to ignore statutory limits on who 
may command U.S. forces in combat3 and even how many soldiers or sailors 
must compose particular units.4 
This pro-presidential consensus is mistaken. It is true that the President, 
as Commander in Chief, must have some form of directive authority over 
U.S. military forces in the field, and military officers may often hold a duty 
to obey lawful presidential commands. This core presidential authority, 
however, leaves Congress with extensive power to structure the offices, 
chains of command, and disciplinary mechanisms through which the 
President’s authority is exercised. In particular, much as in the administrative 
context, Congress may vest particular powers and duties—authority to launch 
nuclear weapons or a cyber operation, for example, or command over 
particular units—in particular offices, even with respect to use of force. 
Furthermore, although the Constitution affords Presidents removal authority 
over these officers as a default means of command discipline, Congress may 
to some degree supplant and limit this authority by replacing it with 
alternative disciplinary mechanisms, such as criminal penalties for 
disobeying lawful orders. By defining duties, command relationships, and 
disciplinary mechanisms in this way, Congress may establish structures of 
executive branch accountability that promote key values, protect military 
professionalism, and even encourage or discourage particular results, all 
without infringing upon the President’s ultimate authority to direct the 
nation’s armed forces. 
 
Commander-in-Chief Clause would seem to include the power to promote or demote officers and 
to make duty assignments”); cf. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War 
and Military Powers, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 299, 384 (2008) (arguing that Congress “cannot create 
independent military officers or agencies, it cannot force the Commander in Chief to use officers 
that lack his confidence, and it cannot require the Commander in Chief to consult others prior to 
exercising his constitutional powers”). 
2. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 185 (1996). 
3. Id. at 183. 
4. Letter from the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Chairman Mac 
Thornberry, Committee on the Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives and Chairman John 
McCain, Committee on the Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Nov. 8, 2017) [hereinafter “2018 NDAA 
Views Letter”], https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1010611/download [https://perma.cc/3A5D-
AAA7] (expressing views on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 
2810, as passed by the Senate, and asserting that required “manning levels” for certain ships “would 
contravene the President’s indefeasible authority as Commander in Chief”). 
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Here, as in prior work, I will defend these conclusions using what I take 
to be the “mainstream” approach to separation-of-powers interpretation.5 
Under this approach, constitutional analysis is a holistic inquiry centered on 
considerations of text, structure, original understanding, and subsequent 
practice and precedent. Although the Constitution’s text and structure are 
ultimately controlling, the broad contours of historical practice carry great 
weight in resolving ambiguities, particularly in the absence of dispositive 
court decisions. 
By these lights, although my conclusions may be at odds with modern 
intuitions about the President’s Commander-in-Chief power, they have the 
virtue of according substantially not only with the Constitution’s plain text, 
but also with our government’s actual practice over the past 150 years—or 
so I will argue. Contrary to the widespread assumption that the President’s 
military command authority is unusually broad, an unusually thick overlay 
of statutes in fact regulates military office-holding at every stage. Statutes 
regulate military offices with respect to everything from appointments6 and 
promotions,7 to duties and assignments,8 to removals9 and other forms of 
discipline,10 often to a degree well beyond the norm for civil and 
administrative officers. Ironically, then, the frequent assumption that military 
affairs are an area of special presidential authority relative to civil governance 
may have it backwards in key respects. 
Indeed, during at least one key historical period, Reconstruction, 
Congress went even further, vesting authority over governance of the 
defeated Confederacy in particular military officers and requiring that all 
Army orders go through a top general who was also protected from at-will 
removal.11 As a practical matter, these measures went beyond simply 
structuring command relationships to encourage certain policy outcomes and 
came close to stripping the President’s command authority altogether.12 
Although some key decisions and scholarship, rather curiously, have treated 
such Reconstruction-era precedents as dangerous anomalies,13 we shall see 
 
5. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. 
DRONE WAR 191–93 (2016) (describing this approach); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xv–xvi (1991) (offering a similar theory). 
6. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532 (2018). 
7. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 611, 624 (2018). 
8. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 125, 7065, 8062 (2018). 
9. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (2018). 
10. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946a (2018). 
11. See infra subsection II(B)(4)(a). 
12. See infra subsection II(B)(4)(b). 
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 585 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(questioning the value as precedent of Reconstruction-era recess appointments in part because they 
arose in “a period of dramatic conflict between the Executive and Congress that saw the first-ever 
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that other precedents set during that period have remained central to the 
military’s practical operation ever since.14 Given Reconstruction’s centrality 
to the modern constitutional order, as well as its resonance with our own era 
of unstable and conflicted politics, Congress’s maximal assertions of power 
in that period warrant more respectful consideration, on this question among 
others. 
The analysis offered here bears directly on numerous current 
controversies. In just the past few months, the Secretary of Defense 
apparently withdrew military forces from certain domestic security functions 
against the President’s wishes,15 the Navy Secretary resigned rather than 
accept presidential interference with planned discipline for a wayward Navy 
SEAL,16 controversy erupted over an aggressive military strike against a 
senior Iranian officer in Iraq,17 and Congress created a new “Space Force” 
within the Department of the Air Force.18 In addition, one recent statute 
 
impeachment of a sitting President”); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 544 (1969) 
(characterizing Congress’s “abandonment of . . . restraint” in employing its exclusion power as 
“among the casualties of the general upheaval produced in war’s wake”); Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 164–65 (1926) (characterizing statutes limiting presidential removal authority as 
growing “out of the serious political difference between the two Houses of Congress and President 
Johnson”). See generally DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS 
AND CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 179 (2016) (“The story of this broader power struggle [between the 
President and Congress during Reconstruction] is now usually remembered . . . as an example of 
Congress taking things too far. In the decades after the trial, the story of congressional overreach 
burrowed into the national memory . . . .”). 
14. See infra subsection III(A)(1)(b)(i) & section III(A)(2)(b). 
15. Gordon Lubold, Trump Wanted to Fire Esper over Troops Dispute, WALL ST. J.  
(June 9, 2020, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-wanted-to-fire-esper-over-troops-
dispute-11591728235 [https://perma.cc/258F-4H9F] (“President Trump last week was on the brink 
of firing Defense Secretary Mark Esper over their differing views of domestic use of active-duty 
military, before advisers and allies on Capitol Hill talked him out of it, according to several 
officials.”). Just as this Article was going to press, new controversy erupted over the Defense 
Department’s role in failing to protect the Capitol from being stormed by riotous supporters of 
President Trump. See, e.g., Dan Lamothe, Military Quick-Reaction Force Not Deployed During 
Storming of Capitol Because of a Lack of Planning, Defense Officials Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 
2021, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/01/09/military-quick-
reaction-force-not-deployed-during-storming-capitol-because-lack-planning-defense-officials-say/ 
[https://perma.cc/4BFL-QHCB] (“A small quick-reaction force assembled by the Defense 
Department to assist if needed during protests in Washington on Wednesday did not immediately 
respond when a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol because of a lack of a prior planning with 
Capitol Police over how it might be deployed . . . .”). 
16. Ashley Parker & Dan Lamothe, Navy Secretary Forced Out by Pentagon Chief over 
Handling of Navy SEAL’s War Crimes Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 7:12 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/11/24/pentagon-chief-asks-navy-secretarys-
resignation-over-private-proposal-navy-seals-case/ [https://perma.cc/9ZN2-9V6W]. 
17. Isabel Coles, Tensions Rise in the Middle East After U.S. Killing of Iranian Military Leader, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-strike-in-iraq-threatens-ties-
with-vital-middle-east-ally-11578058413?mod=hp_lead_pos1 [https://perma.cc/XVA5-KRBF]. 
18. United States Space Force Act, Pub. L. No. 116-92, §§ 951–953, 133 Stat. 1561, 1561–64 
(2019) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081–83 (2018)). 
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vested authority over certain offensive cyber operations jointly in the 
President and Secretary of Defense, rather than the President alone.19 Another 
statute conditioned certain force withdrawals from South Korea on 
certifications by the Secretary,20 though President Trump declared this 
provision unconstitutional in a signing statement.21 Some have even called 
for statutory limits on presidential discretion over nuclear weapons, among 
other things.22 
The validity of all these actions and proposals depends on the relative 
extent of congressional and presidential authority to define military officers’ 
duties and their degree of independence from presidential dictates. Nor are 
such questions likely to fade away. So long as our politics remain erratic, 
conflicted, and polarized, it is not hard to image Congress employing its 
 
19. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-
232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132 (2018) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394 note); see also Robert Chesney, 
The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE (July 26, 2018, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa [https://perma.cc
/K7P7-UMKN] (noting peculiarity of “mak[ing] the ‘National Command Authority’ the relevant 
decision maker” rather than “just the [P]resident”); Rebecca Ingber, Congressional Administration 
of Foreign Affairs, 106 VA. L. REV. 395, 434 (2020) (noting this provision “appears to dilute the 
delegation of power, at least as compared to a delegation to the President alone”). 
20. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1254, 133 
Stat. 1198, 1671–72 (2019) (providing that no funds authorized by the statute “may be used to 
reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed 
to South Korea below 28,500 until 90 days after” the Secretary of Defense certifies, among other 
things, that “[s]uch a reduction is in the national security interest of the United States and will not 
significantly undermine the security of United States allies in the region”). 
21. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201900880 (Dec. 20, 2019) (indicating that “[s]everal 
provisions of the Act, including section[] 1254 . . . , purport to restrict the President’s authority to 
manage personnel, materiel, and logistical matters in the manner the President believes to be 
necessary or advisable for the successful conduct of military missions and foreign affairs” and will 
accordingly be “implement[ed]” in a manner “consistent with the President’s authority as 
Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs”); see also Letter 
from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legis. Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice to Senator James Inhofe, Chairman, Comm. on Armed Servs. (Nov. 27, 2019) 
[hereinafter 2020 NDAA Views Letter], https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1222061/download 
[https://perma.cc/3LB7-W3KJ] (objecting to earlier version of this provision on the grounds that 
“[t]he President’s constitutional authority to deploy personnel and materiel cannot be conditioned 
. . . on certifications or waivers made by subordinate Executive Branch officials”). 
22. See, e.g., Dakota S. Rudesill, Nuclear Command and Statutory Control, 11 J. NAT’L SEC. 
L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 28–30); Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, 
The President and the Bomb: Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process, FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(Mar./Apr. 2018); Bruce Blair & Jon Wolfsthal, Trump Can Launch Nuclear Weapons  
Whenever He Wants, with or Without Mattis, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/12/23/trump-can-launch-nuclear-weapons-whenever-he-wants 
-with-or-without-mattis [https://perma.cc/9D5B-GQTB]; Joseph Cirincione, No President Should 
Have the Absolute Authority to Launch Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2019,  
12:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/01/no-president-should-have-
absolute-authority-launch-nuclear-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/694A-WY2B]; Editorial Board, The 
President Alone Should Not Be Able to Start a Nuclear War, SCI. AM. (Apr. 2020). 
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power to structure the military still more aggressively—nor to anticipate 
Presidents pushing back with aggressive theories of Commander-in-Chief 
power. 
Beyond their immediate importance, the conclusions reached here have 
significant implications for broader separation-of-powers debates. First, 
although the Supreme Court recently suggested in Seila Law LLC v. 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau23 that “[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ 
belongs to the President alone” and that subordinate officers therefore 
“wield” authorities belonging to the President,24 this view is wrong even for 
the military, which even the Seila dissenters presumed is an area of greater 
presidential authority.25 Seila notwithstanding, Congress’s extensive 
authority to allocate military duties should put to rest the strongest versions 
of so-called “unitary” executive branch theory, under which all power vested 
in executive offices is thought to be necessarily vested in the presidency as 
well.26  
Second, the analysis highlights the importance of baseline constitutional 
understandings about office-holding to sustaining the superstructure of 
norms, expectations, and “conventions” about government behavior that 
recent scholarship has underscored as a key feature of responsive and 
accountable governance.27 Third, recognizing Congress’s authority over 
military offices should strengthen arguments that parallel legal protections 
for officers and employees in the civil service are constitutionally valid.28 
Finally, the history addressed here should refocus scholarly attention on 
Reconstruction’s importance not only to the constitutional law of civil 
liberties, but also to operative understandings of separation of powers.29 
My analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on 
constitutional debates over office-holding in general and military officers in 
particular. Among other things, Part I maps out major schools of thought 
regarding presidential authority over federal officers, explaining how the 
arguments developed here fit into those debates. Part II then addresses a first 
key question: whether Congress may assign particular duties and authorities 
to military offices other than the presidency. This Part advances the view that, 
contrary to frequent executive assertions and the undeveloped assumption of 
many scholars, Congress in fact holds extensive authority to assign 
authorities and responsibilities to particular offices, even if officers holding 
those positions are under a duty to obey lawful orders from the Commander 
 
23. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
24. Id. at 2197 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). 
25. Id. at 2233 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
26. See infra subpart IV(A). 
27. See infra subpart IV(B). 
28. See infra subpart IV(C). 
29. See infra subpart IV(D). 
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in Chief. Part III turns to removal and argues that Congress may limit 
presidential removal of military officers provided it enacts alternative means 
of command discipline. Part IV briefly addresses the four broader 
implications described earlier. The Article ends with a conclusion reflecting 
on these constitutional principles’ importance in our political moment. 
I. Background on Military Offices and Appointments 
Article II of the Constitution, as Jerry Mashaw has observed, gives 
remarkably little attention to administration.30 The Constitution, to be sure, 
establishes a single President as head of the executive branch and 
“Commander in Chief” of the military.31 It also prescribes the appointment 
process for all “Officers of the United States.”32 It says nothing explicit, 
however, about the President’s authority to remove officers and contains 
maddening ambiguities about the degree of presidential control over federal 
administration. These gaps in the text have fostered long-running debates in 
scholarship, case law, and legislative practice over the precise content of the 
President’s authority over the executive branch. 
To lay groundwork for analyzing congressional authority over military 
duties and command discipline, I begin here with a brief overview of relevant 
Article II provisions on military office-holding, the questions about duties 
and removal that these provisions generate, and the connection between these 
questions and related, more developed scholarly debates over civil and 
administrative office-holding. I then briefly address and set aside two key 
threshold issues that are much contested outside the military but relatively 
clear in this setting: which positions count as “offices” in the first place, and 
what limits Congress may place on who receives those positions. 
A. Article II’s Text and Its Ambiguities 
What does the Constitution say about military offices? To begin with, 
of course, Article II makes the President “Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when 
called into actual Service of the United States.”33 Article I, however, gives 
Congress the power to “declare War,” “raise and support Armies,” “provide 
and maintain a Navy,” and provide for calling the state militias into federal 
service.34 It also empowers Congress to “make Rules for the Government and 
 
30. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 30 (2012) (“The 
American Constitution of 1787 left a hole where administration might have been.”). 
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. § 2, cl. 1. 
32. Id. § 2, cl. 2. 
33. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
34. Id. art. I, § 8. 
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Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”35 It does the same for state militia 
forces when in federal service, except that the states retain power over “the 
Appointment of the [militia] Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”36 
More generally, the Constitution’s Appointments Clause provides that 
all “Officers of the United States” must be appointed by the President with 
Senate advice and consent, unless Congress provides by law for appointment 
of an “inferior Officer” by the President alone, the head of a department, or 
a court of law.37 In addition, Congress holds overall authority to structure the 
executive branch by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Though 
better known for granting Congress authority to enact laws “necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution” Congress’s other enumerated legislative 
powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the same authority 
with respect to “all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.”38 
On the other hand, Congress lacks the power to impeach and remove military 
officers. Although certain officers “shall be removed from office on 
impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors,” this clause applies only to “[t]he President, Vice-
President, and all civil [i.e., nonmilitary] officers of the United States.”39 
Long-running debates address Congress’s authority to structure civil 
and administrative offices under these and other related provisions.40 
Although the Constitution’s plain text says nothing at all about removal of 
executive officers through means other than impeachment, the First Congress 
debated the issue at length. It apparently concluded, in its celebrated 
“Decision of 1789,” that presidents have constitutional authority to remove 
executive officers they appoint.41 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have 
rejected requiring Senate or congressional approval for removal of an 
executive officer,42 but approved tenure protections for certain civil or 
 
35. Id. § cl. 14. 
36. Id. § cl. 16. 
37. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
38. Id. art. I, § 8. 
39. Id. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added). 
40. See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET 
THE CONSTITUTION 29–32 (2015) (discussing debates over presidential supervisory authority 
during Washington’s presidency). 
41. Id. at 30–32; see also Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1021, 1075 (2006) (arguing that members of Congress who voted for statutes creating 
executive departments in 1789 “knew that they were endorsing the President’s right to remove 
[executive] officers by virtue of his executive power”). I discuss this historical debate and its 
implications in more detail below in subsection III(A)(1)(a). 
42. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720–21 (1986); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 
(1926). 
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administrative positions.43 In its recent synthesis in Seila, which invalidated 
tenure protections for an officer charged with interpreting and enforcing 
multiple financial consumer protection statutes, the Court characterized its 
past decisions as allowing tenure protections only “for multimember expert 
agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, and . . . for inferior 
officers with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative 
authority.”44 
Apart from the question of what removal authority presidents hold, the 
question why they hold any such power at all is equally vexed. Some 
authorities, including the majority opinion in Seila,45 base this power on the 
so-called Vesting Clause, which vests “the executive power” in the 
President;46 others locate it in the Take Care Clause, which obligates the 
President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”;47 and still 
others argue that removal authority may be inferred from appointment 
authority.48  
As a rough approximation, judges and scholars who have addressed 
presidential removal authority with respect to administrative offices fall in 
three main camps. A first perspective characterizes Article II as requiring a 
“unitary” executive branch in which the President holds indefeasible power 
to remove all executive officers.49 A second view maintains that while 
presidents hold removal authority as a default, Congress may restrict or 
regulate that power by statute when doing so is functionally justified.50 
Finally, a third account maintains that Congress may impose removal 
limitations as a matter of near-plenary discretion over administrative 
 
43. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935). 
44. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–2200 (2020). 
45. Id. at 2197. 
46. E.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1840 (2006). 
47. See, e.g., MICHAEL MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING 165–66 
(2020) (advocating removal power rooted in the Take Care Clause); cf. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2228 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the Take Care Clause’s text “requires . . . enough 
authority to make sure ‘the laws [are] faithfully executed’—meaning with fidelity to the law itself, 
not to every presidential policy preference”). 
48. See, e.g., Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 233 (1839) (discussing removal power as 
incidental to appointment power). 
49. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the President’s “executive Power” entails removal authority); STEVEN G. CALABRESI & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO 
BUSH 4 (2008) (discussing the unitary executive theory); MCCONNELL, supra note 47 (advocating 
at-will removal power with respect to civil officers based on the Take Care Clause). 
50. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (upholding for-cause removal 
limitation for independent prosecutor). 
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design.51 As we shall see, parallel questions arise in the military context, but 
the arguments are less well developed, some textual theories for civil officers 
are not readily applicable, and the Commander-in-Chief Clause raises distinct 
questions.52 
A related and overlapping debate concerns Congress’s authority to vest 
particular authorities in particular executive offices other than the presidency. 
On this question, the predominant scholarly view holds that Congress may 
vest civil and administrative powers and duties in offices other than the 
President.53 Proponents of this view maintain that the Appointments Clause 
and Necessary and Proper Clause grant Congress the power to create offices 
and vest them with particular duties and authorities—duties and authorities 
that may then be exercised only by those officers, not by the President 
personally. On the other hand, proponents of a strong “unitary” executive 
branch argue that the President, as a Chief Executive endowed with 
“executive power” and obliged to ensure faithful execution of the laws, 
necessarily holds authority to control subordinate executive officers’ 
functions or even personally discharge those officers’ duties.54 Though 
 
51. See, e.g., Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2227 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Congress’s “broad 
authority to establish and organize the Executive Branch”); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S 
NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34–35 (2009) 
(“Congress may structure the agencies to prevent the President from exercising his own supervisory 
control over their policy discretion.”). 
52. See infra Part III. 
53. See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 456–59 (2006) (discussing historical support for this view); HAROLD J. 
KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 22–23, 56–57 (2005) (noting that “Congress over the past two 
centuries has delegated authority to officers independent of the president, and the president has 
never exerted close control over all law enforcement nor over administration of governmental 
policy”); MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 349–50 (advocating congressional authority to vest duties 
in civil offices as a limited qualification of unitary presidential control of the executive branch); 
SHANE, supra note 51, at 143–44 (arguing that the President is properly an “overseer” rather than 
the “decider” with respect to the federal bureaucracy); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control 
of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465 (1987) (Congress “may provide 
that the President may not substitute his judgment (or the judgment of a member of his staff) for 
that of the official to whom Congress has delegated decisionmaking power”); Robert B. Percival, 
Who’s in Charge?: Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory 
Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2490 (2011) (“If an agency head refuses to accommodate 
the President’s policy preferences, there is no constitutional problem with the President removing 
him from office. But this does not imply that the President has the authority to dictate the substance 
of agency decisions that regulatory statutes entrust to agency heads.”); Neomi Rao, Removal: 
Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1210, 1234–36 (2014) 
(“[R]emoval provides the necessary and sufficient constitutional mechanism for ensuring 
presidential control and the possibility of direction . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 1, at 698 (arguing 
that “absent actual congressional delegation of decisional authority to the President, his role is 
limited to executive oversight of the agency on which that authority is statutorily conferred”). 
54. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 49, at 4 (“All subordinate nonlegislative and 
nonjudicial officials exercise executive power, and they do so only by implicit or explicit delegation 
from the president. They are thus all subject to the president’s powers of direction and control.”); 
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significant pre-Seila case law supported the former view,55 the Seila majority 
opinion appears to embrace the latter theory. It asserts that “[t]he entire 
‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone” and characterizes 
subordinate executive officers as mere assistants to the President, “whose 
authority they wield.”56  
As with removal, precisely the same questions may arise with respect to 
military officers, but these issues have received far less attention in that 
context. Even leading proponents of congressional authority in the civil and 
administrative context have presumed that the military is different,57 and 
presidents, as noted earlier, have repeatedly claimed a plenary authority to 
reassign military duties.58 Yet the textual basis for this distinction is unclear. 
Although the President is the military’s Commander in Chief under Article II, 
the Appointments and Necessary and Proper Clauses apply by their terms to 
military offices, and Congress holds specific authority not only to raise 
armies and maintain navies, but also to enact rules for their governance. 
Resolving these questions—the degree of congressional authority to 
limit removal power and assign duties with respect to military functions—
will be the focus of this Article. Again simplifying greatly, most 
administrative law scholars embrace either the unitarian view on both 
questions (advocating an indefeasible removal power as well as a presidential 
 
SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 184–92 (2015) (arguing the President holds plenary directive authority over 
executive officers and may revise their determinations); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 598–99 (1994) (indicating 
that the President may “completely withdraw [an officer’s] authority should he feel that an officer 
is no longer exercising authority consistent with his views” and then personally “make all those 
decisions previously vested by statute in the now constitutionally disempowered officer”); Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (1994) 
(arguing that the President “necessarily has the power to nullify discretionary actions of 
subordinates”); Adam White, The D.C. Circuit’s “Trump Card” for Executive Orders, NOTICE & 
COMMENT BLOG (Mar. 13, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-d-c-circuits-trump-card-for-
executive-orders/ [https://perma.cc/QSF6-6GGG] (suggesting that executive agencies may be 
obligated to follow presidential directives). 
55. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (indicating that the President 
“may properly supervise and guide [executive officers’] construction of the statutes under which 
they act”); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm’n, 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that ex parte communications between the White House and responsible executive 
officials may be improper). See generally Strauss, supra note 1, at 708–13 (surveying case law). 
56. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). 
57. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38 (distinguishing military officers from other 
executive officers); cf. Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 323, 324 (2016) (challenging the “hard version” of unitary executive branch theory under 
which Presidents hold “plenary authorit[y], which Congress may not limit, . . . to direct how 
[administrative officials] shall exercise any and all discretionary authority that those officials 
possess under law,” but conceding that “the President enjoys such control over subordinate 
personnel who assist the President in performing specific constitutionally enumerated tasks, such as 
negotiating treaties or commanding the military”). 
58. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text; infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
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power to revise or control subordinates’ actions)59 or else the non-unitarian 
view on both (advancing the second or third view described above on 
removal while also defending congressional authority to define officers’ 
duties).60 At least one scholar maintains the intermediate position that the 
President holds indefeasible removal authority but Congress may vest 
statutory duties in particular offices.61 
With respect to the military, I will defend yet another position: Congress 
may assign powers and duties to offices, and it may also displace presidential 
removal authority, but only if it provides a robust alternative disciplinary 
mechanism for effectuating presidential command authority. In other words, 
the President, unlike in civil settings according to non-unitarian accounts, 
must have some form of directive authority over the military. But Congress 
may nevertheless vest duties in particular offices other than the presidency, 
so long as it provides either removal authority or some other robust 
disciplinary mechanism for securing compliance with lawful presidential 
directives as to how those duties are exercised. As a practical matter, these 
congressional powers may enable Congress to place the Secretary of 
Defense, other civilian officers within the chain of command, or even regular 
military officers in much the same position as the Attorney General or 
Treasury Secretary under current governing statutes: those officers may hold 
powers that only they can exercise, but the President can fire or threaten to 
fire or punish them to get his or her way. As we shall see, this constitutional 
understanding has historically enabled Congress to structure the military and 
impose procedural constraints in ways that effectively constrain presidents’ 
choices and shape policy outcomes. 
I will return later to this position’s implications for administrative law 
debates. To lay groundwork for these arguments, however, two other key 
Article II ambiguities warrant brief attention. Whereas the removal and duty 
questions have received at least an uneasy resolution in the civil and 
administrative context but remain underexplored with respect to the military, 
these next two issues have the opposite character: relative clarity with respect 
to the military despite considerable debate outside it. 
 
59. E.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 54, at 598–99. 
60. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 51, at 34–35 (advancing “pluralist” model of the executive 
branch in which “the degree of policy control the President may exercise is up to Congress, which 
is limited, in turn, only by the Constitution’s constraints on the scope of the national legislative 
authority”); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 107–08 
(2006) (“In our system, . . . while the President may sometimes exercise independent organizational 
power, it is largely Congress that decides what departments to create, how to organize those 
departments into various authorities and agencies and whether to create agencies outside of any 
department.”). 
61. MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 349–50. 
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B. Which Positions Are Offices? 
The first such question is who counts as an “officer of the United States” 
under the Appointments Clause in the first place. To be clear, this question is 
not essential to resolving the duty-assignment and removal issues addressed 
here. In principle, Congress might hold equivalent authority to assign duties 
and limit termination with respect to nonofficer employees as well. Yet the 
Supreme Court suggested in its 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board62 that removal and 
appointment questions might be linked,63 and in any event, clarifying terms 
at the outset may help avoid confusion in discussing key governing 
authorities regarding military officers. 
Under governing case law, the Supreme Court has generally considered 
a position an office if it entails both a degree of permanence—“tenure and 
duration,” as opposed to ad hoc or temporary responsibility—and some 
exercise of “significant authority under the laws of the United States.”64 As a 
matter of current practice, within administrative agencies, only the most 
senior officials—agency heads, assistant heads, deputy assistant heads, and 
the like—have typically been understood to meet these twin criteria. 
Prompted, however, by recent scholarship suggesting that the Framers 
viewed a wider range of positions as offices,65 litigants and commentators 
have begun raising challenges to existing statutory arrangements.66 In 2018, 
in Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court entered this fray but offered little 
clarification.67 Rather than adopting any new general framework for 
identifying “significant authority,” the Court in Lucia held narrowly on the 
 
62. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
63. Id. at 506 (reserving the question “whether ‘lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of 
the United States’ must be subject to the same sort of control as those who exercise ‘significant 
authority pursuant to the laws’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 & n.162 (1976) (per 
curiam)). 
64. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 
511–12 (1879), for the first requirement and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam), 
for the second). The Executive Branch has generally applied this same framework, see, for example, 
The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 
141–42 (1996), but an Office of Legal Counsel opinion during the George W. Bush Administration 
adopted a similar framework focused instead on whether the position is “continuing” and entails an 
exercise of “sovereign power.” Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the 
Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 73–74 (2007). 
65. See generally Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 443 (2018) (exploring the original public meaning of “officer”); James C. Phillips, Benjamin 
Lee & Jacob Crump, Corpus Linguistics and “Officers of the United States”, 42 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 872 (2019) (similar); Aditya Bamzai, The Attorney General and Early Appointments Clause 
Practice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1501 (2018) (addressing understanding of early attorneys 
general). 
66. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018) (addressing whether certain 
administrative law judges are “officers”). 
67. Id. at 2052. 
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facts of the case that the administrative law judges in question were officers 
under the Appointments Clause because a closely analogous precedent had 
so held.68 
In contrast to this general ferment with respect to administrative offices, 
in the military setting, statutes, executive practice, and judicial opinions all 
point to a clear, and unusually broad, understanding of who counts as an 
Appointments Clause officer. As the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel put it in a recent opinion, all “[c]ommissioned military officers are 
‘Officers of the United States’ for purposes of the Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution, and each promotion of a military officer from one grade 
level to the next is considered a separate appointment to a new office.”69 
Accordingly, within the military, the operative understanding of “officer” 
converges with ordinary usage, ensuring that all commissioned officers, from 
generals and admirals down to lieutenants and ensigns, must either be 
appointed by the President with Senate consent or else, if Congress so 
provides, by the President alone or the Secretary of Defense. Further, 
although promotion within grade is viewed as a mere change in duties and 
not a change in office, a promotion from one grade to the next requires a new 
appointment in accordance with the Appointments Clause. 
As noted, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court suggested, 
without resolving the issue, that tenure protections might be more permissible 
for employees than for Appointments Clause officers.70 To the extent that 
inference is sound (and it may well not be), the points discussed here with 
respect to military officers may bear on current debates over civil-service 
protections post-Lucia—a point I return to in Part IV.71 The key point for the 
moment is that a very broad set of officials, stretching from the upper ranks 
of the Defense Department down to nearly the most junior officers, qualify 
as Appointments Clause officers. 
C. How Are Officers Appointed? 
 Another unusual, but seemingly settled, feature of military office-
holding relates to appointment qualifications. Despite the broad definition of 
Appointments Clause “officers” with respect to the military, in practice 
 
68. Id. at 2052 (relying on Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)). 
69. Promotions of the Judge Advocates General Under Section 543 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 32 Op. O.L.C. 70, 71 (2008) (internal citations omitted); 
see also 10 U.S.C. § 531 (2018) (providing for appointment to new officer grades); Weiss v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994) (indicating that military officers must be appointed in accordance 
with the Appointments Clause); Dysart v. United States, 369 F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(same). 
70. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506 (2009) (holding 
that double-layer tenure-protection is unconstitutional for officers but might be permissible for 
employees). 
71. See infra subpart IV(C). 
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military appointments are highly regulated. Even at the highest level, statutes 
establishing military offices are rife with qualification requirements that limit 
the pool of eligible appointees. At the very top, the Secretary of Defense may 
not have served on active duty in the military within the past seven years.72 
Similar or more onerous requirements apply to Assistant Secretaries and 
other senior civilian offices.73 Requirements for regular military officers are 
often even more restrictive. By their terms, governing statutes limit 
candidates for promotion to those included on lists of qualified officers 
prepared by boards of other military officers based on their assessment of 
junior officers’ performance.74 Although presidents may remove candidates 
from the lists, in effect this statutory framework limits their choice of 
nominees to individuals recommended by other military officers.75 
The executive branch has never fully accepted these statutes. In a series 
of legal opinions, executive-branch lawyers have asserted that “Congress 
may point out the general class of individuals from which an appointment 
must be made, if made at all, but it cannot control the President’s discretion 
to the extent of compelling him to commission a designated individual.”76 In 
other words, in the executive branch’s view, “the President must retain 
sufficient discretion in selecting nominees for Executive Branch offices”; 
Congress cannot limit the choice too narrowly.77 Presidents, moreover, 
appear to have occasionally acted on this understanding by appointing 
 
72. 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2018). 
73. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 136 (2018) (requiring at least seven years in civilian life for the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness); id. § 137 (same for Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence); id. § 135 (same plus “significant budget, financial management, or audit 
experience in complex organizations” for the Defense Department Comptroller). 
74. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 611, 616–618, 624 (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 9082(a) (2018) (requiring 
appointment of the Chief of Space Operations from the general officers of the Air Force). Statutes 
of this sort stretch back to the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 21, 1864, 13 Stat. 53 
(directing that “no line officer of the navy, upon the active list, below the grade of commodore, nor 
any other naval officer, shall be promoted to a higher grade, until his mental, moral, and professional 
fitness to perform all his duties at sea shall be established to the satisfaction of a board of examining 
officers to be appointed by the President of the United States”). 
75. See 10 U.S.C. § 618(d) (2018) (allowing the President or, in some cases, the Secretary of 
Defense to remove names from lists recommended for promotion by promotion boards); id. § 624 
(providing for officers’ appointments to more senior positions from promotion lists based on 
approved promotion-board reports). 
76. Issuance of Commission in Name of Deceased Army Officer, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 254, 256 
(1911). 
77. Promotions of the Judge Advocates General Under Section 543 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 32 Op. O.L.C. 70, 75 (2008). The Executive Branch applies 
the same standard to nonmilitary appointments. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Statute Governing 
Appointment of United States Trade Representative, 20 Op. O.L.C. 279, 280 (1996) (“Any power 
in the Congress to set qualifications ‘is limited by the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment 
and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment.’” (quoting 
Civil Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 520–21 (1871))). 
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unlisted individuals.78 With these limited exceptions, however, the Executive 
Branch appears to have acquiesced to a remarkable degree to this quite 
restrictive process for making certain military appointments. Subject to some 
residual presidential discretion that remains ill-defined, Congress has 
effectively confined and professionalized the selection of individuals who 
may hold certain key positions within the military.79 
Executive acquiescence in this appointments process may, once again, 
hold implications beyond the military; I will explore this theme briefly in 
Part IV. With respect to the military itself, the most pressing questions about 
presidential control relate instead to assignment of duties and removal of 
officers. In other words, with respect to the broad set of military positions 
universally treated as “offices” and appointed through the process just 
described, what authority does Congress have either to vest particular 
authorities and responsibilities in particular offices other than the presidency, 
or to limit at-will presidential removal of individuals holding those offices? I 
will now offer sustained analysis of these two issues. 
II. Assignment of Duties 
The first key question regarding congressional authority over military 
offices is whether Congress may not only impose qualifications on officers, 
but also define the particular authorities and responsibilities that those 
officers may perform. As we have seen, the executive branch has repeatedly 
asserted that any such congressional power is nugatory. “As commander-in-
chief of the army it is your right to decide according to your own judgment 
what officer shall perform any particular duty,” Attorney General Jeremiah 
 
78. See, e.g., Promotion of Marine Officer, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 291, 293 (1956) (upholding 
President’s authority to temporarily appoint an individual outside the statutory framework for 
promotions because “the President may not be bound in his selection of an officer or group of 
officers merely because in the opinion of others they are better qualified for promotion”). Former 
President and then-future Chief Justice William Howard Taft argued in a lecture on presidential 
powers that although such promotion statutes are constitutionally valid, “[n]o court and no other 
authority . . . can compel the President to make a nomination, and the only method of preventing 
his appointing someone other than the one specified by law is for the Senate to refuse to confirm 
him, or for Congress to withhold an appropriation of his salary, or for the Comptroller of the 
Treasury to decline to draw a warrant for his salary on the ground of his ineligibility under the law.” 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 128 (1916). 
79. An Attorney General opinion from 1911 describes, and properly rejects, the still broader 
theory that Congress’s power to establish rules for the military entails power to make military 
appointments on its own. Issuance of Commission in Name of Deceased Army Officer, 29 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 254, 255–56 (1911). 
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S. Black wrote to President James Buchanan in 1860,80 and later presidents 
have nodded in agreement.81 
Commentators seem largely to have agreed as well. Even a leading 
proponent of congressional power over nonmilitary offices argues the 
military is categorically different: Although “the heads of departments the 
President appoints and the Senate confirms have the responsibility to decide 
the issues Congress has committed to their care—after appropriate 
consultation, to be sure—and not simply to obey,” “army generals” may 
simply “be commanded.”82 Similarly, a leading account of congressional 
authority over use of military force asserts in a footnote that although 
Congress may vest particular duties in military officers, this congressional 
authority may be limited to “certain internal functions apart from the conduct 
of war.”83 Some with broader theories of presidential power have embraced 
 
80. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468 (1860). 
81. See, e.g., 2018 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 4, at 4 (invoking the Black’s Attorney 
General opinion to indicate that “Presidents have asserted [the] authority [to assign military duties 
to particular personnel] since at least 1860”); Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the 
National Security Agency Described by the President, 30 Op. O.L.C. 1, 37–38 (2006) (disclosing 
white paper on surveillance activities that cites Meigs for the proposition that “an act of Congress, 
if intended to constrain the President’s discretion in assigning duties to an officer in the army, would 
be unconstitutional”); Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Act, 2004, 2 Pub. Papers 1659 (Dec. 1, 2003) (“The executive branch shall construe provisions of 
the Act that direct the Secretary of a military department to perform the Secretary’s duties through 
a particular military officer in a manner consistent with . . . the constitutional authority of the 
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief.”); Statement on 
Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1 Pub. Papers 226 (Feb. 10, 
1996) (“[T]he Congress deleted the restriction on the President’s authority to make and implement 
decisions relating to the operational or tactical control of elements of the U.S. armed forces, a 
restriction which clearly infringed on the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in 
Chief.”); Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 184 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of this authority in other contexts, 
there can be no room to doubt that the Commander-in-Chief Clause commits to the President alone 
the power to select the particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and operational control over 
U.S. forces.”); Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 
61–62 (1941) (observing that the President’s “authority” as Commander in Chief “undoubtedly 
includes the power to dispose of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to 
promote the safety of the country”); see also 2020 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 21, at 3 (“The 
President’s constitutional authority to deploy personnel and materiel cannot be conditioned . . . on 
certifications or waivers made by subordinate Executive Branch officials.”); Acquisition of Naval 
and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 490 (1940) (calling it 
“of questionable constitutionality” to “prohibit action by the constitutionally created Commander 
in Chief except upon authorization of a statutory officer subordinate in rank,” but ultimately finding 
it “unnecessary” to resolve this issue). 
82. Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38. 
83. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief Clause at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 986–87 n.164 (2008); see also id. at 1102–
06 (discussing presidential command authority and suggesting that “[t]he ‘independence’ that is 
permissible in [certain] areas [of civil administration] . . . might be constitutionally dubious with 
respect to similarly consequential positions of authority in the military establishment”). More 
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Buchanan’s view explicitly. Professor John Yoo, for example, argues that 
“[e]ven if inferior officers refused to carry out presidential orders, the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause would seem to include the power to promote or 
demote officers and to make duty assignments.”84 
This view is mistaken. Presuming that the President can personally 
discharge all military duties or reassign them at will is at odds not only with 
the constitutional text and structure, but also with both contemporary and 
historical practice. Instead, the text and history support broad congressional 
power to vest military duties and authorities in offices, even if presidents, to 
a greater degree than in civil administration, must have some means of 
removing or disciplining officers who defy presidential directives. 
This conclusion may matter. Outside the military, scholars have 
recognized that “[f]iring [an officer to get the President’s way] typically has 
much higher political cost to the President than (successfully) directing an 
official’s exercise of discretion.”85 In consequence, legal understandings of 
where powers are legally vested “likely influences the relative bargaining 
positions of the [officer] and the President.”86 Similar benefits could flow 
from vesting military functions in particular offices, even if the President 
ultimately holds authority to direct officers to exercise those authorities in a 
particular way. Indeed, in keeping with that assumption, Congress in recent 
years has adopted several measures vesting key authorities, most notably 
authority over certain cyber operations and withdrawals from South Korea, 
in the Secretary of Defense, or in the Secretary in combination with the 
President, rather than the President alone.87 Some have proposed measures to 
 
generally, these authors indicate that the President’s Commander-in-Chief title “suggests that, at 
least with respect to certain functions, Congress may not (by statute or otherwise) delegate the 
ultimate command of the army and navy (or of the militia when in the service of the national 
government) to anyone other than the President,” but they acknowledge that “the full extent of this 
preclusive prerogative of superintendence remains uncertain.” Barron & Lederman, supra note 1, 
at 769; cf. Mark Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 482 (2015) (arguing that the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority 
likely includes power to form a “functional combatant command” to address climate change). 
84. Yoo, supra note 1, at 2280 (calling these powers “central components of a president’s ability 
to decide on strategy and tactics and ensure that the officers who are in place will carry them out”); 
cf. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 253 (2007) (“[T]he 
commander-in-chief clause shows that Congress cannot assign ultimate command responsibilities 
to someone other than the President . . . .”); John Harrison, The Executive Power 19  
(June 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398427 (“The Commander in 
Chief Clause . . . excludes . . . independent discretion in lower-level commanders.”). 
85. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 263, 295 (2006). 
86. Id. 
87. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-
232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132 (2018) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394 note); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-29, § 1254, 133 Stat. 1198, 1671–72 
(2019). 
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limit unilateral presidential responsibility for nuclear weapons launches,88 
and other more mundane proposals and enactments govern assignment of 
forces to particular ships, units, or commands.89 Whatever the wisdom of 
such constraints—a point I return to below90—they all raise directly the 
constitutional question considered here. 
I will defend Congress’s authority to enact such statutes first as a matter 
of constitutional text, structure, and contemporary practice and then as a 
matter of historical tradition. I will close this Part by reflecting on some key 
implications of this view. 
A. Text, Structure, and Current Practice 
1. Congressional Authority Over Nonmilitary Duties.—Let me begin with 
the general argument for congressional authority to allocate and define 
nonmilitary officers’ powers. Although Seila’s reasoning casts doubt on this 
understanding, the prevailing scholarly view, supported by substantial pre-
Seila case law, holds that the President is ultimately an “overseer” and not a 
“decider,” in Peter Strauss’s memorable formulation, with respect to powers 
vested in civil and administrative offices.91 In other words, although the 
President may oversee how other officers discharge their responsibilities, and 
perhaps remove them from office if their performance is unsatisfactory, 
authorities vested by statute in a particular officer ultimately belong to that 
officer, not the President.92 On this view, Congress holds authority not only 
to create offices as the Appointments Clause contemplates, but also, by virtue 
of that power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to vest those offices with 
particular functions and duties that then belong to the individual officer, not 
the President. 
Article II’s text reinforces this conclusion in two places. First, by 
empowering the President to seek “the Opinion, in writing, of the principal 
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to 
the Duties of their respective Offices,” the Opinions Clause implies that 
“duties” may belong to other “officers,” even if those officers are subject to 
presidential supervision.93 Second, by requiring the President to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” the Take Care Clause implies that 
officials other than the President may sometimes be doing the executing.94 
 
88. See supra note 22. 
89. See 2018 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing provisions to that effect). 
90. See infra subpart II(C). 
91. Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38. For discussion of competing views on removal, see supra 
subpart I(A). 
92. Strauss, supra note 1, at 737–38. 
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Strauss, supra note 1, at 702–03. 
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3; Strauss, supra note 1, at 703. 
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Seila notwithstanding, and despite one early Attorney General opinion 
to the contrary,95 substantial practice and precedent support this 
understanding.96 On some accounts, as noted, this view of congressional 
authority over duty assignment further supports congressional power to limit 
presidential direction and supervision.97 But even when the President may 
remove the officer in question at will, Congress’s power to vest duties in 
offices serves important practical purposes.  
In particular, to the extent they hold authority to remove officers and 
replace them with someone more pliable, Presidents may ultimately be able 
to get their way. But needing to remove an officer to do so raises the political 
stakes, enabling what I have called the “fire alarm function” of office-
holding.98 If the officer believes the action the President seeks would be 
unlawful or profoundly unwise—as, for example, when President Andrew 
Jackson sought to require removal of treasury funds from the Bank of the 
United States, or when President Richard Nixon demanded termination of a 
special prosecutor—the officer may resign or force his or her own 
termination, thereby elevating the issue’s political salience and bringing 
maximum scrutiny and pressure to bear on the President.99 The simple 
expedient of vesting authorities in a particular office other than the 
presidency may thus enable political enforcement of legal requirements and 
conventional understandings that surround particular government functions. 
Insofar as the position requires Senate confirmation, furthermore, the 
appointment process may ensure that only people with particular skills or a 
particular outlook and proven sense of responsibility discharge the authorities 
of particular offices, such as the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, 
or Environmental Protection Agency Administrator. 
2. The Theory Extended to Military Duties.—Could this same constraint 
on presidents extend to military functions? For the most part, yes. Contrary 
to scholarship and executive branch assertions suggesting otherwise, there is 
no compelling textual, structural, or historical reason to distinguish military 
 
95. See Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–71 
(1855) (“[N]o Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act against the will of the 
President . . . .”). But see The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (1823) 
(“[I]t could never have been the intention of the constitution . . . that he should in person execute 
the laws himself.”). 
96. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 705–15 (collecting precedents and examples). 
97. See, e.g., id. at 710–11 (discussing precedent supporting this view). 
98. Zachary Price, The Fire Alarm Function of Office-Holding, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 19, 
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-fire-alarm-function-of-office-holding [https://perma.cc
/45QJ-9QN3]. 
99. See, e.g., MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 349 (arguing that firing certain officials may carry 
a high political cost); Stack, supra note 85, at 295–96 (“President Nixon’s efforts to remove 
Archibald Cox as special prosecutor made apparent the political costs of firing an officer that refuses 
to heed the President’s policies.”). 
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offices from other positions when it comes to statutory assignment of duties 
and functions. Indeed, if anything, the case for such congressional authority 
with respect to the military is stronger. Congress, if it chose, could vest 
control over nuclear weapons, or offensive cyber capabilities, or a particular 
component of the Army, Navy, or Air Force in a particular officer who could 
then be subject to removal, and perhaps other forms of command 
discipline,100 for disobeying presidential directives but who would ultimately 
be personally responsible for discharging the function in question. 
Why? To begin with, the language governing office-holding in the 
Appointments Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause makes no distinction 
between military and nonmilitary offices. Both types of positions must be 
“established by Law” under the Appointments Clause,101 and in both cases, 
Congress holds authority to enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.”102 To the extent these provisions give Congress authority to 
define civil officers’ functions and the organizational hierarchy within which 
they operate, Congress holds precisely the same authority with respect to the 
military. 
In fact, even if one doubted Congress’s power to allocate statutory 
authorities with respect to civil and administrative officers, as the Supreme 
Court appeared to in Seila,103 Congress’s specific constitutional powers with 
respect to the military provide a still stronger warrant for inferring such 
congressional power in that context. Congress, again, holds specific 
constitutional authority to “raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain 
a Navy,” and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces.”104 Assigning duties and responsibilities within the military 
chain of command may be a potent means of governing and regulating the 
military; indeed, as we shall see, it is one that Congress has routinely 
employed as a means of shaping and controlling the nation’s armed forces.  
As a matter of plain text, furthermore, a provision assigning some 
responsibility or command to a particular office can readily be described as 
a “Rule[]” regarding the military’s “Government,” if not also its 
“Regulation,” even if this constitutional language might more immediately 
call to mind legislation prescribing a military code of conduct and procedures 
for military justice. For that matter, such a provision might also be 
characterized as a valid condition that Congress has imposed on the army or 
 
100. See infra Part III. 
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
103. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207 (2020). 
104. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12–14. 
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navy it has raised or provided. At any rate, in cases implicating these 
provisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized the breadth of Congress’s 
authority. “It is clear,” the Court has ruled, “that the Constitution 
contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, 
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military 
Establishment . . . .”105 Indeed, in a recent case, the Court upheld a statutory 
bar on military officers exercising certain civil governmental functions.106 
Far from indicating any constitutional difficulty, the Court characterized this 
provision as validly “designed to ensure civilian preeminence in 
government.”107 
On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief Clause’s language might 
suggest a stronger directive power with respect to the military than the Take 
Care Clause provides for the civil service. The Take Care Clause, after all, 
obligates the President only to “take Care” that the laws are executed 
faithfully, whereas being Commander in Chief implies some power to issue 
affirmative commands. This distinction, however, relates to removal and 
other means of discipline—the question I address in Part III—and perhaps 
also to the strength of any presumption that officers are duty-bound to follow 
presidential directives in exercising statutory authorities. It does not affect 
Congress’s power to assign duties in the first place. As to that question, the 
Take Care and Commander-in-Chief Clauses are parallel: both suggest that 
primary government power will at least sometimes be exercised by others. In 
other words, much as the obligation to ensure faithful execution implies that 
someone else may do the executing, serving as commander in chief implies 
having some military force to command. 
The framers at the Philadelphia Convention in fact debated whether the 
President should even be allowed to exercise direct command over troops in 
the field.108 Although President Washington did so during the Whiskey 
Rebellion,109 the norm across American history has been to command troops 
 
105. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983); see, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 
U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“[W]e give Congress the highest deference in ordering military affairs.”); 
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (holding that “[t]he Framers expressly entrusted . . . to 
Congress” the task of balancing the rights of servicemembers against the “overriding demands of 
discipline and duty”); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 78–79 (1857) (deriving Congress’s “power to 
provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses” from its constitutional 
authorities over the military). 
106. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2181–82 (2018) (addressing 10 U.S.C. 
§ 973(b)(2)(A)). 
107. Id. at 2172. For discussion of this statutory “civil office ban,” see generally Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Military Officers and the Civil Office Ban, 93 IND. L. J. 241 (2018). 
108. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 1, at 787 (“[T]here were some delegates who wished 
to restrict the President from commanding the army and navy in person, as the New Jersey Plan had 
prescribed, but that proposal failed.”). 
109. PRAKASH, supra note 54, at 160. Presidents Madison and Lincoln apparently considered 
leading armies in the field but decided against it. BARRON, supra note 13, at 93, 151. 
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only indirectly, through orders to subordinate commanders in the field—a 
practice that reinforces the institutional separation between presidential 
command and actual military activity that the text itself implies.110 The 
Federalist Papers, likewise, emphasized only that the President would be the 
military’s overall commander. Stressing that the President would be “in 
substance much inferior to” the British King with respect to military powers, 
the Federalist No. 69 observed that the American President’s Commander-
in-Chief power “would amount to nothing more than the supreme command 
and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of 
the Confederacy.”111 
Apart from the Commander-in-Chief Clause, another possible basis for 
inferring plenary presidential authority over military duties is the Vesting 
Clause. A favorite empty vessel for proponents of broad presidential 
authority, this clause grants “[t]he executive Power” to the President.112 But 
even if the clause carries substantive import, as opposed to serving as a mere 
placeholder for more specific grants of power in Article II, there is no reason 
to think it confers preclusive authority to personally exercise military powers 
vested specifically in other offices. For one thing, some recent scholarship 
suggests the framers would have understood the term “executive power” to 
refer exclusively to an authority to execute the law, a meaning with no 
relevance to military command.113 If correct, this view would suggest that 
unitarian arguments for personal presidential authority over civil or 
administrative authorities need not carry over to the military; only civil 
administration involves “executive power” in the plain sense of executing 
federal law. 
But even if this interpretation of the Vesting Clause is wrong and the 
term “executive power” carries broader meaning, as indeed some early 
authority regarding foreign affairs suggests,114 the Commander-in-Chief 
 
110. See, e.g., 2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
HISTORY, APPLICATION, AND CONSTRUCTION 919 (1910) (arguing that if the President “should 
undertake to command the military and naval forces of the government in time of war, he would be 
exercising a power which would necessarily prevent him from executing important duties required 
of him by the Constitution”). 
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 347, 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see 
also John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 
83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 614–16 (2011) (emphasizing the breadth of Congress’s regulatory authority 
over the military as reflected in early practice and the original understanding). 
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
113. Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1173–74 (2019). 
114. See Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1792) (Alexander Hamilton) (suggesting that the President 
had the power to issue the Proclamation of Neutrality); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas 
Jefferson (Apr. 24, 1790), in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 343 (Dorothy Twohig et al. 
eds., 1996) (referencing the Vesting Clause and observing that “[t]he transaction of business with 
foreign nations is Executive altogether”). 
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Clause more specifically indicates the relationship between the President and 
the military, and the power conferred by that clause is, again, a power to issue 
commands, not a power to personally discharge other officers’ duties or 
reallocate at will what officers will perform them. Congress, furthermore, 
even apart from its general authority over the executive branch under the 
Appointments and Necessary and Proper Clauses, holds specific authority to 
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces”—an authority that, once again, suggests still broader authority to 
structure the military than Congress holds with respect to the civil service. 
3. Contemporary Statutes.—Further support for congressional authority 
over allocation of military duties may be found in current statutes. Executive 
branch bluster notwithstanding, the military establishment’s actual governing 
architecture is replete with provisions assigning particular functions to 
particular offices. To give just a few examples, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is the “principal military adviser” to the President and certain 
cabinet secretaries, but is barred by law from “exercis[ing] military command 
over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces”;115 the Army’s Judge 
Advocate General is “the legal adviser of the Secretary of the Army and of 
all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army” and “shall direct 
the members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the performance of 
their duties”;116 the commander of the unified special operations command is 
responsible for various functions involving special operations forces;117 the 
commanders of other unified combatant commands hold authority over 
certain forces and missions assigned to them by the President;118 the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence holds responsibility, subject to the 
Secretary of Defense’s direction, for certain intelligence functions and 
operations;119 and the brand new Chief of Space Operations prepares certain 
plans and supervises certain forces, subject to the Air Force Secretary’s 
direction.120 
The Commander-in-Chief Clause might well support presuming that 
these officers, perhaps unlike their counterparts in civil administration, are 
duty-bound to follow presidential directives in carrying out their duties, or 
else accept removal or other discipline for failing to do so. But even so, these 
statutes carry no implication that the president holds plenary constitutional 
authority to personally discharge the functions in question or reallocate 
military responsibilities at will. On the contrary, all these statutes presume 
 
115. 10 U.S.C. § 151(b)(1), 152(c) (2018). 
116. 10 U.S.C. § 7037(c)(1)–(2) (2018). 
117. 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2018). 
118. 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2018). 
119. 10 U.S.C. § 137 (2018). 
120. 10 U.S.C. § 9082(c) (2018). 
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that when the Senate confirms individuals for particular offices, those 
individuals (or validly appointed substitutes) will perform those 
responsibilities and not others. 
In the statutes themselves, to be sure, Congress has often provided a 
degree of flexibility. In general, for example, the Secretary of Defense holds 
broad authority to assign duties and responsibilities within the department (as 
do commanders and service secretaries within their commands and 
services).121 But these statutes also impose limits. For example, except when 
the President considers it “necessary because of hostilities or an imminent 
threat of hostilities,” the Secretary of Defense may not “substantially 
transfer[], reassign[], consolidate[], or abolish[]” any “function, power, or 
duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency 
thereof, by law”—and even when the President orders a more significant 
reassignment or consolidation, the change lasts only until the emergency 
justifying it has passed.122 This statute would make no sense if Congress 
lacked power to prescribe duties and functions with respect to the military; 
the statute’s implicit constitutional theory is that Congress may calibrate by 
law the degree of flexibility in reallocating assigned military duties and 
authorities. Indeed, even statutes granting flexibility to the President, 
Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials negatively imply that 
Congress could withhold such flexibility if it wished. 
Governing statutes also often specify that functions should be performed 
subject to direction from the President, the Defense Secretary, or some other 
senior officer, a pattern that might suggest congressional support for broad 
presidential prerogatives of command.123 As Kevin Stack has argued with 
respect to administrative statutes, however, the “longstanding and active 
congressional practice of granting authority to officials expressly subject to 
the control of the President” may suggest, by negative inference, that duties 
vested without such qualifications belong to the particular officer alone, even 
if that officer is subject to removal for disobedience.124 Even if the same 
negative inference does not apply with equal force in the military context 
given the Commander-in-Chief Clause, it at least undercuts any suggestion 
 
121. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2018) (“Unless specifically prohibited by law, the Secretary 
may, without being relieved of his responsibility, perform any of his functions or duties, or exercise 
any of his powers through, or with the aid of, such persons in, or organizations of, the Department 
of Defense as he may designate.”). 
122. 10 U.S.C. § 125 (2018). 
123. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 125(b) (2018) (“[I]f the President determines it to be necessary 
because of hostilities or an imminent threat of hostilities, any function, power, or duty vested by 
law in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, including one assigned 
to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by section 7062(b), 8062, 8063, or 9062(c) of this 
title, may be transferred, reassigned, or consolidated.”); id. § 162(b) (specifying the chain of 
command for combatant commands “[u]nless otherwise directed by the President”). 
124. Stack, supra note 85, at 268, 284. 
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that Congress’s specification of directive power in some statutes reflects an 
assumption that presidents necessarily hold authority to exercise all military 
powers vested in other offices.125 
As a matter of fact, in at least a few places, Congress has gone so far as 
to specifically preclude command discipline, thus effectively insulating 
officers performing certain specified functions from any directive control. 
Officers serving on courts-martial, for example, are specifically protected 
from command influence or retaliation,126 and the Judge Advocates General 
are protected from any interference with their authority to provide 
independent legal advice.127 Likewise, judges on the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, a non-Article III court that reviews court-martial rulings, are 
removable only for cause during their fifteen-year terms.128 In a recent 
statute, Congress even restricted considerably the convening officer’s 
authority to alter or override a court-martial’s conviction and sentence.129 
These changes effectively vest exclusive authority over certain military–
justice functions in the particular officers serving as jurors or judges on a 
given court-martial. 
These examples may well reflect a particular concern, rooted in due 
process, to afford a neutral decision-maker in military tribunals.130 But 
Congress has also guaranteed independence with respect to at least one 
function with concrete effects on military performance: service on the 
promotion boards that effectively determine who occupies the military’s 
higher ranks.131 In addition, as noted, one provision addressed in a recent 
Supreme Court decision specifically precludes many military officers from 
“hold[ing], or exercis[ing] the functions of, [certain] civil office[s] in the 
Government of the United States.”132 At the level of senior civilian 
leadership, furthermore, Rebecca Ingber has recently highlighted that 
Congress quite frequently rejigs procedures, command relationships, and 
 
125. Some of Stack’s examples from the early Republic in fact involve the military. See id. at 
278 (discussing 1789 statute vesting authority in the Secretary of the Navy but requiring the 
Secretary to execute the President’s orders). 
126. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2018). 
127. 10 U.S.C. § 7037 (2018). 
128. 10 U.S.C. § 942 (2018). 
129. Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5322, 130 Stat. 2894, 2925 (2016); 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 133-66, § 1702(b), 127 Stat. 
672, 956–57 (2013). See generally 1 DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 17-9 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the effect of the Military Justice Act 
of 2016 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 on the ability of the 
convening authority to set aside findings and sentences). 
130. The Court in Free Enterprise Fund suggested that removal limitations may be particularly 
appropriate for officers with adjudicative functions. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010). 
131. 10 U.S.C. § 616(f) (2018). 
132. 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) (2018); Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2018). 
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even allocation of duties within the country’s national security apparatus as 
a backdoor means of shaping policy outcomes.133 Again, one recent provision 
goes so far as to vest authority over certain cyber operations jointly in the 
President and Secretary of Defense, rather than the President alone;134 
another requires certain certifications from the Secretary of Defense before 
the President may withdraw forces from South Korea.135 Such provisions 
would be meaningless if presidents could simply assume and redelegate 
duties within the military command structure as they saw fit. 
B. Historical Debates 
History adds still more support for congressional authority to vest 
military duties in particular offices. Without attempting any comprehensive 
account, briefly considering several salient episodes across time highlights 
both the extent of debate over these questions and the ultimate weakness of 
the executive branch’s current stated view. To the extent historical practice 
illuminates constitutional meaning, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
assumed it does,136 this history reinforces textual, functional, and originalist 
arguments for congressional authority to assign military duties to particular 
offices. 
1. Early Statutes and Practice.—To begin with, some of the earliest 
military-organization statutes specified that senior officials held particular 
authorities but exercised them subject to presidential direction. A 1798 
statute, for example, established the office of Secretary of the Navy and 
specified that the Secretary’s “duty . . . shall be to execute such orders as he 
shall receive from the President of the United States, relative to the 
procurement of naval stores and materials and the construction, armament, 
equipment and employment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters 
connected with the naval establishment of the United States.”137 The same 
statute, moreover, specifically transferred these authorities from the 
previously created office of Secretary of War to the newly created position 
of Secretary of the Navy, making clear that the Secretary of War could no 
 
133. See generally Ingber, supra note 19, at 399 (discussing Congress’s frequent 
“restructur[ing] [of] the decision-making process inside the executive branch in order to preference 
decision makers and processes more likely to favor their preferred outcomes”). 
134. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 
115-232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132, 2132 (2018) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394 note). 
135. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1254, 133 
Stat. 1198, 1671–72 (2019). 
136. E.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015); NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014). 
137. Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, § 1, 1 Stat. 553, 553. 
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longer exercise them.138 This statute’s sharp division between Army and 
Navy commands would persist, with only limited interruptions—and 
important institutional consequences139—until 1947.140 Other early statutes 
referred, albeit obliquely, to top military officers in the Army and Navy 
serving as “commander in chief” with respect to particular operations.141 
Provisions for presidential control in these and other statutes might be 
understood to endorse a broad view of presidential control over military 
functions. As with modern statutes, however, the very specification of 
presidential directive power in these provisions more naturally implies 
congressional authority to withhold or modify, or at least regulate, such 
power if Congress so desired.142 Indeed, Congress’s specification of such 
authority in the 1798 statute seems especially telling, given that Congress 
extensively debated presidential removal authority less than a decade 
earlier—and ultimately used indirect language to indicate that the President 
held removal authority by virtue of Article II rather than congressional 
grace.143 
Early statutes also vested particular duties in particular subordinate 
offices; an 1813 law, for example, assigned certain duties relating to military 
supplies to a “superintendent general of military supplies,” appointed by the 
President with Senate approval, who would act “under the direction of the 
Secretary for the War department.”144 At the very least, such duty 
assignments and the repeated clarifications and revisions in early statutes—
transferring powers from the Secretary of War to the Navy Secretary,145 for 
example, and specifying ranks and authorities within both the Army and 
Navy146—provide strong historical support for Congress’s authority to define 
the authorities and relationships of offices within the military under the 
 
138. Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 554 (repealing “so much of” a prior statute creating the department of 
war “as vests any of the powers contemplated by the provisions of this act, in the Secretary for the 
department of War”). 
139. JAMES R. LOCHER III, VICTORY ON THE POTOMAC: THE GOLDWATER–NICHOLS ACT 
UNIFIES THE PENTAGON 16–19 (2004). 
140. See infra section II(B)(7). 
141. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, §§ 6, 11, 1 Stat. 709, 715–17 (discussing share of 
prize money owed to “any commander in chief” in the event of a naval capture); Act of Mar. 3, 
1797, ch. 16, § 4, 1 Stat. 507, 508 (providing double rations to the brigadier general “while 
commander in chief”). 
142. See Stack, supra note 85, at 268, 284 (arguing that statutes expressly conferring 
presidential directive authority “support the negative inference that when Congress simply delegates 
to an agency, without conditioning the delegation on the President’s approval, the statute denies the 
President directive authority”). 
143. See infra subsection III(A)(1)(a). 
144. Act of Mar. 3, 1813, ch. 47, §§ 2, 3, 5, 2 Stat. 816, 816, 817 (codified at 1 Rev. Stat. § 219 
(2d ed. 1875)). 
145. Act of Apr. 30, 1789, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553. 
146. E.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119 (repealed 1795). 
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Appointments and Necessary and Proper Clauses, just as it does for 
nonmilitary administration.147 
For its part, the Executive Branch early on seems also to have accepted 
Congress’s authority to structure the military by defining officers’ duties. An 
1815 report to Congress from Secretary of War James Monroe appeared to 
consider it beyond doubt that “a provision for . . . actual command is an 
object of legislative regulation,” whereas “the selection of the person to 
whom [the command is] committed” is a matter of “executive discretion.”148 
In 1820, an Attorney General opinion by William Wirt observed that the 
President, as Commander in Chief, “may suspend, modify, or rescind, at 
pleasure, any order issued by the lieutenant-colonel of the marine corps, or 
any other subordinate officer.”149 Yet he went on to recognize an exception 
to this rule “where a direct authority has been given by Congress to an officer 
to perform any particular function—for example, for a commanding officer 
to order courts-martial in certain cases.”150 This opinion further concluded 
that because the Marine Corps was a component of the Navy, the Navy 
Secretary could issue orders to it, unless in a particular operation the 
President chose to relay his own orders to Marine officers through the War 
Department.151 
In 1822, another Attorney General opinion observed that the President 
could determine “what should constitute a brigade, or what should be a 
command according to brevet rank,” but only “[i]n the silence of the law.”152 
A third opinion in 1829 likewise observed that the President could “designate 
posts or stations among which the army should be distributed,” but “if 
Congress thought proper to assume the power, and expressly to specify a 
certain number of military stations for the peace establishment, inhibiting 
their increase or diminution, . . . the authority of the President would be 
superseded.”153 
An episode two decades later suggests that these constraints remained 
real and powerful throughout the antebellum period. Though disgruntled with 
his top general, Winfield Scott, during the Mexican–American War, 
President James K. Polk apparently considered himself powerless to displace 
 
147. See PRAKASH, supra note 54, at 162, 166 (explaining that “Americans [in the early 
Republic] were quite familiar with the idea that there could be multiple commanders in chief in a 
single branch of the military,” each of which “enjoyed circumscribed military authority”). 
148. JAMES MONROE, RELATIVE POWERS OF THE GENERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS OVER 
THE MILITIA, S. REP. NO. 13-142 (1815), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 604, 605–07 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1832). 
149. Power of the Secretary of the Navy Over the Marine Corps, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 380, 381 
(1820). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 382. 
152. Brevet Pay of General Macomb, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 547, 548 (1822). 
153. Brevets’ Pay and Rations, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 223, 232 (1829). 
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Scott without authority from Congress to appoint a different general in a 
superior grade.154 Scott, Polk complained in his diary in 1847, “acted with so 
little discretion since he assumed the command” that certain confidential 
plans were revealed; “[h]is vanity [was] such that he could not keep the most 
important secrets of the Government which were given to him”; and he was 
“wasting himself in most extravagant preparations, and . . . making such a 
parade before the public in all he does that there is danger that the objects of 
the campaign may be entirely defeated.”155  
Polk accordingly asked Congress to authorize appointment of a 
Lieutenant General with overall command of army forces. “An efficient 
organization of the army,” Polk argued in a message to Congress, “would 
require the appointment of a general officer to take command of all our 
military forces in the field.”156 Yet Congress, following heated debates, 
rejected the proposal.157 Polk then felt his hands were tied. “I have asked 
 
154. See CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 
126 (1921) (discussing this episode as evidence that “no officer can be appointed by the President 
until Congress has created the grade and made provision for it”). 
155. Diary Entry of James K. Polk (Feb. 27, 1847), in 2 THE DIARY OF JAMES K. POLK 393–
94 (Milo Milton Quaife ed., 1910). 
156. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (Jan. 4, 1847) (message to Congress from 
President Polk). 
157. 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
MILITARY HISTORY 638–39 (Dr. Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2013). In congressional debates, 
Representatives and Senators took slightly different views regarding the extent of Polk’s existing 
authority to determine command precedence. One proponent of the Lieutenant General proposal 
argued that the President was bound to give seniority to the existing Major General with the earliest 
date of commission (apparently Scott)—an outcome this Senator considered “exceedingly 
undesirable” given the “numerous forces as are now to be combined, and in such extensive 
operations as are to be carried on.” CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1847) (statement of 
Sen. Dix) (“At least four of these generals [in the field] have the same rank, that of major general, 
the highest rank in the service; and precedence among them in their respective arms is, therefore, to 
be determined by their date of commission.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 
(1847) (statement of Rep. Jacob Thompson) (“The very composition of the army seems to me to 
suggest the propriety of the appointment of a leader to direct the movements of the different 
divisions and brigades . . . .”). An opponent (who supported an alternative proposal) suggested Polk 
could give a different general precedence only by withdrawing others from the campaign. CONG. 
GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 522 (1847) (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis) (“He may designate any 
one of these major generals, by brevet or otherwise, to act as commander-in-chief of our army in 
the field in Mexico. But, in order to do so, he must withdraw from the service those who now outrank 
him.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1847) (statement of Sen. Badger) (“The 
President of the United States may assign to the present major general commanding our army the 
whole control, under him, of all the operations of this war . . . [or] may confine the present senior 
major general of the army to a particular district, to a narrow command, or to a small body of 
troops . . . .”). By contrast, one Representative suggested that an existing statute gave the President 
flexibility to designate commanders for particular campaigns from among the existing officer corps, 
though he conceded that he did “not know that [such a designation] ha[d] ever been done” and that 
“it is considered by some that there is ambiguity upon this subject, and the practice of the country 
has been otherwise.” CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1847) (statement of Rep. Sims). The 
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Congress for authority to select a commander in whom I have confidence,” 
Polk wrote in his diary, “and some weeks ago they refused it.”158 Polk thus 
complained to posterity: “My situation is most embarrassing. I am held 
responsible for the War, and yet I am required to entrust the chief command 
of the army to a Gen’l in whom I have no confidence.”159 
2. Captain Meigs and the Washington Aqueduct.—Perhaps because this 
early practice appears unsupportive, the urtext for plenary presidential 
authority over military duties is instead an 1860 Attorney General opinion 
regarding Captain M.C. Meigs and his work on the Washington, D.C., 
aqueduct.160  
A self-confident and ambitious officer who went on to serve as Union 
army quartermaster during the Civil War, Meigs had been overseeing the 
aqueduct project since 1853.161 He came into conflict, however, with 
President Buchanan’s Secretary of War over the latter’s political favoritism 
in awarding contracts.162 To forestall termination of the aqueduct project, 
Meigs personally (and insubordinately) lobbied congressional allies for 
funding. Congress obliged by including provisions in an appropriations 
statute that not only provided $500,000 for the aqueduct but also required 
that it be completed according to Meigs’s plans and under his supervision.163 
Indeed, although an initial version of this legislation would have 
accomplished its goal obliquely by requiring that “the Chief Engineer of the 
Washington Aqueduct . . . shall be as heretofore an officer of the corps of 
Engineers not below the rank of Captain and having experience in the design 
and construction of Bridges & aqueducts,”164 the final version brazenly 
referred to Meigs by name. It required that the appropriated funds were “to 
 
debate did not suggest, however, that the President could simply designate a preferred commander 
without regard to rank or existing statutory restraints. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 
526 (1847) (statement of Rep. Schenk) (responding to Rep. Sims’s argument by stating, “Had 
[Congress] no right to say whether the army should be placed under such an officer as was now 
proposed, or should be left as it was! He thought they had, and he desired the army to remain as it 
was”). 
158. Diary Entry of James K. Polk, supra note 155, at 394. 
159. Id. A recent history of the war observes that “Polk’s choice of Scott to command the 
campaign was driven mostly by the desire to prevent Whig and potential presidential candidate 
[General Zachary] Taylor from gathering even more laurels.” PETER GUARDINO, THE DEAD 
MARCH: A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR 293 (2017). 
160. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860). 
161. HARRY C. WAYS, THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT 10 (1996). 
162. Id. at 35–37; RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNION ARMY: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF M.C. MEIGS 101 (1959). 
163. WAYS, supra note 161, at 37; WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 103. 
164. WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 103. 
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be expended according to the plans and estimates of Captain Meigs, and 
under his supervision.”165 
In a statement to Congress, President Buchanan objected to this 
provision. Buchanan explained that he would consider it precatory because 
he “deemed it impossible that Congress could have intended to interfere with 
the clear right of the President to command the Army and order its officers 
to any duty he might deem most expedient for the public interest.”166 His 
Attorney General issued an opinion to similar effect. “As commander-in-
chief of the army,” Attorney General J.S. Black opined, “it is your right to 
decide according to your own judgment what officer shall perform any 
particular duty, and as the supreme executive magistrate you have power of 
appointment.”167 In accordance with its view of the proviso, the 
administration initially appointed a different officer to serve as chief 
engineer, retaining Meigs only as the aqueduct’s disbursing officer and 
charging him with “keep[ing] such general supervision of the works as to 
assure himself that they are being constructed according [his] plans and 
estimates.”168 After Meigs disobeyed orders to approve certain payments, 
however, the Secretary of War ordered Meigs to leave Washington and 
assume command of a fort in Florida.169 Meigs nevertheless had the last 
laugh. Within four and a half months, following replacement of the Secretary 
of War and Attorney General, Meigs was ordered back to Washington to 
resume control of the project.170 
This rather odd episode from an undistinguished administration has 
taken on an improbable precedential importance in later executive-branch 
imaginings. The Trump Administration, for example, recently cited the 
Meigs signing statement and Attorney General opinion in a letter asserting 
that Congress lacks authority to prevent reduction in personnel levels for 
certain ships.171 The Clinton Administration similarly relied heavily on the 
Meigs precedent to conclude that Congress could not forbid placing U.S. 
forces under U.N. command.172 
 
165. WAYS, supra note 161, at 37. 
166. James Buchanan, Statement to the House (June 26, 1860), in 7 COMPILATION OF 
MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3128–29 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897). 
167. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468 (1860). 
168. Id. at 464. 
169. WAYS, supra note 161, at 39; WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 105, 107–09. 
170. WAYS, supra note 161, at 40–41. 
171. 2018 NDAA Views Letter, supra note 4, at 4 (expressing views on the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 2810). 
172. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 185, 187 & n.7 (1996); see also Nevitt, supra note 83, at 459–60 (citing 
the Meigs signing statement to indicate that Congress has “largely been unsuccessful” in using “its 
appropriations power to thwart the President’s command and organization authority”). 
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On examination, however, even granting it precedential force, the Meigs 
example is ambiguous and provides only weak support for any notion of 
plenary presidential authority over assignment of military duties. For one 
thing, notwithstanding broad language about presidential authority over 
duties in the statement and opinion, the proviso’s constitutional deficiency 
could be understood much more narrowly. By vesting particular 
responsibilities in a particular individual, rather than a particular office, 
Congress infringed upon the President’s appointment and removal powers, 
effectively requiring him, contrary to the principles discussed earlier, to place 
a particular individual in a particular office.173 Furthermore, neither President 
Buchanan’s signing statement nor the Attorney General opinion ultimately 
resolved the constitutional question. Both read the statute (admittedly 
counter-textually) as merely stating Congress’s “preference.” For both these 
reasons, the executive’s resistance to the provision need not signify that 
presidents can reallocate military responsibilities as they see fit, without 
regard to the office-holding structure Congress has enacted.174 
In actual fact, notwithstanding Meigs’s temporary reassignment, the 
administration at least partially complied with the statute’s text. Before 
leaving Washington, Meigs deposited all remaining aqueduct funds in the 
U.S. Treasury and advised the Treasury Secretary that any disbursements 
without his approval would violate the governing appropriation.175 The Army 
nevertheless paid out substantial sums (some $150,000 out of the $500,000 
appropriation) during Meigs’s absence, but upon his return Meigs made good 
on his view of the law by declining to approve payment of $5,600 in 
remaining open claims for work done in his absence.176 
 
173. See supra subpart I(C); see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 83, at 987 n.164 (noting 
this deficiency in the statute). Congress does appear to have successfully assigned military duties to 
particular individuals on at least two other occasions. WAYS, supra note 161, at 37–38. 
174. Professors Barron and Lederman have further called it “unlikely Black even intended to 
imply that Congress could not assign particular military functions to particular offices,” Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 83, at 986 n.164, because in a later opinion regarding the execution of federal 
laws, Black opined that “[i]f[] . . . an act of Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by 
a particular officer, it cannot be done by a different officer.” Power of the President in Executing 
the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 519 (1860). As noted, however, Black’s opinion on Meigs does 
state that the Commander in Chief has the “right to decide according to [his or her] own judgment 
what officer shall perform any particular duty. . . .” Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. at 468. In 
addition, in a subsequent opinion regarding the aqueduct, Attorney General Black observed that 
Meigs “is not authorized to withhold payment which the Secretary of War or the engineer-in-chief 
has ordered him to make, though he himself may differ from his superior officers about the justice 
of the debt” and that “[h]e cannot make distinctions between orders of that kind, and choose which 
he shall obey and which he shall dishonor.” Washington Aqueduct, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 493, 494 
(1860). 
175. WEIGLEY, supra note 162, at 108–09. 
176. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 49, at 158–59; WAYS, supra note 161, at 41; Christopher 
N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 949–51 (1994). 
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A foundational precedent for plenary presidential authority over military 
duties thus offers no compelling reason to disregard earlier, more cogent 
examples that support Congress’s authority to assign particular military 
duties and authorities to particular offices. 
3. The Civil War.—During the Civil War, President Lincoln claimed 
authority to allocate particular command responsibilities to individual 
officers within the military hierarchy.177 Indeed, along with promotions and 
firings, assigning and reassigning particular commands was one of Lincoln’s 
main means of controlling the progress of military campaigns.178 Lincoln, 
however, appears to have exercised this authority within prescribed statutory 
structures, not in defiance of them. While applicable statutes often granted 
the President authority to organize military units,179 they dictated the 
military’s overall structure, prescribing, for example, the precise numbers of 
officers in particular ranks and the general composition of particular units.180 
At least some of these statutes, moreover, conferred particular duties on 
particular offices,181 and on at least one occasion, Lincoln declined a 
general’s request for command authority over certain bureaus because  
 
177. THOMAS J. GOSS, THE WAR WITHIN THE UNION HIGH COMMAND: POLITICS AND 
GENERALSHIP DURING THE CIVIL WAR 109 (2003) (“To the president, the power to assign 
commanders, which he alone possessed, was the power to steer Union strategy and impose his views 
on senior military officers.”). 
178. Id. at 109, 111. 
179. See, e.g., Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 9, 12 Stat. 597, 598 (1862) (granting president 
discretion to organize army corps); Act of July 22, 1861, ch. 9, § 2, 12 Stat. 268, 269 (1861) 
(authorizing president to form volunteers into army regiments). 
180. See, e.g., Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 253, 13 Stat. 394 (1864) (reorganizing army 
quartermaster-general’s office); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 82, 12 Stat. 758 (1863) (authorizing 
conferral of brevet ranks); Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 78, 12 Stat. 699 (1863) (authorizing additional 
general officer appointments); Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 68, 12 Stat. 743 (1863) (reorganizing the 
army corps of engineers and ordinance department); Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 10, 12 Stat. 
597, 599 (1862) (prescribing organization of certain army corps); Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 183, 12 
Stat. 583 (1862) (specifying naval officer grades, the number of positions in each grade, and the 
class of ship subject to command by each grade of officer); Act of July 5, 1862, ch. 134, 12 Stat. 
510 (1862) (dividing the Navy Department into nine bureaus to be led by “chiefs” with four-year 
terms); Act of Aug. 3, 1861, ch. 42, §§ 2–3, 12 Stat. 287 (1861) (prescribing composition of 
adjutant-general’s office and army corps of engineers); Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 279 
(1861) (specifying number and composition of regular army regiments); Act of July 25, 1861, 
ch. 19, 12 Stat. 275 (1861) (specifying number of officers in each grade for the Marine Corps); Act 
of July 22, 1861, ch. 9, §§ 2–4, 12 Stat. 268 (1861) (specifying organization and number of officers 
for regiments and authorizing certain general officer appointments); see also Act of July 28, 1866, 
ch. 299, 14 Stat. 332 (1866) (same for peacetime army); Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 231, 14 Stat. 222 
(1866) (specifying organization and number of officers in each grade for peacetime navy). 
181. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, §§ 5, 7, 12 Stat. 731, 732 (1863) (requiring of 
appointment of provost-marshals and obligating them to arrest deserters); Act of July 16, 1862, 
ch. 183, § 3, 12 Stat. 583 (1862) (specifying the relative rank of naval officers and the grade of naval 
officer required, “as near as may be,” to command each class of ship). 
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of statutory constraints.182 One Civil War-era statute specified that 
transportation of troops, munitions, and other military property was to occur 
“under the immediate control and supervision of the Secretary of War and 
such agents as he may appoint.”183 Others specifically granted authority to 
detail three naval officers to the War Department for inspecting transport 
vessels,184 “assign the command of the forces in [a particular] field or 
department” between officers of the same grade “without regard to seniority 
of rank,”185 and transfer certain gunboats from the War Department to the 
Navy,186 thus implying in each case that the President lacked such powers 
without statutory authorization. Likewise, late in the war, Lincoln 
specifically obtained statutory authority to appoint a Lieutenant General who 
could “be authorized, under the direction, and during the pleasure of the 
President, to command the armies of the United States.”187 This law again 
implied that, as President Polk recognized during the Mexican–American 
War,188 the President otherwise lacked such power to grant one general 
precedence over all others in the field.189 
4. Reconstruction.—After Lincoln’s death, amid its intense conflict with 
President Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction policy, Congress asserted its 
powers still more aggressively. In particular, it passed several laws that 
assigned particular duties of great importance to particular military officers. 
In context and in their practical operation, these laws specifically aimed to 
constrain President Johnson’s policy choices, notwithstanding Johnson’s 
ultimate authority in most cases to remove and replace the officers in 
question. 
 
182. See GOSS, supra note 177, at 174 (“When Grant sought control over the various bureaus 
that supplied the army, Lincoln told him that he could not legally change the military 
organization . . . .”). 
183. Act of Jan. 31, 1862, ch. 15, § 4, 12 Stat. 334 (1862). 
184. Act of Feb. 12, 1862, ch. 21, 12 Stat. 338 (1862). 
185. Act of Apr. 4, 1862, No. 25, 12 Stat. 617 (1862). 
186. Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 185, 12 Stat. 587 (1862). 
187. Act of Feb. 29, 1864, ch. 14, 13 Stat. 11, 12 (1864). Nine days later, President Lincoln 
appointed Ulysses Grant to this position and “delegated an unprecedented level of authority to his 
new commanding general.” GOSS, supra note 177, at 165; see also RON CHERNOW, GRANT 337–
44 (2017) (discussing the appointment). 
188. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text. 
189. GOSS, supra note 177, at 173 (discussing “the congressional effort to revive the rank of 
lieutenant general in order to promote Grant over all the generals in the army”). But cf. CHERNOW, 
supra note 187, at 335–36 (indicating that Grant expected to “outrank and supersede” other officers 
by virtue of the promotion but also noting then-Congressman James Garfield’s view in 
congressional debates that “Lincoln already had full authority to name a new general in chief”). The 
Lieutenant General rank had previously been held only by George Washington and (by Brevet) 
Winfield Scott. Id. at 330. 
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a. Statutory Architecture.—To begin with, in the Military Reconstruction 
Act of March 2, 1867, which established requirements for readmission of 
former rebel states, Congress divided those states into five military districts 
and declared it the “duty of the President to assign to the command of each 
of [these] districts an officer of the army, not below the rank of brigadier-
general.”190 The Act gave these district commanders “the duty . . . to protect 
all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection, 
disorder, and violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers 
of the public peace and criminals.”191 In addition, “when in his judgment it 
may be necessary for the trial of offenders,” the Act gave each district 
commander the “power to organize military commissions or tribunals for that 
purpose,” and it specified that “all interference under color of State authority 
with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be null and 
void.”192 
On the same day that Congress enacted this law over President 
Johnson’s veto, the President reluctantly signed an Army appropriations 
statute requiring that “all orders and instructions relating to military 
operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through 
the General of the army,” who was then Civil War hero and former 
Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant.193 This statute further provided that the 
General of the Army’s headquarters were to remain in Washington, D.C. and 
that he “shall not be removed, suspended or relieved from command, or 
assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters, except at his own 
request, without the previous approval of the Senate.”194 Any orders issued 
contrary to this statute’s requirements were deemed “null and void”; any 
officer issuing instructions contrary to those requirements was “deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor in office”; and any army officer who knowingly 
“transmit[ted], convey[ed], or obey[ed]” an order issued in violation of the 
statute was to be liable for imprisonment for between two and twenty 
years.195 
In debates over this law, opponents deemed it an unconstitutional 
interference with the President’s command authority. One representative 
complained that, in the event of an invasion or insurrection in which the 
General of the Army was “averse to any action being taken,” 
[t]he President, who is made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy by the Constitution of the United States, is by this provision 
 
190. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 2, 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867). 
191. Id. § 3. 
192. Id. 
193. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486–87 (1867). “[I]n case of inability,” 
such orders were to be issued through the General of the Army’s “next in rank.” Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
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estopped from sending any other general there to repel the forces 
which may be attempting to come upon our soil, or to put down any 
insurrection that might take place within any of the States.196  
 Echoing the Buchanan Administration’s position with respect to Captain 
Meigs, another Representative complained, “It has always, so far as my 
reading has taught me on the subject, been conceded to [the President] that 
he was entitled, as Commander-in-Chief, to assign to officers whatever duty 
in his judgment he thought they ought to be called upon and were best 
qualified to perform.”197 To do otherwise, this Representative complained, 
“is not a practicable thing,” and he “[wa]s inclined to think” it “wholly 
nugatory, so far as it attempts to restrain the action of the President or the 
action of the General of the Army.”198 The Representative continued, 
I never heard it urged seriously anywhere . . . that the Congress of the 
United States shall prescribe to what particular duty an officer shall be 
assigned, and may by legislation tie up the hands of the President in 
such a way that he cannot assign an officer to the particular kind of 
duty to which, in his judgment, that officer is adapted.199 
A third Representative called the proposed law  
a proposition to restrict the office and control the power of the 
President of the United States; to tear away from him by a single act 
of this Congress his powers under the Constitution of the United 
States, which makes him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States.200 
Despite these constitutional objections, Congress enacted the law, 
specifically declining to remove the rider.201 Its actions thus signaled 
institutional rejection of arguments that the law violated the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief power. For his part, President Johnson complained in 
his signing statement that the law “deprives the President of his constitutional 
functions as Commander in Chief of the Army.”202 He issued a proclamation 
advising military officers of their duty to obey orders from him and others in 
 
196. 37 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 1353 (statement of Rep. Le Blond). 
197. Id. at 1354 (statement of Rep. Niblack). 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 1355 (statement of Rep. Wright). 
201. Id. at 1404 (House rejects amendment to delete provision in question); id. at 1744, 1752 
(final passage in House and Senate). 
202. Andrew Johnson, Message to the House (Mar. 2, 1867), in 8 COMPILATION OF MESSAGES 
& PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3670 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
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the chain of command,203 and he later urged Congress to repeal it.204 Yet in 
practice Johnson complied with the statute’s terms.205 
Later in the spring and summer of 1867, Congress passed further 
Military Reconstruction Acts adding to the district commanders’ duties, 
overriding a presidential veto each time.206 The third of these statutes, enacted 
on July 19, 1867, specifically confirmed a power to displace putative state 
officials that district commanders and other occupation officials had already 
been exercising.207 The district commanders, the Act provided, “shall have 
power, subject to the disapproval of the General of the army of the United 
States, and to have effect till disapproved, whenever in the opinion of such 
commander the proper administration of [the first Military Reconstruction 
Act] shall require it, to suspend or remove” officials claiming governmental 
power under nonfederal (i.e., state) authority.208 The district commanders 
could appoint other individuals, or detail army officers, to act in such 
suspended or removed officials’ place.209 The Act further provided that “the 
General of the army of the United States shall be invested with all the powers 
of suspension, removal, appointment, and detail” granted by the Act to 
district commanders,210 and it specified that “no district commander . . . shall 
be bound in his action by any opinion of any civil officer of the United 
States.”211 
b. Practical Operation.—Grant and other generals who favored 
reconstructing the South made deliberate use of the powers conferred on 
them by these statutes. Even before Congress enacted specific protections for 
his position, Grant employed his position atop the army hierarchy to 
influence on-the-ground policy.212 In one instance, as the historian Gregory 
 
203. G. NORMAN LIEBER, REMARKS ON THE ARMY REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE 
REGULATIONS IN GENERAL 72 (1898). 
204. Andrew Johnson, Fourth Annual Message to the House and Senate (Dec. 9, 1868), in 9 
COMP. MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3870, 3871–72 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897). 
205. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS 91 
(1998). 
206. Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41 (1868); Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 2, 15 Stat. 
14 (1867); Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867). 
207. For contemporaneous discussion of district commanders’ exercise of this power, see The 
Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 182, 187, 193–96 (1867). 
208. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 2, 15 Stat. 14, 14. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. § 3, 15 Stat. at 15. 
211. Id. § 10, 15 Stat. at 16. The Act also specified that its provisions “shall be construed 
liberally, to the end that all the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out.” Id. § 11, 15 
Stat. at 16. 
212. Congress did not create the position of General of the Army until July 1866, but Lieutenant 
General Grant was already the most senior officer. Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 232, 14 Stat. 223; 
CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 573–74. 
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Downs recounts, Grant “decided unilaterally” that an Attorney General 
opinion addressing the scope of military jurisdiction following Memphis riots 
in May 1866 applied only in Tennessee—a decision that effectively allowed 
commanders elsewhere to continue following earlier orders to try offenders 
in military commissions.213 In April 1867, following enactment of the first 
two Military Reconstruction Acts, Grant denied that even he could direct the 
district commanders in exercising the powers vested in them by statute. As 
he wrote to one district commander, “My views are that District Commanders 
are responsible for the faithful execution of the reconstruction Act of 
Congress, and that, in Civil matters, I cannot give them an order.”214  
One district commander for Louisiana and Texas, the “short, brave, and 
often thoroughly unpleasant” Civil War hero Philip Sheridan,215 employed 
his powers particularly aggressively. Having earlier dismissed numerous 
officials in New Orleans whom he blamed for a notorious 1866 massacre,216 
Sheridan took steps to remove more officials in spring 1867 following 
passage of the first Military Reconstruction Acts.217 When President Johnson 
responded to protests from Louisiana Governor J. Madison Wells by 
overruling those firings, Sheridan doubled down, removing the New Orleans 
city council and police chief as well as Governor Wells himself.218 Grant 
wrote to Sheridan: “I have no doubt myself that the removal of Governor 
Wells will do great good in your command if you are sustained, but great 
harm if you are not sustained. I shall do all I can to sustain you in it.”219 
For his part, President Johnson procured an Attorney General opinion 
construing the district commanders’ authority narrowly and specifically 
denying their power to remove state and local civilian officials.220 But “Grant 
told his commanders to treat the memorandum as an advisory opinion, not an 
order, and suggested they ignore it.”221 A month later, in July 1867, Congress 
passed the Third Military Reconstruction Act, which confirmed not only the 
district commanders’ authority to remove local officials, but also, as noted, 
 
213. GREGORY P. DOWNS, AFTER APPOMATTOX: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE ENDS OF 
WAR 148 (2015). 
214. Letter to Bvt. Major Gen. John Pope (Apr. 21, 1867), in 17 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. 
GRANT 117, 117 (John Y. Simon ed., 1991). 
215. RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING 
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 1865-1896 112 (2017). 
216. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 182. 
217. Id. at 184. 
218. Id.; CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 589. 
219. Letter to Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (June 7, 1867), in PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, 
supra note 214, at 185. 
220. The Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 182, 187, 189 (1867); CHERNOW, supra note 
187, at 589. 
221. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 183; see also CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 589 (indicating 
that Grant let district commanders “know they could freely interpret [the opinion] as they chose”). 
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Grant’s view that civil officers’ opinions did not bind the commanders.222 
Armed with this statutory authority, and disgusted by ongoing terrorist 
violence against freedpeople in Texas, Sheridan removed Texas governor 
James W. Throckmorton in late July.223 Though backed by Grant, Sheridan 
did so in defiance of Johnson.224 
Johnson responded by removing the “tyrant” Sheridan and transferring 
him to other duties.225 Because of the March 1867 General of the Army 
provision, however, Johnson could issue the removal order only through 
Grant. Though Grant ultimately relayed the order, he took advantage of his 
position to “argu[e] with Johnson and warn[] the president that Sheridan was 
‘universally, and deservedly, beloved by the people who sustained this 
government through its trials.’”226 What is more, presumably because the 
Third Reconstruction Act specifically vested the General of the Army with 
the district commanders’ “powers of suspension, removal, appointment, and 
detail,”227 Grant reconsidered his earlier view that he could not direct the 
commanders’ performance of their duties and specifically ordered Sheridan’s 
successor not to reinstate the officials removed by Sheridan.228  
In an August letter to President Johnson, Grant wrote: “The Act of 
Congress of July 19th 1867 [the Third Military Reconstruction Act] throws 
much of the responsibility of executing faithfully the reconstruction laws of 
Congress, on the General of the Army. I am bound by the responsibility thus 
imposed on me.”229 Grant thus insisted that he was “authorized . . . by Acts 
of Congress” to approve Sheridan’s prior orders and “instruct[] his successor 
to carry out those orders.”230 “I emphatically decline,” Grant further 
emphasized, “yielding any of the powers given the General of the Army by 
 
222. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, §§ 2, 10, 15 Stat. 14, 14, 16; see also supra note 213 and 
accompanying text. 
223. WHITE, supra note 215, at 112–13. 
224. Id. at 113. 
225. Id. Johnson removed another district commander at the same time. DOWNS, supra note 
213, at 184–85. 
226. ALLEN C. GUELZO, RECONSTRUCTION: A CONCISE HISTORY 52 (2018) (quoting  
Letter from Ulysses S. Grant (Aug. 1, 1867), in 12 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON 447  
(Paul H. Bergeron ed., 1995); see also Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1867,  
at 1, https://www.nytimes.com/1867/08/20/archives/washington-news-the-order-for-gen-sheridans 
-removal-issued-gen.html [https://perma.cc/K8YX-SQWX] (reporting that after receiving a 
“positive order” to transfer Sheridan to different duties, “Grant visited the President . . . and entered 
his earnest protest against the movement, but the President was immovable” and Grant relayed the 
order to Sheridan the next day). 
227. Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 3, 15 Stat. 14, 15 (1867). 
228. CHERNOW, supra note 187, at 596; DOWNS, supra note 213, at 185. 
229. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant (Aug. 26, 1867), in THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON, 
supra note 226, at 512. 
230. Id. 
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the laws of Congress.”231 Grant also wrote to Sheridan in September. “I feel 
that your relief from command of the 5th District is a heavy blow to 
reconstruction . . . ,” Grant complained. “I felt it my duty . . . to do all I could 
to keep you where you was until the laws which you were executing so 
faithfully were carried through and your District restored to the Union.”232 
The House of Representatives eventually impeached President Johnson 
for, among other things, attempting to remove Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton in violation of another March 1867 statute, the Tenure of Office 
Act.233 Much as the 1867 appropriations rider did for the General of the 
Army, that statute precluded removing certain senior officers without Senate 
consent.234 Another impeachment article accused Johnson of planning to 
circumvent the General of the Army provision, though no evidence at trial 
showed that Johnson had in fact done so.235 The Senate ultimately failed to 
convict on any counts, in part because key Republican Senators doubted 
whether requiring Senate approval for removal of executive officers was 
constitutional.236 After Ulysses Grant himself became President in 1869, 
Congress repealed the General of the Army provision,237 and it repealed the 
Tenure of Office Act altogether two decades later.238 
c. Interpreting Reconstruction Examples.—This history offers powerful 
support not only for Congress’s authority to vest military duties in particular 
offices, but also for that power’s practical importance. Though denied the 
power to remove Grant as General of the Army without Senate consent, 
Johnson could—and did—appoint and remove district commanders at will.239 
Grant, moreover, seems to have respected his ultimate obligation to relay 
direct orders from the President to the commanders. Nevertheless, 
Congress’s enactments, as interpreted by Grant and other generals, gave 
military officials considerable latitude to shape initial Reconstruction policy, 
often placing the President in a reactive posture. At the same time, those 
statutes placed considerable friction between Johnson’s wishes and on-the-
ground actions, enabling Grant and Sheridan, among others, to elevate issues’ 
 
231. Id. at 512–13. 
232. Letter to Maj. Gen. Philp H. Sheridan (Sept. 8, 1867), in PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, 
supra note 214, at 316, 317. 
233. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430–31 (1867). For an account of Johnson’s 
attempted removal of Stanton, see WHITE, supra note 215, at 92–94. 
234. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 430. 
235. MAY, supra note 205, at 91. 
236. BRUFF, supra note 40, at 174–75. 
237. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 15, 16 Stat. 315, 319 (1870). 
238. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887). 
239. Cf. State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 499 (1866) (observing that the district 
commanders’ “duties must necessarily be performed under the supervision of the President as 
commander-in-chief”). 
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public salience and even defy the President temporarily so as to pursue 
instead their understanding of congressional policy. Finally, even if Johnson 
could ultimately get his way, his need to employ removal to do so helped 
ensure political backlash against controversial actions. These constraints on 
Johnson mattered. As Professor Downs argues, although Reconstruction 
ultimately ended in the tragic failure of Jim Crow, Military Reconstruction, 
while it lasted, “was in a basic way a success,” and it left important legacies, 
including ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments.240 
Some might dismiss these examples as relating more to domestic 
governance than the military. In some sense, of course, the army during 
Reconstruction functioned as a form of civilian government; indeed, the 
Military Reconstruction Acts allowed military officers to displace state and 
local officials and govern in their stead. Yet dismissing these examples as 
more akin to civil administration would misunderstand the legal theory on 
which the entire occupation was predicated. Congress did not employ 
ordinary tools of federal civil administration to govern the defeated 
Confederacy in 1867. Instead, congressional majorities viewed the army’s 
presence in the South as akin to a foreign military occupation.241 In other 
words, Congress presumed it could govern the defeated Confederacy through 
the military precisely because the federal government’s war powers remained 
active, even after the Confederacy’s nominal defeat.242 Congress’s 
enactments during this period thus reflect exercises of congressional power 
to regulate the President’s Commander-in-Chief power with respect to 
military officials exercising military duties. 
More generally, some might dismiss Reconstruction examples as 
aberrational, given the period of crisis in which they arose. Reconstruction 
today is often considered America’s “second founding,” a “rebirth of 
freedom” in which three key amendments and a host of statutes sought to 
purge the founding sin of slavery and establish a racially egalitarian 
republic.243 Nevertheless, some court decisions and scholarship have 
remained curiously dismissive of separation-of-powers precedents from this 
 
240. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 180; see also id. at 247–49 (discussing the long-term 
consequences of Military Reconstruction, including the southern states’ compelled ratification of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). 
241. DOWNS, supra note 213, at 7–8 (explaining that Congress addressed concerns about 
military governance in a republic by creating “a bounded, exceptional time” in which the federal 
government employed war powers to govern the defeated Confederacy). 
242. Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 215, at 83–84 (discussing how Congress employed war 
powers to impose reforms during Reconstruction). 
243. See generally ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (generally advancing this view). 
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period, at times characterizing Congress’s efforts to constrain President 
Johnson as aberrant and illegitimate.244 
But even if Reconstruction is not the best model for constitutional 
governance in ordinary times, precedents from this period should not all be 
lightly dismissed. On the contrary, they might reflect a latent toolkit of 
congressional powers that Congress can deploy if hostility to a given 
president arouses it to do so. Indeed, the Johnson impeachment’s failure 
might indicate a capacity for self-correction that should weigh against 
wholesale suspicion of Reconstruction-era separation-of-powers precedents 
other than removal limitations.245 
From that point of view, the Military Reconstruction Acts and the 
General of the Army rider warrant more serious consideration as valid 
precedents. Holding aside for the moment the restrictions on Grant’s 
removal, these provisions simply exercised Congress’s power to design the 
military command structure and vest particular duties in particular offices. 
Unlike the Meigs rider, none of these laws, by their plain terms, required any 
particular individual to perform the functions in question; nor for that matter 
did they vest direct control over the military in any officer other than the 
President. On the contrary, all of these statutes simply vested particular 
authorities and responsibilities—issuing orders to the Army or controlling 
military occupation—in particular officers.  
As we have seen, this vesting of duties strengthened these officers’ 
bargaining position in policy disputes with the President, and Grant and 
others in fact employed their authorities to shape on-the-ground policy. In the 
event of an impasse, moreover, resignation or removal, or perhaps a court 
martial for insubordination, might have been the President’s only means of 
getting his way. But building such friction into the command structure could 
constitute a valid exercise of Congress’s powers to govern the military and 
pass laws necessary and proper to discharging other officers’ powers. In 
combination with earlier examples, this history suggests that such measures 
are not an unconstitutional imposition on the President’s Commander-in-
Chief authority. 
 
244. See supra note 13; see also BRUFF, supra note 40, at 175 (“The judgment of history has 
been that Johnson was right, that the [Tenure of Office Act] was an unconstitutional infringement 
on the President’s control over the executive branch.”); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 49, at 178 
(“[R]ather than remove Johnson for unconstitutionally impeding Reconstruction and threatening 
congressional authority, Congress responded by passing unconstitutional legislation that would tie 
Johnson’s hands with respect to the removal power.”); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 
PRECEDENTS 744–45 (photo. rprt. 1979) (1920) (referring to the “political history” surrounding 
enactment of an 1866 statute limiting presidential removal of military officers as a factor counting 
against the law’s constitutionality). 
245. Cf. BRUFF, supra note 40, at 175 (noting that “the Johnson acquittal provided some 
precedential support for the constitutional unity of the executive branch under presidential 
command”). 
PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/21 12:56 PM 
536 Texas Law Review [Vol. 99:491 
5. World War I.—A half century later, the United States’ rise to global 
preeminence in the two World Wars and the early Cold War prompted a 
renewed set of congressional debates over military organization.246 
During World War I, the so-called Overman Act gave the President just 
the sort of command flexibility that modern presidents, invoking the Meigs 
opinion, have claimed as a matter of constitutional right. Under this statute, 
the President held authority 
to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as 
he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties, and powers 
hitherto by law conferred upon any executive department, 
commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer, in such manner as in 
his judgment shall seem best fitted to carry out the purposes of this 
Act.247 
Those purposes specifically included “successful prosecution of the war” and 
“the more effective exercise and more efficient administration by the 
President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the land and naval 
forces.”248 By its terms, the Overman Act expired six months “after the 
termination of the war by the proclamation of the treaty of peace,” at which 
point “all executive or administrative agencies, departments, commissions, 
bureaus, offices, or officers” reverted to “the same functions, duties, and 
powers as heretofore or as hereafter by law may be provided, any 
authorization of the President under this Act to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”249 
In congressional debates, some of the Act’s proponents suggested it was 
necessary only for civil and administrative functions. “I understand,” one 
Senator said, “the powers proposed to be confided to the President under the 
Overman bill are chiefly executive powers and not those which he has as 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”250 Yet President Wilson 
 
246. At least one significant debate occurred in the interim, when Congress rejected a proposal 
by the Theodore Roosevelt Administration to consolidate powers in the Secretary of War. BARRON, 
supra note 13, at 192. In 1903, a joint order by the War and Navy Secretaries established a “Joint 
Board” to facilitate cooperation between the army and navy. See 1 VERNON E. DAVIS, THE HISTORY 
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN WORLD WAR II 1 (1972) (discussing Joint Board’s 
establishment). Reflecting the statutory separation between the two services, however, this board 
was “an advisory body for the purpose of making recommendations jointly to the War and Navy 
Secretaries looking toward the coordination of the policies and action of the armed forces. It had no 
executive functions, and its pronouncements had official force only when approved by the two 
Secretaries.” Id. at 15. 
247. Overman Act, Pub. L. No. 65-152, § 1, 40 Stat. 556, 556 (1918). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. §§ 1, 6, 40 Stat. at 556–57. 
250. 56 CONG. REC. 5404 (1918) (statement of Sen. Shields). Another Senator argued more 
explicitly that “[t]he President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy can practically assign 
such members of the Army or such officers as he sees fit to such positions as he sees proper to place 
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proposed the Overman Act in the first place to counter a proposed law that 
would have created a special “war cabinet” and required the President to 
“exercise” essentially all war-related authorities “conferred on him by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States” through this new body.251 
Even some of the Overman Act’s proponents, moreover, recognized that 
then-existing statutes “conferred [certain powers] directly upon [the service 
secretaries or their subordinates], so that in these matters these officers are 
not subject to the control or direction by the President.”252 Meanwhile, at the 
other extreme, one Senator argued the Overman Act was entirely unnecessary 
because the President had constitutional authority to reallocate all executive 
functions.253 As a contemporaneous scholar observed, “[t]he majority in 
Congress” effectively repudiated that view.254 The majority 
felt . . . that the act was not only justified in order to avoid suspicion 
or necessity of the President setting himself up as a dictator and doing 
the same things without definite authority of law, but also that it was 
necessary to secure the proper coordination of effort on the part of the 
agencies entrusted with carrying on the various war activities of the 
government . . . .255  
In any event, on the very day he signed the Act into law, Wilson invoked 
the statute as authority for an executive order redistributing certain functions 
 
them in.” 56 CONG. REC. 4577 (1918). This Senator, however, appeared to view this power as a 
function of presidential removal authority: 
It is as useless and senseless to say that the President is handicapped in [controlling the 
ordinance, a function then vested by statute in a particular officer] as it is to say that 
the colonel of a regiment on independent duty is handicapped by some regulation 
which gives a first sergeant certain powers when he can change that first sergeant and 
put his own man in at any instant. . . . [T]he President possesses the power either as 
President in his civil capacity or as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to put 
into practically every position except those great independent tribunals and boards a 
man who will do exactly what the President wants done. 
Id. 
251. 56 CONG. REC. 1077 (1918) (reading of bill). For background on this proposal and 
Wilson’s support for the Overman Act as a response, see BERDAHL, supra note 154, at 172–73; 
BARRON, supra note 13, at 222–24; and DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD 
WAR IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 124–25 (1980). 
252. 56 CONG. REC. 5406 (1918) (statement of Sen. Shields) (discussing the provisions cited in 
supra note 144). 
253. 56 CONG. REC. 4520 (1918) (statement of Sen. Knox) (stating that he thought the President 
“has the authority to require every executive officer and every department of the Government to do 
anything that he directs to be done in order to prosecute this war to a successful conclusion” and 
“has the power to delegate from one Cabinet officer to another the discharge of any particular duty 
that he thinks such a Cabinet officer can discharge better than the one upon whom it would normally 
be incumbent”). But see 56 CONG. REC. 4525 (1918) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (“[I]f there is a 
statute which says that [certain] duties must be performed by a certain officer, then, of course, the 
President can not assign those duties to some other officer or appoint some other officer to perform 
those duties . . . .”). 
254. BERDAHL, supra note 154, at 175. 
255. Id. 
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of the Army’s Chief Signal Officer and requiring designation of a new 
Director of Military Aeronautics by the Army’s chief commander.256 
Although he invoked his status as Commander in Chief along with the statute 
as authority for the executive order, the order’s directives were to expire six 
months after the war’s end—a limitation that conformed with the Overman 
Act and thus implied dependence upon it.257 
When the war did end, the military sought to preserve the organizational 
flexibility it had gained. Thus, in 1919, the War Department proposed 
legislation that, among other things, would have preserved presidential 
authority to flexibly reallocate military duties and functions.258 Opponents 
decried this proposed consolidation of power as antithetical to republican 
government; a blistering report by one Senator decried “the spirit displayed 
by its framers throughout the whole bill—a consuming desire for despotic, 
unrestricted power—militarism run mad.”259 The proposal died. Congress 
instead largely prescribed the Army’s structure itself in the National Defense 
Act of 1920.260 
6. World War II.—At the start of World War II, just days after the Pearl 
Harbor attack, Congress reenacted the Overman Act’s key provisions in a 
new war powers statute, again providing for the law’s sunset six months after 
the war’s end.261 Like Wilson, President Roosevelt invoked this statute along 
with his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to reorganize certain 
military functions. In his case, he signed executive orders restructuring 
command arrangements in both the Army and Navy, in each case directing 
 
256. Woodrow Wilson, Executive Order (May 20, 1918), in 17 COMPILATION OF MESSAGES & 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8513, 8513–14 (1927). 
257. Id. at 8516. 
258. 58 CONG. REC. 3600 (1919) (recording the War Department’s transmission of a bill that 
would require the President to “merge” existing War Department offices and then grant the 
President “authority to make such distribution or redistribution of the duties, powers, functions, 
records, property, and personnel of such previously existing departments, bureaus, and offices as he 
may deem necessary for the efficiency of the military service,” as well as “authority to prescribe the 
duties, powers, and functions of officers of the services, units, and organizations” authorized for the 
Army); see also 1 WAR DEP’T, ANN. REP. 1919, at 478, app. at 480 (proposing this legislation). 
259. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, 66TH CONG., ARMY REORGANIZATION BILL: 
ANALYTICAL & EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 8 (Comm. Print 1919) (statement of Sen. George E. 
Chamberlain). 
260. National Defense Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (1920). In an earlier 
controversy during the Theodore Roosevelt administration, Congress rejected a proposal to “abolish 
the office of the commanding general and to vest more power in the secretary of war” based on 
similar fears that such legislation would pave the way to dictatorship. BARRON, supra note 13, at 
192. 
261. First War Powers Act, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, §§ 1–5, 401, 55 Stat. 838, 838–39, 841 
(1941); see, e.g., 87 CONG. REC. 9838 (1941) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys) (“The bill was prepared 
in the Department of Justice . . . . Title I of the bill reenacts the measure . . . commonly known as 
the Overman Act, which was approved May 20, 1918.”). 
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that changes would expire six months after the war’s end—a sunset that again 
implied reliance on statutory rather than constitutional authority.262  
Despite the President’s organizational flexibility, however, pre-War 
institutional structures continued to hamper coordination. In particular, 
Army–Navy rivalries and coordination problems repeatedly marred combat 
performance; the British Air Marshal observed that “[t]he violence of 
interservice rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was 
an appreciable handicap to their war effort.”263 To address these challenges, 
Roosevelt designated one admiral as his Chief of Staff and improvised a 
coordinating body of “joint chiefs” to advise him and oversee operations.264 
He also gave the Army and Navy precedence in different theaters and in some 
instances placed units from one service under the command of officers from 
the other.265 Though all these actions admittedly could reflect broad 
assertions of Commander-in-Chief power, they could also be supported by 
the 1941 War Powers Act; the President never issued any formal order 
establishing the Chief of Staff position or the joint chiefs.266 In any event, 
Roosevelt’s organizational arrangements failed to quell interbranch friction. 
In effect, pre-War statutory arrangements, though superseded for the duration 
of the war, continued to limit presidential coordination of the armed forces.267 
7. The National Security Act of 1947.—After the war, to address the inter-
service coordination problems, the executive branch once again proposed a 
 
262. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Reorganization of the Navy Department and the Naval Service, 
EXEC. ORDER NO. 9096 (Mar. 12, 1942), in 1942 THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN 
D. ROOSEVELT 157 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1st ed. 1950); Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President 
Reorganizes the Army and the War Department, EXEC. ORDER NO. 9082 (Feb. 28, 1942), in 1942 
THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 140–41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 
1st ed. 1950). 
263. LOCHER, supra note 139, at 20–21. 
264. DALE R. HERSPRING, THE PENTAGON & THE PRESIDENCY: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 24–25 (2005). 
265. Id. at 23–26, 31, 41; James R. Locher III, Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols 
Reorganization Act, 54 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV., Autumn 2001, at 95, 96. 
266. HERSPRING, supra note 264, at 24; see also EDGAR F. RAINES, JR. & MAJOR DAVID R. 
CAMPBELL, THE ARMY AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: EVOLUTION OF ARMY IDEAS ON THE 
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, 1942-1985, at 18–19 
(1986) (noting that “[t]he legal basis of the authority exercised by the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff 
was, to say the least, ambiguous” because “President Roosevelt never issued an executive order 
clearly delineating the organization’s functions as he certainly had the power to do under the First 
War Powers Act”). For a detailed history of the Joint Chiefs’ origins and organizational evolution, 
see DAVIS, supra note 246. 
267. In August 1944, then-Vice Presidential candidate Harry Truman wrote in a popular 
magazine, “Proof that a divine Providence watches over the United States is furnished by the fact 
that we have managed to escape disaster even though our scrambled professional military set-up 
has been an open invitation to catastrophe.” RAINES & CAMPBELL, supra note 266, at 37; see also 
id. at 37–42 (discussing clashing Army and Navy plans for post-War military reorganization and 
Truman’s commitment to unification). 
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statutory consolidation of military functions.268 Recognizing that post-War 
rivalry with the Soviet Union would necessitate continued mobilization and 
an effective global deterrent, Congress took action this time in the National 
Security Act of 1947.269 But even this reorganization fell short of the degree 
of flexibility sought by the President and some military leaders.270 Among 
other changes, the 1947 statute merged the War and Navy Departments into 
a single new agency, the National Military Establishment (later renamed the 
Department of Defense), to be headed by a new Secretary of Defense.271 It 
also created the Air Force as a distinct service; established separate 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force with authority over their 
respective services, subject to the general direction of the Secretary of 
Defense; and authorized the Joint Chiefs to establish unified commands 
combining forces from multiple services.272 Though significant, these 
changes deliberately stopped short of complete consolidation, and the Act 
imposed multiple impediments to direct presidential control over the 
services. 
For one thing, to address renewed fears about militarism and 
dictatorship and appease concerns about preserving distinct service identities, 
Congress included statutory definitions of each service’s functions in the 
Act.273 It also sharply limited the new Defense Secretary’s authority, giving 
the office power to set general policies but not to issue direct commands,274 
though subsequent amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 expanded the 
Secretary’s authority and gave the President greater control over unified 
 
268. Id. at 43, 98. 
269. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947). 
270. RAINES & CAMPBELL, supra note 266,  at 98. 
271. National Security Act of 1947 §§ 201–202, 61 Stat. at 499–500. 
272. Id. §§ 205–208, 211(b)(3), 61 Stat. at 501–05. 
273. Id. §§ 205(e), 206(b), 207(f), 61 Stat. at 501–03. Senators and Members of Congress 
repeatedly expressed concerns about militarism in the Act’s legislative history. See, e.g., 93 CONG. 
REC. 9435 (1947) (statement of Rep. Hoffman) (“[T]o permit immediate or gradual growth of 
military control of war management is to follow the path of militarism—to disaster.”); 93 CONG. 
REC. 8297 (1947) (statement of Sen. Gurney) (responding to “some who express a fear that the 
creation of this office [the Secretary of Defense] will lead toward dictatorship”); 93 CONG. REC. 
8316–8317 (1947) (statement of Sen. Robertson) (expressing concerns that the bill will foster 
militarism); H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 7 (1947) (additional views of Clare E. Hoffman, Chairman) 
(“A careful reading of the bill, of the hearings, and a realization of the implications justify the 
conclusion that the possibilities of a dictatorship by the military are in this legislation.”). More 
practical worries about loss of Navy prestige and congressional influence over procurement and 
basing decisions appear also to have motivated Congress’s weakening of the proposed 
consolidation. See Locher, supra note 265, at 98. 
274. National Security Act of 1947 § 202, 61 Stat. at 500 (granting limited duties to the 
Secretary and providing specifically that the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments “shall be 
administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries”). 
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commands.275 Some critics of the 1947 law, including the Marine Corps 
Commandant, worried that unification of the services would cause a 
withering and eventual abolition of the Marine Corps and naval aviation, 
despite those components’ distinguished contributions to the recent Allied 
victory.276 Congress addressed such concerns by adding specific statutory 
protections for marines and aviators within the Navy.277 Finally, building on 
the jerry-rigged joint command structure developed during the war, the Act 
formally established the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.278 In another nod to militarism fears, however, the statute limited these 
bodies to advisory rather than command functions.279 
Amid all these changes, Congress recognized and preserved the 
President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. Some legislative 
history even appeared to take a broad view of this presidential power. For 
instance, a Senate committee report observed that “[t]he creation of such an 
official [as the Secretary of Defense] in no way reduces the responsibility and 
authority of the President who, by the Constitution, remains both the 
Commander in Chief, and also the source of all executive power in the 
Government.”280 Similarly, during floor debates, Senators and 
Representatives recognized the President’s ultimate constitutional power; 
some, for example, justified the new position of Defense Secretary as a 
measure aimed at easing the President’s workload, rather than displacing his 
command authority.281 
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, this statute, like earlier enactments, 
presumed broad congressional authority to structure the offices and 
command relationships through which presidential power would be 
exercised. Indeed, neither the Act itself nor the extensive debate surrounding 
 
275. Locher, supra note 265, at 99; Gregg Garbesi, U.S. Unified Command Plan, in AMERICA’S 
VICEROYS: THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 17, 37–38 (Derek S. Reveron ed., 2004). 
276. See, e.g., National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services): Hearing 
on S. 758 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 80th Cong. 411–13 (1947) (statement of Gen. A.A. 
Vandegrift, Commandant, United States Marine Corps). 
277. National Security Act of 1947 § 206(b), (c), 61 Stat. at 501–02. 
278. Id. §§ 101, 211, 61 Stat. at 496–97, 505. 
279. Id. Although less relevant here, another noteworthy innovation in the statute was its 
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. § 102, 61 Stat. at 497. 
280. S. REP. NO. 80-239, at 11 (1947) (reporting the bill from the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services). 
281. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 8297 (1947) (statement of Sen. Gurney) (“It is universally 
recognized that all our forces are subject to the direction of the President as constitutional 
Commander in Chief. . . . But all of us know full well that the overburdened Chief Executive of our 
Government . . . cannot possibly discharge [the] responsibility [of directing all military 
subordinates] with a modern military organization.”); H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 4 (1947) (explaining 
that “[t]he complexity and magnitude of the President’s task in peace and war are such that your 
committee believes it is a generally accepted fact that he needs a full-time civilian official to assist 
him in the performance of his onerous duties as Commander in Chief of the armed forces,” and 
determining that “[t]he Secretary of Defense fills this need”). 
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it would have made much sense if the President held constitutional authority 
to simply reorganize military forces and command structures as he saw fit. 
Stating the constitutional theory implied by the bill itself, one Congressman 
observed in floor debate, “I would remind you that the responsibility for the 
organization and maintenance of our Army and Navy is not one which the 
Constitution places upon the Commander in Chief. It is one which is imposed 
upon the Congress . . . .”282 
Even the executive branch appeared to acknowledge this view. Early in 
the legislative debates, it submitted a joint statement from the War and Navy 
Secretaries calling for legislation with particular features, including 
provisions to ensure that “[t]he armed forces shall be organized” into separate 
services and that “[e]ach [service] shall be under a Secretary and, under the 
over-all direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered 
as an individual unit.”283 Likewise, the same Senate committee report that 
referred to the President as the “source of all executive power” observed that 
“[t]he safeguard against militarism in this country is not to be found in the 
costly confusion and inefficiency of uncoordinated executive agencies with 
confused lines of authority.”284 With this assertion, the report seemingly 
acknowledging that Congress could create, if it wished, just such confused 
and inefficient agency relationships within the military. More directly, a 
House committee report observed that “[t]he specific powers given the 
Secretary of Defense have been carefully delineated in the bill so that there 
can be no doubt as to the kind and scope of the powers he will exercise.”285 
This report thus asserted unambiguously that Congress may define, and limit, 
the military authorities of officers other than the President. 
On the whole, then, both the Act itself and its legislative history support 
broad congressional power to allocate military duties and authorities by 
statute. 
8. The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986.—A last major military 
reorganization took place in 1986, when Congress sought to update and 
improve the 1947 structure by enacting the Goldwater–Nichols Department 
of Defense Reorganization Act.286 Building on earlier amendments to the 
1947 Act, this statute authorized the President, “through the Secretary of 
Defense,” to establish so-called “combatant commands” with authority over 
forces in particular regions of the globe.287 Under the structure established by 
 
282. 93 CONG. REC. 9419 (1947) (statement of Rep. Cole). 
283. Letter to the President from Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, and James Forrestal, 
Secretary of the Navy (Jan. 16, 1947), in S. REP. NO. 80-239, at 5. 
284. S. REP. NO. 80-239, at 11, 16. 
285. H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 4. 
286. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986). 
287. Id. § 211, 100 Stat. at 1012–13 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 161, 162). 
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the Act, military commanders drawn from the different services would 
exercise command authority over particular units, also drawn from different 
services and assigned to the command by the service secretaries as directed 
by the Secretary of Defense; these combatant commanders would then bear 
responsibility for achieving military objectives within the region under their 
charge.288 Though earlier statutes had also allowed such unified commands, 
Goldwater–Nichols strengthened the combatant commanders’ position and 
authority in various ways.289 In particular, the Act relegated the service 
secretaries—officers who once held exclusive command authority over entire 
branches of the military—to an essentially supportive role, with power over 
training, equipping, and disciplining their respective services but no power 
of actual military command.290 Finally, the Act made additional adjustments 
to the National Security Council, consolidating authority in the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs while allowing other Joint Chiefs to express dissenting 
views.291 
As with the National Security Act of 1947, neither this statute nor the 
hard-fought “victory on the Potomac” that was necessary to enact it would 
have made much sense if Congress lacked power to define duties and 
authorities within the military apparatus.292 The legislation’s entire purpose 
was to break down prior command relationships and replace them with new 
ones better suited (presumably) to achieving the nation’s military and foreign 
policy objectives.293 Again, even the Executive Branch appeared to 
acknowledge congressional authority to make such changes. In a statement 
of executive views early in the legislative process, President Reagan 
cautioned that any new statute “must not infringe on the constitutionally 
protected responsibilities of the President as Commander in Chief.”294 He 
explained: “Any legislation in which the issues of Legislative and Executive 
responsibilities are confused would be constitutionally suspect and would not 
 
288. Id. § 211, 100 Stat. at 1012–16 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 162, 164, 165). 
289. See Garbesi, supra note 275, at 39, 41 (observing that “Goldwater-Nichols reinforced the 
intent of previous reforms by clearly spelling out in the legislation what was often left unsaid” and 
that the law had “a profound effect on strengthening the power of the combatant commanders,” who 
“[p]reviously[] . . . had difficulty directing their component commanders . . . in joint operations”). 
290. Mark P. Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L. REV. 905, 929 
& n.128 (2019); see also Andrew J. Bacevich, Elusive Bargain: The Pattern of U.S. Civil-Military 
Relations Since World War II, in THE LONG WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 207, 245 (Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2007) (describing the “drastically 
diminished” influence of the service secretaries). 
291. Goldwater–Nichols Act § 201, 100 Stat. at 1004–10 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 151–55). 
292. See supra note 139. 
293. See generally Locher, supra note 265 (examining the background and effects of the Act). 
294. RONALD REAGAN, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING HIS VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF OUR DEFENSE 
ESTABLISHMENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE STEPS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT DEFENSE 
REFORMS, H.R. DOC. NO. 99-209, at 1–2 (1986). 
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meet with my approval.”295 But the very same statement went on to discuss 
the President’s goals without suggesting any constitutional difficulty with 
statutory assignment of duties and command relationships. 
For example, President Reagan wrote: 
Where the roles and responsibilities of each component of our defense 
establishment are necessarily placed in law, they must be clear and 
unambiguous, but not so constrained or detailed as to impair 
operational flexibility or the common sense of those in positions of 
responsibility. . . . [Laws] should establish sound, fundamental 
relationships among and between civilian and military 
authorities . . . .296 
Elsewhere, he advocated strengthening the Secretary of Defense’s 
authority297 and “set[ting] apart and establish[ing] in law” the Joint Chiefs 
Chairman’s “unique position and responsibilities.”298 Reagan’s eventual 
signing statement on the final legislation indicated no constitutional 
objections.299 
Much like President Reagan’s statement, some assertions in key 
legislative documents could imply that Congress believed a degree of 
command flexibility was constitutionally required. A key provision in the Act 
prescribed that “[u]nless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of 
command to a unified or specified combatant command runs—(1) from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense 
to the commander of the combatant command.”300 Commenting on this 
provision, a conference committee report on the final legislation explained 
that “the conferees determined that the extremely important chain of 
command to the warfighting commands should be clearly prescribed.”301 
Accordingly, the report explained, the conference legislation “specif[ied] the 
normal chain of command,” but it did so “[w]ithout infringing upon the 
President’s authority as Commander in Chief to direct otherwise.”302 
 
295. Id. at 2. Elsewhere Reagan observed cryptically: “Restrictions in the law that prohibit the 
establishment of certain command arrangements should be repealed. My authority as Commander 
in Chief is sufficient to deal with any necessary command arrangements or adjustments in the 
assignment of forces that unforeseen circumstances could require.” Id. at 5. These sentences seem 
ambiguous as to whether Reagan was advocating repeal of command restraints because he 
considered them unconstitutional or simply because they were unduly constraining. 
296. Id. at 3. 
297. Id. at 4. 
298. Id. at 5. 
299. Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Oct. 1, 1986), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-
signing-the-goldwater-nichols-department-defense-reorganization-act-1986 [https://perma.cc
/YFE7-YS29]. 
300. Goldwater–Nichols Act § 211, 100 Stat. at 1013 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 162(b)). 
301. H.R. REP. NO. 99-824, at 118 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
302. Id. 
PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/21 12:56 PM 
2021] Congress’s Power over Military Offices 545 
Though seeming to assert robust authority to prescribe chains of 
command, this cryptic qualification by the conferees might imply that 
preserving presidential authority to alter command structures was 
constitutionally necessary; alternatively, it might suggest only that Congress 
saw fit to preserve such flexibility as a matter of prudence. Whatever the 
correct view, however, more specific assertions in the very same report 
contradict any inference of preclusive general presidential control over 
military duties. For example, the very next paragraph addressed separate 
provisions precluding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from exercising 
command authority.303 According to the report, “the conferees intend[ed] that 
(1) the JCS Chairman would not be part of the chain of command, and (2) the 
chain of command would not run through the JCS Chairman.”304 Likewise, 
an earlier Senate committee report indicated that its bill would preserve “the 
President’s authority as Commander in Chief” despite also specifically 
precluding any exercise of command authority by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs.305 
On balance, then, both the Act and its history once again support broad 
congressional authority to structure the offices and chains of command 
through which the executive branch exercises military power. 
C. Implications 
 Congress’s broad authority to allocate military duties, reflected not only 
in the Constitution’s text and structure but also in legislative and executive 
practice across the Republic’s history, carries general implications for 
separation of powers that I will address later.306 This authority also, however, 
has immediate concrete significance. 
To begin with, the understanding developed here places recent statutes 
assigning military functions to officers other than the President on rock-solid 
constitutional foundations. One recent example is the statute mentioned 
earlier that grants the President and Secretary of Defense joint authority over 
whether to undertake certain cyber operations.307 Another is the provision in 
the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, to which President Trump 




305. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERV., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986, 
S. REP. NO. 99-280, at 16–17 (1986). 
306. See infra Part IV. 
307. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 
115-232, § 1642, 132 Stat. 2132 (2018), 10 U.S.C. § 394 note. 
308. Donald Trump, Statement by the President (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/briefings-statements/statement-by-the-president-34/ [https://perma.cc/KS5L-V73M]; 2020 NDAA 
Views Letter, supra note 21, at 3. 
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the Defense Secretary before American troop levels in South Korea may fall 
below a prescribed threshold.309 If the President’s executive power or 
Commander-in-Chief authority entailed preclusive personal authority over 
such governmental decisions, then vesting these military functions in an 
officer other than the President would be unconstitutional. But they do not, 
for all the reasons I have indicated. Such measures are meaningful, moreover, 
because, as with civil offices, the choice to vest these powers in a different 
officer may impose practical and political restraints on presidents even if they 
can ultimately get their way by firing or threatening to fire the officer in 
question. 
By the same token, Congress might impose measures that go even 
further, giving the secretary or another senior officer authority over nuclear 
weapons, for example, or giving a particular officer authority over a 
particular theater of combat. Lower down the hierarchy, it could also impose 
more rigid restraints on particular commands so as to give the Senate greater 
say in who actually holds specified operational authorities in the event of a 
conflict. Congress imposed similarly severe constraints during 
Reconstruction, and more routine legislation at other times reflects the same 
constitutional understanding. So long as the President retains some means of 
effectuating his or her wishes—either by removing the responsible officers 
at will, or by employing other means of discipline afforded by statute—
legislation placing a gap, and thus a potential source of friction, between the 
President’s desire and actual government action in this manner is 
constitutional. 
To the extent past Executive Branch opinions and statements suggest 
otherwise, the Executive Branch’s assertions are mistaken. Perhaps the most 
thorough and thoughtful opinion in this vein is OLC’s Clinton-era opinion 
concluding that Congress could not by statute preclude assignment of U.S. 
forces to a non-U.S. commander as part of a United Nations operation.310 
Although OLC reasoned that such authority is inherent in the President’s 
power to command U.S. forces,311 the President’s Commander-in-Chief 
power properly carries no such implication. For one thing, even if the 
President generally held broad authority over military assignments, it would 
not follow that the President’s command authority entails a preclusive power 
to place U.S. forces under officers who are not themselves subject to 
 
309. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-29, § 1254, 133 
Stat. 1671 (2019). 
310. Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical 
Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 182–83 (1996). 
311. Id. at 184 (“[T]here can be no room to doubt that the Commander-in-Chief Clause commits 
to the President alone the power to select the particular personnel who are to exercise tactical and 
operational control over U.S. forces.”). 
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presidential command.312 Furthermore, and more to the point here, because 
Congress holds authority to define military officers’ duties and command 
relationships, presidents lack authority to disregard such restraints; they must 
instead exercise command authority through the particular mechanisms 
Congress has provided. Accordingly, if Congress precludes assignment of 
U.S. forces to foreign commanders, thus effectively defining command of 
U.S. forces as an exclusive responsibility of American officers, then 
presidents lack constitutional power to override Congress’ choice. 
This constitutional analysis, of course, does not mean that limiting 
presidential command authority in these ways is necessarily prudent or wise. 
The best course may often be to retain clear presidential accountability for 
matters of war and peace and operational success or failure. Indeed, the broad 
and flexible authority over military responsibilities that Congress has 
generally provided to the President seems to reflect just that type of 
judgment. It might also be the case that binding presidential authority too 
tightly, particularly with respect to such weighty matters of national security, 
could risk undermining constitutionalism as a whole by tempting presidents 
to defy limits on their power during an emergency.313 Under the constitutional 
analysis advanced here, however, such judgments are ultimately Congress’s 
to make; the Constitution has not already made them for us. 
Congressional authority to vest duties in offices also does not 
necessarily mean that Congress can simultaneously preclude presidential 
supervision and removal of the officer exercising those duties. Grasping the 
full contours of this question, however, requires grappling with yet another 
question that has been a matter of historic debate but is largely neglected in 
contemporary scholarship: the scope of presidential removal authority over 
military officers. 
III. Presidential Removal Authority 
A next key question regarding congressional authority over military 
offices concerns presidential removal power. Do presidents necessarily hold 
constitutional authority to remove all military officers at will, or can 
Congress instead grant such officers tenure protection or require their 
removal through specified procedures, such as court-martial prosecution? 
Earlier in the country’s history, this question was a matter of extensive 
debate, yet for all the ink spilled over removal in general, modern scholars 
 
312. According to John Yoo, presidents had never before claimed that such authority was part 
of the Commander-in-Chief power. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 173, 175–76 (2005). 
313. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Publius Paradox, 82 MODERN L. REV. 1 (2019) 
(advancing this argument). 
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have given the question and its broader implications comparatively little 
attention.314 
In fact, the best view of the constitutional text and structure, interpreted 
in light of subsequent practice, supports a result with respect to military 
officers that administrative lawyers may find surprising. In the civil and 
administrative context, the removal debate has resulted (for the moment at 
least) in case law that generally supports presidential authority to remove 
officers but grants Congress limited authority to give certain positions tenure 
protection. With respect to the military, by contrast, longstanding practice 
supports allowing limits on presidential removal authority, at least during 
peacetime, even with respect to operational military functions, so long as 
Congress has provided by law for robust alternative means of command 
discipline. Presidents and those in the chain of command today may often 
have authority to relieve an officer of particular duties such as command of 
a particular ship or unit, but they do not have authority in peacetime to 
unilaterally remove an officer from the service altogether. In this Part, I first 
defend this understanding of Article II and then address its implications for 
congressional authority. 
A. Congress’s Power to Limit Presidential Removal 
1. The Constitutional Text and Structure 
a. Removal as Default Commander-in-Chief Authority.—As noted earlier, 
the extent of presidential removal authority is one of the oldest and most 
fraught debates in constitutional law. Although the Constitution says nothing 
specific about presidential removal, the First Congress apparently 
determined, following extensive debate, in its “Decision of 1789” that 
principal executive officers are at least presumptively subject to termination 
by the President.315 At any rate, the debate resulted in a set of statutes that 
made no provision for removal but referred obliquely to presidential removal 
of the department head. Attorneys General and other commentators at the 
 
314. Two recent treatments have briefly defended these removal limitations. See Kent H. 
Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1399–1400 
(2012) (arguing that the limitations are valid exercises of Congress’s power over military discipline 
and accord with other cases upholding removal limitations); Barron & Lederman, supra note 83, at 
1105 (“Each of the branches has long accepted . . . that Congress can provide for courts-martial to 
have a decisive role, even countermanding the President’s judgments, in some personnel questions, 
including dismissal from the service.”); see also Dakota S. Rudesill, The Land and Naval Forces 
Clause, 86 U. CINN. L. REV. 391, 406 n.51 (2018) (noting “reasonable disagreement” over the 
question). Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund also called attention to removal 
limitations for military officers. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 543 (2010). The majority, however, characterized this example as “far afield” from the 
questions at issue in the case. Id. at 507. 
315. Prakash, supra note 41, at 1067–68. 
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time understood this outcome to imply a constitutional removal power for the 
President.316 
One department addressed in these statutes, albeit not the initial focus 
of debates, was the Department of War.317 This early practice thus supports 
viewing at least the Defense Secretary and other senior civilian officials with 
responsibility for military functions as at least presumptively removable by 
the President. Even apart from this history, moreover, the constitutional text 
and structure offer particularly strong reasons to presume presidential 
removal power, at least as a default rule, with respect to all officers with 
military authority. The President, after all, is Commander in Chief. Whatever 
else this status entails, it must carry some constitutional power to ensure 
adherence to presidential commands. Presuming presidential authority to 
impose disciplinary measures other than removal or suspension, however, 
would violate more specific constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws 
and punishment without due process.318 Removal and suspension, by 
contrast, hold a deep pedigree as basic aspects of command authority, even 
apart from the broader history of removal debates going back to the Decision 
of 1789.319 
The Constitution’s exclusion of military offices from impeachment 
reinforces this inference. Lest the Constitution create a dangerous vacuum of 
military unaccountability, military officers must be accountable, directly or 
indirectly, to the President if they are not accountable to Congress through 
impeachment. Joseph Story’s influential treatise thus explained military 
officers’ exclusion from impeachment by reference to the alternative system 
of military discipline: “The very nature and efficiency of military duties and 
discipline require this summary and exclusive jurisdiction; and the 
promptitude of its operations are not only better suited to the notions of 
military men; but they deem their honour and their reputation more safe in 
the hands of their brother officers, than in any merely civil tribunal.”320 
It is true that, even without the Commander-in-Chief Clause, one might 
derive presidential removal authority from textual provisions invoked in 
other settings, such as the Vesting and Take Care Clauses. But those 
provisions seem less readily applicable to the military. By obligating the 
President to ensure faithful execution of the laws, the Take Care Clause 
arguably implies authority to remove officers who execute laws unfaithfully. 
 
316. Id.; see also infra subsection III(A)(2)(a). 
317. See Prakash, supra note 41, at 1023 & n.7. 
318. See PRAKASH, supra note 54, at 158 (arguing the President lacks unilateral authority to 
impose such penalties). 
319. See id. (arguing based on English practice that “the president can suspend or oust 
disobedient soldiers and sailors”). 
320. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 258–
59 (1991). 
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As Saikrishna Prakash has observed, however, it is not obvious that most 
military functions constitute execution of the laws.321 The military, to be sure, 
has at times performed law-enforcement functions, but since 1878 the Posse 
Comitatus Act and other statutes have limited such use of the armed forces.322 
A conventional military campaign, by contrast, amounts to law-execution 
only in the attenuated sense that it involves seeking to achieve some express 
or implied congressional objective.  
Alternatively, removal authority might be part of the “Executive Power” 
conferred on Presidents by the Vesting Clause. Prakash generally endorses 
this view, arguing that “the Constitution’s grant of executive power 
encompasses a removal power” with respect to executive officers.323 But 
applying that view here requires presuming not only that the Vesting Clause 
has substantive content (rather than simply conferring the powers granted 
elsewhere in Article II), but also that it properly extends beyond law 
execution into other aspects of traditional executive authority. Some recent 
scholarship has called that view into question, at least as a matter of original 
meaning.324 In any event, whatever the correct interpretation of the Vesting 
Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause provides a specific textual anchor 
for presuming presidential removal authority with respect to military officers. 
This conclusion nevertheless is not the end of the story, because here, 
as in other areas, the most difficult question is not whether Article II supports 
inferring presidential removal authority as a constitutional default, but 
whether the Constitution ever allows Congress to limit that authority. Despite 
all the reasons for generally inferring presidential removal authority, modern 
case law, at least, could support relaxing this requirement with respect to 
certain narrow functions, even within the military, such as those relating to 
military justice. Simplifying somewhat, after suggesting in one case that at-
will presidential removal is essential for executive officers,325 the Supreme 
Court held during the New Deal that Congress may grant tenure protection 
to “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-adjudicative” offices such as multimember 
regulatory commissions, but not to “purely executive” offices.326 Half a 
century later, the Court qualified even that conclusion by holding that 
 
321. Prakash, supra note 46, at 1837. 
322. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018). For a brief primer on current statutory restraints, see Nevitt, 
supra note 83, at 471–73. 
323. Prakash, supra note 46, at 1815; see also Prakash, supra note 1, at 363 (“The [Constitution] 
grants the power to remove [military officers] via the grant of Executive power.”). Prakash has 
argued with respect to the military that Congress has broad authority to regulate the military, 
including how operations are conducted, but that within such statutory limits, the President as 
Commander in Chief “may direct military operations” and control officers through removal. Id. at 
351. 
324. See generally Mortenson, supra note 113 (arguing against this view of the Vesting Clause). 
325. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). 
326. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1935). 
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Congress could require for-cause removal for even a purely executive 
position such as a prosecutor if the office’s responsibilities were relatively 
narrow and some particular functional need justified independence.327 In 
Seila, the Court characterized this case law as recognizing a general rule of 
at-will removal authority, subject to two limited exceptions: “one for 
multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power, 
and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no policymaking or 
administrative authority.”328 
Under this framework, military offices would presumably be purely 
executive (and thus subject to at-will removal) as a general matter, but tenure 
protection could be justified for those with “limited duties,” particularly in 
settings involving a functional need for independence. In keeping with this 
logic, as noted earlier, several adjudicatory military offices hold tenure 
protections of the sort associated with independent agencies and adjudicatory 
officers in the administrative context. Judges on the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, for example, are appointed to fifteen-year terms and 
removable only “by the President, upon notice and hearing, for (1) neglect of 
duty; (2) misconduct; or (3) mental or physical disability.”329 Military judges 
are similarly protected against adverse treatment based on their rulings even 
though they are military officers within the chain of command.330 
But it turns out that such narrow, functionally justified limitations are 
only the tip of the iceberg with respect to the military. Congress has enacted 
much more general removal restraints, albeit ones that involve a model of 
independence quite alien to the usual debates in administrative law, and one 
that the Court has yet to consider in its modern case law. 
b. The Complicating Factor of Military Discipline  
 i. Statutory Architecture.—Since 1866, governing statutes have 
limited disciplinary removal of nearly all military officers in peacetime 
without a court martial. The current version of the governing statute provides: 
“No commissioned officer may be dismissed from any armed force except 
(1) by sentence of a general court-martial; (2) in commutation of a sentence 
of a general court-martial; or (3) in time of war, by order of the President.”331 
 
327. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
328. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–2200 (2020). 
329. 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) (2018). 
330. 10 U.S.C. § 826(c)(2) (2018). 
331. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 123(a) (2018) (“In time of war, or of 
national emergency declared by Congress or the President . . . , the President may suspend the 
operation of any provision of law relating to the promotion, involuntary retirement, or separation of 
commissioned officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard Reserve.”); 
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At the same time, the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes disobedience 
of lawful orders, as well as other forms of insubordination, punishable by 
court-martial through sanctions including, when appropriate, removal from 
office.332  
Today, “dismissal” is a term of art for a punitive separation, akin to the 
“dishonorable discharge” of enlisted personnel,333 and dismissal by a general 
court-martial sentence generally results in a loss of veterans’ benefits.334 
Other statutes, however, more generally regulate involuntary separation. 
Apart from certain officers in an initial probationary status,335 officers in the 
regular military can generally be discharged against their will only if they are 
not promoted within certain periods,336 or if a board of inquiry composed of 
other officers determines, in accordance with applicable regulations, that 
their performance was substandard, that they committed “moral or 
professional dereliction,” or that their continued service is “not clearly 
consistent with the interests of national security.”337 
Furthermore, when Congress first imposed limits on “dismissal” in 
1866, the term carried no pejorative implication. Treatises and Attorney 
General opinions referred to presidential removals of military officers as 
dismissals.338 As a 1915 treatise explained, “Dismissal by executive order is 
 
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 10 (1921) (indicating that the term “time of peace” in this statute 
requires “not a mere cessation of hostilities, but peace in the complete sense, officially proclaimed”). 
Section 1161(b) also provides for an officer’s termination following an extended unauthorized 
absence or certain criminal convictions by a court martial or civilian court. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(b) 
(2018). 
332. See 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2018) (willful disobedience); id. § 889 (disrespect toward superior 
officer). For a much earlier statute to similar effect, prescribing “death, or such other punishment as 
a court martial shall direct” for “[a]ny officer, seaman, mariner or other person [in the navy] who 
shall disobey the orders of his superior”, see Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 709, 711 (1799). 
333. 2 SCHLUETER, supra note 129, at § 16-17(C). 
334. E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a) (2018); United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 45 (C.A.A.F. 2000). 
See generally Major John W. Brooker, Major Evan R. Seamone & Leslie C. Rogall, Beyond 
“T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility 
Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the Armed Forces, 214 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2012) 
(examining the impact of involuntary and punitive discharges on benefits eligibility). 
335. 10 U.S.C. § 630 (2018). 
336. 10 U.S.C. §§ 631, 632 (2018). 
337. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1181–82, 1184–87 (2018) (establishing review process to determine whether 
the service secretary may remove an officer from active duty); see also DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 1920.6D, ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF 
OFFICERS (2019), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel 
%20Support/01-900%20Military%20Separation%20Services/1920.6D.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8RGV-YH2M] (regulation governing administrative separation of Navy and Marine Corps 
officers). Apart from these procedures, the President or Secretary of Defense may also “drop from 
the rolls” an officer who has been absent without authority for three months. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(b) 
(2018); see also 10 U.S.C. § 804(d) (2018) (providing no right to trial for such discharges). 
338. See, e.g., Claim of Surgeon Du Barry, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 608–09 (addressing “the 
power of the President to dismiss military or naval officers from the service without the sentence of 
a courtmartial” and equating this authority with removal of civil officers). 
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quite distinct from dismissal by sentence. The latter is a punishment; the 
former is removal from office.”339 Another treatise from 1920 elaborated that 
“a reproach upon [the officer’s] reputation” was “by no means an essential 
incident of an executive dismissal,” even if the terms “discharge” or 
“mustering out,” rather than dismissal, were typically employed for 
blameless separations from service.340 At any rate, during the Civil War, 
President Lincoln summarily dismissed officers “in a great number of cases, 
sometimes for the purpose of summarily ridding the service of unworthy 
officers, sometimes in the form of a discharge or muster-out of officers whose 
services were simply no longer required.”341 Nineteenth-century statutes 
limiting presidential dismissal were thus understood at the time as 
congressional attempts to displace any presidential authority to summarily 
remove military officers from service.342 
The statutory structure adopted at the close of the Civil War and refined 
over time thus raises a somewhat different question from more familiar 
debates over at-will removal. Whereas administrative-law debates typically 
center on whether Congress can limit presidential control altogether, current 
and historic military statutes present the question whether Congress can 
displace outright presidential removal power if it provides instead some 
alternative mechanism of control. Lacking impeachment authority, Congress, 
in effect, has reinforced military officers’ accountability to the President 
through the chain of command by criminalizing certain forms of 
disobedience. At the same time, however, it has implemented this control 
through courts martial, thus affording a degree of due process that would be 
lacking if a president simply terminated the officer directly. To the extent this 
statutory structure is valid, it affords military officers with the rough 
equivalent of the civil-service protections that prevent arbitrary dismissal of 
certain personnel outside the military. 
 ii. Constitutional Questions.—But are such removal limitations 
constitutional? On the one hand, Congress not only holds authority to raise 
 
339. MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 524 (1915). 
340. WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 737; see also DAVIS, supra note 339, at 526 (indicating that 
the dismissal of an officer by executive order “may have involved no disgrace”). Winthrop did 
acknowledge that a nonpunitive dismissal without any adjudicatory process could neither impose 
any disability against future employment nor strip an officer of vested rights such as entitlement to 
pay. WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 739–40. 
341. DAVIS, supra note 339, at 525 n.3; see also WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 737 
(distinguishing summary presidential dismissals from punitive court-martial dismissals). 
342. BERDAHL, supra note 154, at 128 (indicating that in “the acts of March 3, 1865, and 
July 13, 1866,” both discussed infra in notes 373–74 and the accompanying text, “Congress divested 
the President of his absolute power of removal at all times”); see also DAVIS, supra note 339, at 
524–25, 527–28 (discussing this statutory change); WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 740 (same). 
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armies and provide navies, but also to establish “Rules for [their] 
Government and Regulation.”343 As a textual matter, prescribing mechanisms 
of military discipline is a straightforward exercise of Congress’s power to 
establish rules regulating the military. Given that the Constitution expressly 
assigns this power to Congress, any such statutory provision might override 
any competing presidential authority to exercise command discipline outside 
of statutorily prescribed limits. By the same token, statutory limits on 
discharging military officers might also constitute necessary and proper 
means of “raising” an army or “providing” a navy; after all, an unremoved 
officer necessarily remains available for service. 
The Supreme Court’s broad holding, noted earlier, that “the Legislative 
Branch [has] plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the 
framework of the Military Establishment”344 could reinforce these textual 
inferences. As we have seen, furthermore, even absent specific statutes 
governing military discipline, early authorities like Joseph Story presumed 
that military discipline would generally occur through the judgments of 
“military men” rather than the President alone (or impeachment).345 As a 
practical matter, such disciplinary mechanisms may help sustain military 
professionalism and protect officers’ careers, thus limiting presidents’ ability 
to make military service a matter of personal allegiance. That objective 
accords strongly with the framers’ oft-stated fear that standing armies could 
undermine republican governance.346 
On the other hand, the President does, once again, hold the constitutional 
status of Commander in Chief. Allowing removal only through courts martial 
could greatly burden this command prerogative if it meant that presidents 
could be stuck with officers in whom they had lost confidence. As one 
Senator put it in a debate discussed further below, “I can not conceive how 
discipline could be maintained in the Army if the President of the United 
States could not weed out the unworthy, the unfaithful, and the dishonest.”347 
Avoiding exercises of government power without presidential accountability 
has been a key reason for inferring removal authority in other settings with 
 
343. For an argument that this constitutional provision authorizing Congress to “make rules for 
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, grants 
broad authority not only over internal military discipline, but also over the military’s external 
projection of force, see generally Rudesill, supra note 314. See also John C. Dehn, Why a President 
Cannot Authorize the Military to Violate (Most of) the Law of War, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 
886–89 (2018) (arguing that Congress may bind the President by statute to follow law-of-war 
restrictions on use of force). 
344. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
345. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
346. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 128, 132–33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009); THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 205, 208–09 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(addressing concern). 
347. 41 CONG. REC. 1082 (1907) (statement of Sen. Clay). 
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respect to core executive offices.348 The same functional concern might 
likewise support recognizing a constitutional removal power over military 
officials. 
The tension between these two positions has in fact been a matter of 
long-running, if largely forgotten, debate. The controversy, moreover, is not 
only important in its own right, but also offers an important example of 
apparent constitutional resolution followed by renewed controversy and 
resolution. 
2. Historical Liquidation, De-Liquidation, and Re-Liquidation 
a. The Antebellum Understanding.—Although Presidents in the 
antebellum Republic appear to have claimed authority to remove all military 
officers at will, this practice’s validity was repeatedly contested. 
In an 1846 treatise on military law, Captain William C. De Hart argued 
that presidents lacked “the legal right . . . to dismiss from the service, without 
trial, a commissioned officer of the army or navy.”349 According to De Hart, 
the Decision of 1789 provided no authority for such removal power. Officers 
in civil departments, according to De Hart, “were appointed by the president 
as aids in the administration of the government, and for the proper and 
becoming exercise of all its powers he is justly held responsible.”350 Hence, 
in the 1789 debates, “it was, in reference to civil officers, conceded, that for 
the faithful execution of the law, the power of removal was incidental to that 
duty, and might often be requisite to fulfill it.”351 By contrast, because 
military officers are subject to military discipline for disobedience, they are 
“the mere actors in a subordinate sphere.”352 “[H]armony of opinions 
between them and the executive is not requisite for any administrative act or 
measure of government; and though the president is responsible to the nation 
for the general direction of military forces, yet he is not so for their individual 
conduct.”353 Nor, according to De Hart, was a power of immediate 
presidential removal practically necessary, “because the legally established 
tribunal [a court martial] can always be convoked for the doing of justice . . . 
in all cases of military delinquencies.”354 
 
348. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) 
(“Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep these officers 
accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.”). 
349. WILLIAM C. DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION AND 
PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL 228 (1846). 
350. Id. at 230–31. 
351. Id. at 231. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. at 233. 
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Echoing De Hart’s view, terminated military officers repeatedly 
objected to being fired without a court martial. In several antebellum 
opinions, exasperated Attorneys General rejected this view, but the argument, 
zombie-like, kept coming back. In the first such opinion, in 1842, Attorney 
General Hugh Legare considered “whether the President of the United States 
may strike an officer from the rolls, without a trial by a court martial, 
notwithstanding a decision in that officer’s favor by a court of inquiry ordered 
for the investigation of his conduct.”355 “Whatever I might have thought of 
the power of removal from office, if the subject were res integra,” Legare 
opined, “it is now too late to dispute the settled construction of 1789.”356 That 
construction, according to Legare, treated removal as deriving “from the very 
nature of executive power, absolute in the President, subject only to his 
responsibility to the country (his constituent) for a breach of such a vast and 
solemn trust.”357 
The Attorney General went on to draw the opposite inference from 
De Hart. “[I]f necessity is a sufficient ground” for inferring removal authority 
with respect to civil officers, Legare reasoned, then “[i]t is obvious that . . . 
the argument applies a multo fortiori to the military and naval 
departments.”358 Furthermore, although it may be a “very peculiar hardship” 
to subject “brave and honorable men” holding military commissions to the 
“capricious despotism” of discretionary presidential removal, prior English 
practice, as well as the practice of other “nations jealous of their rights, and 
earnest in upholding and enforcing their laws against all prerogative,” 
nonetheless recognized “the necessity of such a power in the commander in 
chief of their army and navy.”359 
Just a few years later, in 1847, Attorney General Nathan Clifford 
revisited the issue at greater length. He, too, relied principally on the Decision 
of 1789, declaring that “the question was distinctly settled by the Congress 
of 1789 in favor of the power of the President, so far as it relates to the civil 
officers of the government.”360 This understanding, according to Clifford, 
“was acquiesced in at the time, and has since received the sanction of every 
department of the government.”361 Like Legare, moreover, Clifford viewed 
the Decision of 1789 as a gloss on the nature of executive power, though he 
seemed to recognize that Congress could impose some degree of tenure 
 
355. Military Power of the President to Dismiss from Service, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 1 (1842). 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 1–2. 
358. Id. at 2. 
359. Id. 
360. The Claim of Surgeon Du Barry for Back Pay, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 609 (1847). 
361. Id. 
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protection for civil officers,362 and he also suggested that removal authority 
should normally be incident to appointment power.363 At any rate, he devoted 
much of his analysis to rejecting any distinction between civil and military 
officers with respect to their removability at will.364 
Finally, in 1853, Attorney General Caleb Cushing reiterated the same 
conclusions all over again. “Reasons of a special nature may be deemed to 
exist,” he observed, “why the rule [of at-will presidential removal] should not 
be applied to military, in the same way it is to civil, officers; but the legal 
applicability to both classes of officers is, it is conceived, the settled 
construction of the Constitution.”365 Although military officers may “be 
deprived of their commissions by the decision of a court martial,” Cushing 
saw this possibility as equivalent to the impeachment option for civil 
officers.366 “The difference between the two cases is in the form and mode of 
trial, not in the principle, which leaves unimpaired, in both cases alike, the 
whole constitutional power of the President.”367 
Curiously, none of these opinions relied squarely on the Commander-
in-Chief Clause. On the contrary, these Attorneys General relied principally 
on the Decision of 1789 and the presumed equivalence of civil and military 
officers under the pertinent constitutional provisions. In any event, all 
concluded, over the repeated objections of disgruntled officers, that the 
President held constitutional authority to remove military officers at will. 
By the time of the Civil War, then, presidential removal authority over 
military officers appeared to be settled; as noted, President Lincoln 
repeatedly discharged officers on his own authority, sometimes even after a 
court-martial acquitted them.368 In fact, in 1862, Congress codified this 
understanding. It enacted a statute providing: 
 
362. Id. at 609 (“It is conceded that [civil officers of the government] are removable at pleasure 
in all cases under the constitution where the term of office is not specially declared.”). 
363. Id. at 609–11. 
364. See id. at 610 (finding it “difficult to appreciate the reasoning which seeks to affix a 
permanent tenure to military office, while it is admitted that all civil officers appointed under the 
same clause, with the exceptions specially provided for in the constitution, hold their places subject 
to the executive discretion”). 
365. Military Storekeepers, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 4, 6 (1853). 
366. Id. 
367. Id. 
368. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. Military appointments and promotions during 
the Civil War were often self-consciously partisan. See, e.g., Timothy J. Orr, “All Manner of 
Schemes and Rascalities”: The Politics of Promotion in the Union Army, in THIS DISTRACTED AND 
ANARCHICAL PEOPLE: NEW ANSWERS FOR OLD QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CIVIL WAR-ERA NORTH 
81 (Andrew L. Slap & Michael Thomas Smith eds., 2013) (documenting the role of partisan 
patronage in Civil War military appointments); Andrew J. Polsky, “Mr. Lincoln’s Army” Revisited: 
Partisanship, Institutional Position, and Union Army Command, 1861–1865, 16 STUD. AM. POL. 
DEV. 176, 177–78 (2002) (same). 
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That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, authorized 
and requested to dismiss and discharge from the military service either 
in the army, navy, marine corps, or volunteer force, in the United 
States service, any officer for any cause which, in his judgment, either 
renders such officer unsuitable for, or whose dismission would 
promote, the public service.369 
Attorneys General in the years afterwards viewed this statute as 
confirming the earlier executive branch view. “This provision did not,” one 
wrote in 1868, “clothe the President with a new power, but gave an express 
legislative sanction to the exercise of a power incident to the high official 
trust confided to him.”370 “So far as [the 1862 Act] gives authority to the 
President,” another wrote in an 1878 opinion addressing an 1861 dismissal, 
“it is simply declaratory of the long-established law.”371  
In the terms employed by some scholars today, legislative and executive 
practice thus appeared to have “liquidated” the Constitution’s meaning with 
respect to military removal authority, resolving any textual ambiguity on the 
question in favor of presidential power.372 Even then, to be sure, it might have 
been unclear whether such power existed only in the absence of statutory 
restraints or even in the face of them. Whatever its scope, however, no sooner 
had this understanding crystallized than Reconstruction destabilized it. 
b. The Reconstruction Watershed.—As the Civil War drew to a close, 
Congress abruptly shifted its view of military removals. First, in March 1865, 
it enacted a statute allowing any officer dismissed by presidential order to 
request a court-martial on the charges forming the basis for his dismissal.373 
Then, in July 1866, amid its escalating political conflicts with President 
Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction policy, Congress went further. As a 
rider to an appropriations statute, Congress enacted a provision that not only 
repealed the 1862 statute on removals, but also imposed the following 
constraint on presidential authority: “And no officer in the military or naval 
service shall in time of peace, be dismissed . . . except upon and in pursuance 
of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect, or in commutation thereof.”374 
Thus, after effectively codifying the Executive Branch view of presidential 
authority in 1862, Congress adopted statutes at the start of Reconstruction 
 
369. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 200, § 17, 12 Stat. 594, 596 (1862). 
370. Case of Colonel Belger, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 421, 426 (1868). 
371. Dismissal of Officer in the Marine Corps, 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 421, 422 (1878). 
372. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019) (discussing 
“liquidation” as a theory of interpretation). 
373. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 12, 13 Stat. 487, 489 (1865) (requiring the President to 
convene a court-martial if a dismissed officer “shall make an application in writing for a trial, setting 
forth under oath that he has been wrongfully and unjustly dismissed”). 
374. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, § 5, 14 Stat. 90, 92 (1866). 
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that effectively codified De Hart’s alternative theory. Limitations on 
peacetime removal of military officers have remained in effect, with minor 
alterations, ever since.375 
Given the context and the statutory exclusion of wartime dismissals, one 
might think these restraints, when enacted, were effectively governing a form 
of domestic civil administration. The Army, after all, was initially the federal 
government’s main instrument for enforcing Reconstruction policy in the 
defeated Confederate states,376 and concerns that President Johnson might 
disrupt Reconstruction by demobilizing the Army or purging it of disloyal 
officers might explain this provision’s enactment in 1866. The next year, 
Congress enacted the tenure protections for senior government officials 
discussed earlier.377 Again, however, Congress’s legal theory for 
Reconstruction governance in the years immediately after the Civil War 
depended on war powers, not ordinary means of domestic federal 
governance.378 Accordingly, any notion that these tenure protections 
reflected a theory of civil rather than military administration is misplaced. 
What is more, general restrictions on military dismissals have endured 
while those on the Secretary of War, General of the Army, and other cabinet 
officials have not. As noted, the House of Representatives ultimately 
impeached President Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act by 
removing the Secretary of War, but the Senate failed to convict in part 
because of constitutional doubts about the statute’s validity.379 Following 
Ulysses Grant’s election in 1868, Congress repealed the Army Chief rider 
and relaxed the Tenure of Office Act (eventually repealing it altogether in 
1887),380 but the more general removal restrictions in the 1865 and 1866 
statutes remained in effect. They thus continued to govern military removals 
well after the Army’s withdrawal from the South and from law enforcement 
functions more generally. Indeed, they remain in place to this day, albeit as 
part of a more reticulated legal structure.381 Even if such limitations apply 
 
375. See 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (2018) (generally requiring court-martial sentence for peacetime 
dismissal of commissioned military officers); supra note 331 and accompanying text. A leading 
treatise on military law from 1920 characterized the 1866 Act as “the first instance, since the 
organization of the government under the Constitution, in which Congress has expressly prohibited 
the exercise by the President of the power of removal from office.” WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 
740. The 1866 law rendered the earlier 1865 provision effective only for wartime dismissals. DAVIS, 
supra note 339, at 528 n.1. 
376. On the federal government’s limited enforcement capacity during Reconstruction, see 
BROOKS D. SIMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION PRESIDENTS 182 (1998). 
377. See supra notes 193–95 and 233–34 and accompanying text. 
378. See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text. 
379. SIMPSON, supra note 376, at 125–27. 
380. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 15, 16 Stat. 315, 319 (1870) (repealing Army rider); Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 168 (1926) (discussing revision of Tenure of Office Act followed by 
full repeal in 1887). 
381. See supra notes 331–37 and accompanying text. 
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only during peacetime, constraints on presidential removal authority could 
significantly constrain presidents’ power to staff the military officer corps on 
which they will depend if war erupts. 
c. Curious Judicial and Executive Decisions.—Rather surprisingly, case 
law appears not to squarely resolve these statutes’ constitutionality, although 
courts and the Executive Branch appear to have largely acquiesced to their 
validity. 
To begin with, in a century-old case addressing the 1866 statute’s 
constitutionality, the Supreme Court upheld it, yet it did so based on 
reasoning that appears questionable in light of later decisions. Affirming the 
Court of Claims and adopting its reasoning, the Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Perkins382 that a Naval Academy graduate was an officer and that 
statutory career protections thus prevented the Secretary of the Navy from 
unilaterally discharging him without cause.383 The Court reasoned that “when 
Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of 
Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best 
for the public interest.”384 
Although Perkins thus supports the statute’s validity, the Supreme Court 
described the case’s holding narrowly in Seila. According to Seila, Perkins, 
along with Morrison v. Olson, which upheld tenure protections for an 
independent prosecutor,385 supports an exception to at-will presidential 
removal authority “for inferior officers with limited duties and no 
policymaking or administrative authority.”386 Though appropriate to the 
naval cadet in Perkins, that description may well be inapplicable to other 
military officers with more significant duties who are also statutorily 
protected from peacetime removal. In addition, in Free Enterprise Fund, the 
Court held that two layers of tenure protection—protection for both the 
inferior officer and the superior officer with authority to remove him or her—
is unconstitutional.387 Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent that military 
officers enjoy a form of two-layer protection insofar as they are removable 
only based on the judgments of other military officers serving on courts-
martial or boards of inquiry who are also protected from at-will removal.388 
More generally, Seila, Free Enterprise Fund, and other recent cases 
have focused on accountability to the President as the central constitutional 
value offended by removal limitations. In Seila, for example, the Court 
 
382. 116 U.S. 483 (1886). 
383. Id. at 484–85. 
384. Id. at 485 (quoting Perkins v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 438 (1885)). 
385. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988). 
386. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–2200 (2020). 
387. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). 
388. Id. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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interpreted Article II’s Vesting Clause to afford the President “power to 
remove—and thus supervise—those who wield executive power on his 
behalf.”389 Even Morrison upheld removal limitations on an independent 
prosecutor only because they were functionally justified and the prosecutor’s 
mandate was purportedly limited.390 It did not apply Perkins’s logic that 
Congress’s discretion over appointment of inferior officers implies plenary 
discretion over criteria for their removal.391 
At the same time, a separate line of decisions appears to recognize 
constitutional difficulties with limiting presidential removal authority over 
military officers, but these decisions, too, employ reasoning that is difficult 
to square with later case law. Beginning in McElrath v. United States392 in 
1880, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1865 and 1866 statutes to allow 
replacement of an officer without a court-martial through confirmation of 
another individual to take the officer’s place.393 As the Court explained in 
another decision that year, Blake v. United States,394 the 1866 statute reflected 
“the serious differences existing, or which were apprehended, between the 
legislative and executive branches of the government . . . , in the States lately 
in rebellion, of the reconstruction acts of Congress.”395 Because “[m]ost, if 
not all, of the senior officers of the army enjoyed, as we may know from the 
public history of the period, the confidence of the political organization then 
 
389. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2191–92. 
390. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72. 
391. Cf. United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 614 (D.D.C. 
2018) (“It is unlikely that the broad and dated language of Perkins survived” Edmond v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), “which demands that inferior officers be subordinate to superiors and 
does not contemplate allowing unremovable officers if ‘for the public interest.’” (quoting United 
States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)), appeal dismissed, No. 18-3061, 2018 WL 5115521 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 17, 2018). Even applying Perkins’s reasoning, furthermore, that case’s holding 
might not apply to other officers covered by removal limitations who, unlike the naval cadet in 
Perkins, were appointed by the President with or without Senate confirmation and not by a 
department head. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 624(c) (2018) (allowing appointment by the President alone 
for promotions to lieutenant or lieutenant (junior grade) in the Navy or First Lieutenant or Captain 
in the other branches but otherwise requiring Senate confirmation for promotions); id. § 531 (similar 
for original appointments). Insofar as officers appointed with Senate confirmation are nonetheless 
inferior officers whose appointment Congress could vest in the President alone or the Secretary of 
Defense, removal limitations might still be valid under the reasoning in Perkins. But on the other 
hand, one might argue that activating the authority to limit removal should require making an 
affirmative choice to vest appointment authority in the Secretary or President alone. Cf. Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161–62 (1926) (explaining that “[w]hether the action of Congress in 
removing the necessity for the advice and consent of the Senate and putting the power of 
appointment in the President alone would make his power of removal in such case any more subject 
to Congressional legislation than before is a question this court did not decide in the Perkins Case” 
and suggesting that “[u]nder the reasoning upon which the legislative decision of 1789 was put, it 
might be difficult to avoid a negative answer, but it is not before us and we do not decide it”). 
392. 102 U.S. 426 (1880). 
393. Id. at 437–39. 
394. 103 U.S. 227 (1880). 
395. Id. at 235. 
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controlling the legislative branch of the government [i.e., the Republican 
Party],” Congress expected that those officers “would carry out the policy of 
Congress, as indicated in the reconstruction acts, and suppress all attempts to 
treat them as unconstitutional and void, or to overthrow them by force.”396 
The Court thus presumed that the statute’s purpose was to prevent willful 
presidential depletion of the force, not replacement of some officers with 
others confirmed by the Senate.397 
Although in these and later decisions the Court expressly avoided 
resolving any constitutional questions,398 its reading of the statute might be 
understood as a saving construction aimed at preserving presidential 
authority over the officer corps. If so, however, the Court solved one 
constitutional difficulty only by creating a worse one, at least from the point 
of view of later cases. In its landmark 1926 decision in Myers v. United 
States, the Supreme Court invalidated a provision directly conditioning 
removal of an inferior executive officer on Senate approval, yet its reasoning 
extends equally to provisions conditioning removal on Senate approval of a 
successor.399 In fact, the Myers majority characterized provisions of the 
Tenure of Office Act400 that allowed removal of officers only upon 
confirmation of a Senate-approved successor as no different from the 
removal condition at issue in the case.401 
For its part, the Executive Branch likewise applied the statute without 
recognizing any difficulty in at least one legal opinion. In 1910, Attorney 
General George Wickersham declined to apply Attorney General Cushing’s 
1853 opinion on presidential removal authority because it was written “long 
before the enactment [in the 1866 statute], which forbids the dismissal except 
 
396. Id. at 235–36. 
397. Id. at 237 (“There was, as we think, no intention to deny or restrict the power of the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to displace [officers] by the appointment 
of others in their places.”). 
398. See Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541, 545 (1922) (noting statutory construction and 
observing that “[t]he validity of these acts has never been directly passed on by this court in any 
case”); Mullan v. United States, 140 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1891) (applying statutory construction from 
Blake and McElrath); Blake, 103 U.S. at 236 (expressing no opinion as to whether “the power of 
the President and Senate . . . could be constitutionally subjected to restrictions by statute”); 
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 437 (1880) (likewise avoiding constitutional questions). 
399. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
400. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867) (generally providing that all 
civil officers “shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner 
appointed and duly qualified,” but providing that “the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, 
of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney General” would hold 
their offices throughout the appointing president’s term unless removed “by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate”). 
401. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (holding that “the Tenure of Office Act . . . , in so far as it 
attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by 
him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation 
of the same effect was equally so”). 
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upon sentence of a court-martial. This is a limitation upon the power of 
removal from office of one who had been legally appointed.”402 To the same 
effect, Attorney General Henry Stanberry opined in 1866 that Congress’s 
initial statute allowing court-martial override of presidential removals was 
valid.403 As a matter of practice, furthermore, presidents in the decades since 
appear to have complied routinely with these limitations on their removal 
power. Although a leading treatise on military law in 1920 asserted that the 
1866 statute was unconstitutional given the contrary view “firmly 
established” in antebellum practice,404 at least one leading practice manual 
today does not even indicate any possible constitutional problem.405 
d. An Illuminating Later Debate—Plus a Telling Modern Example.—As 
for Congress, it extensively debated the scope of presidential removal 
authority with respect to the military at least one other time after 
Reconstruction, and its apparent conclusions are illuminating, if again not 
entirely decisive. A more recent incident, moreover, highlights the value of 
current statutory protections for officers and enlisted personnel. 
To start with the congressional debate, in November 1906, President 
Theodore Roosevelt impulsively dismissed 167 African-American soldiers 
in three infantry companies based on reports that some men in the companies 
had engaged in a “riotous disturbance,” leading to one death, while stationed 
in Brownsville, Texas.406 The evidence supporting these allegations was 
weak or nonexistent, and historians have judged them to be false; in fact, the 
soldiers were likely framed by racist town residents who wanted the 
companies relocated.407 Nevertheless, and despite considerable political 
controversy at the time, Roosevelt obtusely resisted calls to reinstate the men 
pending a more thorough investigation.408 
This sorry episode is relevant here because congressional opposition to 
Roosevelt’s action prompted extensive debate in the Senate over the 
President’s authority to dismiss military personnel without a court martial. 
Leading the opposition efforts, Ohio Senator and Civil War veteran Joseph 
Benson Foraker introduced a resolution to call for a Senate investigation of 
 
402. Boatswain in Navy—Revocation of Warrant, 28 Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 328 (1910). 
403. Restoration of Dismissed Military and Naval Officers, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 4, 4–5 (1866). 
For some background regarding this opinion, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 83, at 1017. 
404. WINTHROP, supra note 244, at 744–45. 
405. See 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 110 (Mar. 2019) (“[C]ompliance with applicable statutory 
and regulatory requirements is necessary before an officer validly can be discharged, dismissed, 
separated, or released from service.”). 
406. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 453–55, 467 (2001). 
407. Id. at 511; JOHN D. WEAVER, THE SENATOR AND THE SHARECROPPER’S SON: 
EXONERATION OF THE BROWNSVILLE SOLDIERS 129 (1997). 
408. MORRIS, supra note 406, at 474, 554. 
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the President’s action.409 In support of the resolution, Foraker argued at 
length on the Senate floor that the President lacked legal authority to fire the 
soldiers without a court martial. As a constitutional matter, Foraker asserted: 
[N]o one can question that the Congress has power to prescribe by law 
what rules and regulations shall govern the Army as to its 
organization, as to the size of the Army, its maximum, its minimum, 
as to the number of infantry regiments, the number of cavalry 
regiments, the number of artillery regiments, and the number of 
batteries, and the number of men in each of these units of organization; 
and how, Mr. President, particularly, men shall be enlisted and men 
shall be discharged from the Army, the terms and conditions upon 
which they shall be enlisted, the rights that shall accrue to them on 
account of their service—long service, faithful service—whether or 
not they shall be recognized by the Government and be rewarded by 
the Government. All that rests with Congress as part of that power. As 
a part of that power it is competent for the Congress of the United 
States to provide that no man shall be summarily discharged from the 
Army after he has regularly enlisted except upon certain terms and 
conditions . . . .410 
Foraker argued that then-governing statutes in fact imposed such limitations 
on presidential discharge of enlisted men, much as the 1866 Act did for 
officers.411 
Foraker ultimately succeeded in getting his investigation but only after 
he agreed to modify the resolution so as not to question the President’s legal 
authority. In the resolution’s final form, the Senate resolved to authorize a 
committee to “ascertain all the facts” regarding the incident, but did so 
“without questioning the legality or justice of any act of the President.”412 
Foraker thus obtained his investigation at the cost of abandoning his legal 
theory.413  
Nevertheless, the practical import of this vote is more ambiguous than 
the Senate resolution might suggest. Though Foraker’s most articulate 
opponents disagreed with his analysis of presidential authority, they 
pointedly did so on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. In particular, 
 
409. EVERETT WALTERS, JOSEPH BENSON FORAKER: AN UNCOMPROMISING REPUBLICAN 
235–36 (1948). 
410. 41 CONG. REC. 568 (1906) (statement by Sen. Foraker). 
411. Id. 
412. 41 CONG. REC. 1434 (1907); 41 CONG. REC. 1512 (1907). 
413. Sadly, the investigation ultimately came to naught. Over the dissent of four Senators, 
including Foraker himself, the investigative committee upheld the President’s action. MORRIS, 
supra note 406, at 511. Foraker then proposed a bill to create a military board of inquiry to 
investigate the terminations. But though Congress ultimately enacted a substitute that convened a 
board to consider the soldiers’ eligibility for reenlistment, the board in the end concluded that only 
fourteen of the men could reenlist. WALTERS, supra note 409, at 245–46. 
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Senator John Coit Spooner of Wisconsin argued, despite professing 
sympathy for the discharged soldiers,414 that the President held statutory 
authority to terminate their enlistments.415 Accordingly, Spooner argued, “[i]t 
is not necessary to discuss whether the President, as Commander in Chief 
possesses inherent power to terminate the contract of enlistment.”416 But even 
Spooner acknowledged Congress’s extensive power to regulate and structure 
the military. At one point, he observed: 
The grounds upon which men may be discharged [from the Army] is 
within the constitutional capacity of the Congress. Whether any man 
can be discharged for offense without a trial is entirely within the 
constitutional competency of Congress. Whether the President shall 
be given the right to dismiss an officer at will without trial is for 
Congress to say.417 
Furthermore, despite adding language on presidential authority to 
Foraker’s resolution, the Senate rejected several substitute resolutions that 
would have asserted more directly that the President held authority to order 
the discharges.418 Thus, although President Roosevelt claimed initially to the 
Senate that he discharged the soldiers in “the exercise of my constitutional 
power and in pursuance of what, after full consideration, I found to be my 
constitutional duty as Commander in Chief of the United States Army,”419 
the Senate pointedly declined to endorse this view and its claimed power to 
investigate the discharges arguably cast doubt upon it. 
Overall, then, to quote Edward Corwin, this incident illustrates not only 
“the President’s residual power over the forces” but also that power’s 
“limits.”420 At most, it leaves ambiguous whether the President holds 
preclusive authority to remove military personnel, at either the officer or 
enlisted level, in the face of statutory restrictions requiring a court martial. 
Decades later, another racial incident played out differently—precisely 
because governing statutes gave enlisted personnel clear protection. In 1972, 
after a number of African-American sailors on a particular ship occupied the 
ship’s mess decks to angrily protest real or perceived discrimination against 
them, President Richard Nixon relayed to the Chief of Naval Operations 
 
414. 41 CONG. REC. 1084 (1907) (statement of Sen. Spooner). 
415. 41 CONG. REC. 1134 (1907) (statement of Sen. Spooner). 
416. Id. (statement of Sen. Spooner). On the merits, Spooner asserted that the Senate lacked 
power to override a discharge decision within the President’s power and that, in consequence, it 
also lacked competence to conduct the requested investigation. 41 CONG. REC. 1086 (1907) 
(statement of Sen. Spooner). 
417. 41 CONG. REC. 105 (1906) (statement by Sen. Spooner) (addressing earlier resolution 
requesting documents relating to the discharges from the Executive Branch). 
418. 41 CONG. REC. 1503, 1508, 1511–12 (1907). 
419. 41 CONG. REC. 549 (1906) (message from President Theodore Roosevelt). 
420. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984 295 (5th rev. ed. 
1984). 
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(CNO) through his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger that he 
“wanted the . . . protesters to receive dishonorable discharges immediately if 
not sooner.”421 Because of statutory due process requirements for such 
punishment, the CNO considered this order “clearly illegal” and refused to 
carry it out.422 In response, the President apparently ordered the Secretary of 
Defense to fire the CNO, but the Secretary refused as well.423 Thus, in this 
case, statutory limitations on punitive discharge, combined with the need to 
carry out directives through the chain of command, effectively protected 
enlisted personnel against a president’s vengeful commands. 
B. Implications 
What to make of this history? At this point, despite considerable 
ambiguity and mixed signals, the overall pattern of conduct by all three 
branches suggests general acquiescence to Congress’s authority to limit, at 
least during peacetime, presidential removal without a court martial or other 
procedural protections governing promotions and administrative discharges. 
The theory suggested in Perkins in the late nineteenth century to explain this 
practical result, however, appears internally unsatisfactory and inconsistent 
with subsequent case law, while the limiting construction reflected in 
McElrath and its progeny only exacerbates the statute’s arguable 
constitutional problems. 
An alternative theory, suggested by De Hart’s antebellum treatise and 
reflected in subsequent congressional debates, offers a better explanation for 
the statute’s validity: Although Congress generally may not displace the 
President’s command authority altogether, it can displace the specific 
enforcement mechanism of removal, even with respect to personnel 
discharging operational functions, so long as it provides a robust alternative 
disciplinary mechanism for effectuating the President’s directives.424 
Removal, in other words, may be “sufficient” to ensure adequate presidential 
control of military officers, but it is not also “necessary”; Congress may 
displace it with alternative disciplinary mechanisms.425 By authorizing 
 
421. HERSPRING, supra note 264, at 211 (quoting ELMO R. ZUMWALT JR., ON WATCH: A 
MEMOIRE (1976)). 
422. Id. 
423. Id. at 211–12. 
424. Cf. MCCONNELL, supra note 47, at 165 (“In the military, unlike the civil service, 
disobedience to lawful orders is actually a criminal offense and may be punished by flogging (as of 
1789), imprisonment, or even death—making a plenary power of removal unnecessary for 
maintaining the discipline of the chain of command.”). 
425. Cf. Rao, supra note 53, at 1208, 1244–47 (advocating this view for civil officers). 
Paralleling the analysis here in some respects, Rao defends for-cause removal limitations for certain 
inferior civil officers, so long as insubordination is understood to provide cause for termination. Id. 
at 1244–47. She does not address the military specifically, however, and appears to extend this 
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courts-martial to punish disobedience and insubordination, Congress has 
preserved strong incentives to comply with lawful commands—indeed, 
incentives arguably stronger than any that exist in civil administration. At the 
same time, however, Congress has protected officers’ positions from 
arbitrary removal by precluding such punishment without military due 
process, even if the President has lost confidence in a particular officer for 
reasons other than such disobedience.426 
Though generally alien to debates in the civil and administrative 
context, the Supreme Court hinted at this view in Free Enterprise Fund. 
There, although declining to opine on removal limitations for military 
officers, the Court distinguished them from the double-layer tenure 
protection at issue in the case by noting that military officers “are broadly 
subject to Presidential control through the chain of command and through the 
President’s powers as Commander in Chief.”427 In any event, understanding 
discipline as a constitutionally adequate substitute for removal here accords 
with the constitutional text and structure at least as well as arguments for 
inferring preclusive presidential removal authority.  
This view also, at least potentially, establishes a valuable equilibrium 
well-suited to the military context. While strongly enforcing a general norm 
of command discipline, it ensures that officers who disobey directives they 
perceive to be unlawful will lose their position only if the military justice 
system fails to back up their judgment. In addition, insofar as the function at 
issue is vested in their individual office, officers could resist carrying out 
directives they consider profoundly unwise, on pain of potentially incurring 
later punishment for insubordination.428 President Nixon’s inability to obtain 
a punitive discharge for protesting sailors illustrates how valuable this legal 
structure may be in protecting military careers and preventing unlawful 
orders from taking effect. 
Amid the exigencies of war or another declared emergency, Congress 
has preserved a different equilibrium that more strongly favors command 
authority, making dismissal by court-martial optional rather than 
 
theory only to situations in which “the appointment of [the] officer is vested in the head of a 
department.” Id. at 1246. That limitation would exclude some military officers whom current law 
protects from removal without a court martial. 
426. Current statutes do permit review and eventual removal of officers due to deficient 
performance. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1182, 1184 (2018); see also supra subsection III(A)(1)(b)(i). 
427. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 (2010). 
428. In his study of military “shirking,” Peter Feaver reports that court-martial “conviction rates 
remained high throughout the Cold War,” although “these high rates probably reflect a selection 
effect, as commanders pursued courts-martial only in the cases where they were fairly certain that 
the convictions would hold.” PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 167 (2005) (citing other studies). 
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mandatory.429 Even outside such contexts, moreover, presidents and other 
senior officers within the chain of command generally hold authority to 
relieve officers of particular duties, such as command of a ship or unit. 
Nevertheless, Congress’s choice to restrict discharging officers without cause 
in peacetime provides important career protection to officers and may in 
some instances place valuable friction between presidential directives and 
on-the-ground actions. For all the reasons discussed, this statutory structure 
should stand on solid constitutional ground; any argument to the contrary is 
mistaken. 
Could Congress go further and require courts-martial for removal even 
during wartime or a declared emergency? Although in principle the deterrent 
effect of criminal sanctions should still suffice to ensure obedience, 
preventing displacement of a recalcitrant or incompetent officer in battlefield 
circumstances could more concretely interfere with the President’s ultimate 
constitutional authority to direct military operations. Yet this problem could 
itself be solved by providing (or presuming) some mechanism for temporary 
suspension or relief from specific duties without permanent removal. 
Peacetime limitations on removal already mean that presidents may enter an 
emergency with an officer corps they would not have chosen; to quote one 
Defense Secretary’s glib aphorism, “You go to war with the army you have—
not the army you might wish to have.”430 Extending removal limitations 
beyond peacetime into war, if Congress so chose, would thus be more a 
change of degree than of kind and should also be constitutional. 
IV. Office-Holding Beyond the Military 
Congress, then, holds authority not only to allocate military duties to 
particular offices, but also to displace the President’s default removal 
authority over career military officers by providing sufficiently robust 
alternative mechanisms of command discipline. Though these conclusions 
are important in their own right for reasons identified earlier, the analysis 
supporting them holds at least four broader implications for separation-of-
powers law and scholarship. 
 
429. One early treatise, arguing that the President held constitutional removal power but should 
generally allow dismissal by court-martial, identified the benefits of this balance: 
A mode of proceeding is interwoven with the military organization of great benefit to 
the sound constitution of the army. Although the president is unquestionably 
authorized to deprive any military officer of his commission at pleasure, yet the 
established practice is, to allow the individual, whose conduct has given 
dissatisfaction, an opportunity of explaining and vindicating it, by means of a regular 
tribunal, before he is dismissed, suspended, or even reproved. The same usage prevails 
in the navy. 
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 165 (photo. 
reprt. 2003) (2d ed. 1829). 
430. DONALD RUMSFELD, RUMSFELD’S RULES 316 app. B (2013). 
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A. Interring the Unitary Executive Branch 
First and foremost, Congress’s broad authority over military offices 
should undermine the strongest versions of “unitary” executive-branch 
theory. Under this theory, all executive power necessarily vests in the 
President, even when placed by statute in a particular subordinate officer, and 
presidents accordingly may direct how statutory duties are performed or even 
(on some accounts) perform those duties personally on their own.431 One 
early Federalist treatise-writer went so far as to assert that “the president is 
not confined in his executive functions to the use of a particular department”; 
governmental actions “are equally [the President’s] acts, whether they 
emanate from [one department], or any other department.”432 According to a 
more recent statement of this view, the President, as the unitary receptacle of 
executive power, necessarily holds authority to “completely withdraw” any 
executive power vested in a subordinate officer.433 “Once [the President’s] 
authority is withdrawn,” on this account, “the President must make all those 
decisions previously vested by statute in the now constitutionally 
disempowered officer, at least until the officer leaves office (and a new 
officer is appointed) or Congress, by statute, allows some other executive 
officer to act as the President’s agent over those matters.”434 
The Supreme Court seemed to embrace this theory in its recent Seila 
decision. Though this reasoning was not essential to its result, the Court 
characterized the President as the sole repository of “executive Power” and 
subordinate officers as mere assistants to the President, “whose authority they 
wield.”435 To the extent Seila thus implies that the President can always 
exercise executive powers personally, or even redelegate them at will within 
the Executive Branch, the analysis presented here shows that Seila is 
mistaken even for the military, which has conventionally been assumed to be 
an area of maximum presidential power. In fact, history and practice confirm 
that Congress can vest particular military functions and duties in particular 
officers, who then must themselves perform those functions and duties. What 
is more, even if it cannot create the same sort of tenure protection afforded to 
independent administrative agencies, Congress can calibrate the sanctions for 
those officers’ disobedience, either leaving in place the default mechanism 
of removal or providing more robust forms of punitive discipline. 
Perhaps unlike in the civil and administrative context, military officers 
are normally subject to presidential directive authority by virtue of the 
President’s position as Commander in Chief. In the civil and administrative 
 
431. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
432. RAWLE, supra note 429, at 165–66. 
433. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 54, at 598–99. 
434. Id. at 599. 
435. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020). 
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context, background normative and constitutional principles may or may not 
support presuming such presidential power,436 and non-unitarians maintain 
that Congress may, through tenure protections, altogether displace 
presidential control over exercises of legal discretion with respect to civil 
administration.437 Some history and practice suggests Congress could go that 
far for the military as well, at least in some contexts. During Reconstruction, 
as we saw, Congress made the General of the Army removable only with 
Senate consent,438 and even today certain military judges enjoy tenure 
protection and officers involved in certain appointment selections and 
military justice functions are insulated from command discipline in their 
discharge of those functions.439 
But even if the President, as Commander in Chief, must hold power to 
issue binding commands with respect to most military functions, Congress’s 
authority to vest duties and calibrate sanctions for disobedience still 
undermines any account of the military as strongly unitary. As a practical 
matter, by vesting authority in a particular officer, especially a civil officer 
within the military chain of command such as the Secretary of Defense, and 
providing removal as the President’s means of effectuating directives, 
Congress may create a legal structure that is functionally little different from 
vesting power in a civil officer, such as the Attorney General or Secretary of 
Agriculture, without granting those officers tenure protection. 
Again, history provides examples not only of Congress adopting such 
structures, but also of such structures mattering. Early nineteenth-century 
statutes vesting certain military support functions in the Secretary of War440 
arguably displaced direct presidential control over those functions.441 At the 
least, they rendered the secretaries answerable to the President only through 
removal for their performance of those functions. During Reconstruction, 
though district commanders were removable at will, statutes vesting 
substantial military powers in those officers, particularly when interpreted by 
then-General Grant to preclude direction from him or the President in 
performance of those functions, gave enterprising generals like Philip 
 
436. Compare Stack, supra note 85, at 295 (arguing against presumed directive authority), and 
Percival, supra note 53, at 2490 (same), with Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (arguing in favor), and Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential 
Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 728–30 (2016) (summarizing the debate and defending Kagan’s 
view). 
437. E.g., Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2224–27 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
438. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text. 
439. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
440. See supra notes 144 and 183 and accompanying text. 
441. 56 CONG. REC. 5406 (1918) (statement of Sen. Shields) (characterizing these functions as 
not subject to presidential “control or direction” absent new legislation such as the then-proposed 
Overman Act). 
PRICE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/21 12:56 PM 
2021] Congress’s Power over Military Offices 571 
Sheridan substantial power to shape on-the-ground developments.442 In the 
Nixon Administration, the Secretary of Defense and CNO could block an 
unlawful order to discharge enlisted personnel without proper cause.443 And 
more recently Defense Secretary Esper’s position in the chain of command 
reportedly enabled him to resist President Trump’s directive to deploy troops 
to suppress domestic unrest.444 
Furthermore, much as in civil and administrative contexts, prudent 
exercise of Congress’s power to structure chains of command can 
meaningfully shape executive policy and impose constraints on presidential 
action, even if officers are ultimately subject to command discipline. For 
good or ill, the Goldwater–Nichols structure of combatant commands creates 
different incentives and pathologies from the pre-World War II structure of 
separate War and Navy Departments.445 Likewise, in the 1947 National 
Security Act, Congress could preserve the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation, 
with their distinct competences and esprit de corps, by legislating their 
continued existence.446 
These conclusions with respect to the military should only strengthen 
arguments that Congress holds power to assign duties and structure 
disciplinary mechanisms in civil administration. Having taken the unitary 
theory’s strongest fortress, non-unitarians might now more easily conquer the 
territory beyond. Yet the argument should give pause even to those, 
apparently including Chief Justice Roberts and a majority of the Supreme 
Court, who remain committed to a unitary Executive Branch in civil 
administration. From that point of view, civil administration might be 
distinguished from military examples on various grounds, including 
Congress’s specific textual powers, longstanding practice, and the special 
functional need for civilian oversight. But drawing such distinctions would 
require a considerable shift in the current terms of debate: it would suggest 
that, contrary to much modern commentary and executive-branch bluster, 
Congress’s power to structure the military is especially strong, not especially 
weak. 
B. Convention and Constraint 
A second, related implication bears on current debates over maintaining 
responsive and accountable government amid turbulent and polarized 
politics. Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of “convention,” 
as opposed to hard constitutional law, in our federal government’s practical 
 
442. See supra subsection II(B)(4)(b). 
443. See supra notes 421–23 and accompanying text. 
444. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
445. See supra section II(B)(8). 
446. See supra section II(B)(7). 
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operation. Conventions, in this sense, “are extrajudicial unwritten norms that 
are enforced by the threat of political sanctions, such as defeat in re-election, 
retaliation by other political institutions and actors, or the internalized 
sanctions of conscience.”447 As recent work has emphasized, norms and 
understandings of this sort may do important work buffering maximal 
interbranch conflict within our separation-of-powers system, thus enabling 
smoother and more responsive governance.448 By the same token, 
conventions may help preserve important values and policy commitments—
apolitical law enforcement, for example, or stable monetary policy—even 
when elected officials have a short-term political interest in violating them. 
Insofar as tribal politics encourage political actors to play for the win in each 
case even at the expense of good governance, these effects may be 
particularly important in our era of acute polarization.449 
To the extent all that is true, the constitutional principles developed here 
hold extraordinary importance. Vesting duties in offices by statute creates a 
scaffolding on which the political system may build norms and 
understandings—“conventions” in this theoretical sense—about how those 
duties will be discharged. The Secretary of Defense or a combatant 
commander may face different political and reputational pressures (from 
Congress, professional networks, the media, or elsewhere) than does the 
President. The same is quite manifestly true of the Attorney General, 
Treasury Secretary, and any number of other officials. Insofar as these offices 
require Senate confirmation, moreover, Senators may constrain presidential 
desires regarding the character and policy aims of officials who hold such 
positions in the first place. 
Even without any legal separation between the President’s wishes and 
actual discharge of governmental authorities, the President’s practical 
dependence on governmental agents to carry out desired policies might 
impede unilateral presidential power. As one study of civil–military relations 
proposes, when the military’s preferences diverge from the President’s, 
officers face a choice between obeying or dragging their feet based on their 
“expectations of whether shirking will be detected and, if so, whether 
civilians will punish them for it.”450 Even if some potential for such resistance 
 
447. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1182 
(2013). 
448. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 8–9, 106 
(2018) (emphasizing importance of “forbearance” to the stability of American democracy). 
449. For a sampling of political science literature on current polarization, see generally ALAN 
I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE OF 
DONALD TRUMP (2018); MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, PARTY 
SORTING & POLITICAL STALEMATE (2017); and NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD 
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed. 
2016). 
450. FEAVER, supra note 428, at 3. 
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is inevitable, however, Congress can ratchet this potential up or down 
through its choices of administrative design and allocation of military duties 
to particular offices. Doing so may then increase or decrease the chances that 
conventions will develop regarding particular officers’ performance of their 
duties.  
By contrast, if all powers of government could be exercised by the 
President personally, then the President would be limited only by his or her 
individual electoral accountability and by the need to find some officer 
willing to carry out presidential directives. From this point of view, 
Congress’s underlying power to vest authorities in offices may be vitally 
important to sustaining stable, responsive, and public-spirited government in 
our era, in both military and civil or administrative contexts. Indeed, this 
power may well be even more important to those goals than the more 
contested authority to limit at-will removal, though the latter has received far 
more scholarly attention.451 
It is true that in many cases accurately identifying the boundary between 
constitutional law and political convention may be difficult, in part because 
American constitutional law relies heavily on history and practice to resolve 
textual ambiguities. Here, however, for all the reasons discussed above, the 
deep structure of constitutional practice, along with primary considerations 
of constitutional text, history, and structure, supports viewing Congress’s 
authority to allocate military and other duties as a matter of constitutional law 
rather than mere political convention. The understanding’s centrality to 
enabling other mechanisms of political accountability only adds a further 
practical reason to support it. 
It is also true that norms and conventions themselves may be either good 
or bad. While some norms of government behavior protect the public interest, 
others may impair it or otherwise deserve repudiation. In particular, too 
strong a norm of military independence from civilian control could be 
frightening in its implications.452  
Nor are current arrangements necessarily optimal. In fact, one recent 
appraisal has condemned the current structure of military office-holding 
 
451. Adrian Vermeule has argued that agencies’ real independence is itself a matter of 
convention rather than statutory law. Vermeule, supra note 447. 
452. In one famous example, during the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur defied 
President Truman’s policies regarding conduct of the war. FEAVER, supra note 428, at 128–29. In 
another example, Air Force General Curtis LeMay reportedly indicated during the Cold War that 
he would not necessarily abide by civilian limitations on launching nuclear weapons—a prospect 
that, absent legislation vesting such authority, would appear undesirable, to put it mildly. Id. at 129. 
In one scholar’s assessment, Truman’s firing of MacArthur “proved crucial in shaping military 
expectations of punishment throughout the Cold War.” Id. at 164. 
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under the Goldwater–Nichols Act as pathological.453 Current statutory 
arrangements, according to this critique, give combatant commanders too 
much effective authority over foreign policy, while also giving the service 
secretaries too little incentive to match procurement policies to the fighting 
forces’ real needs.454 On the other hand, amid current political vicissitudes, 
some policy inertia could conceivably carry benefits as well as costs.455 But 
whatever Goldwater–Nichols’s ultimate merits, this critique of the law 
highlights, once again, the powerful effects of agency design on policy 
outcomes, even in areas of presumed presidential prerogative like the 
military. 
In sum, allocating military and other duties, whether in major statutes 
like Goldwater–Nichols or through piecemeal measures, is one of Congress’s 
most potent means of constraining unilateral presidential action. If employed 
wisely, this power may enable Congress to generate and reinforce 
expectations about government policy and official decision-making that 
foster the long-term public interest, even at the expense of short-term 
presidential objectives. To the extent our current erratic politics raise fears 
about rash military action, precipitous changes in policy, or imprudent use of 
particular weapons systems, Congress might consider responding by more 
precisely allocating statutory authority over such matters. 
C. Securing the Civil Service 
A third implication relates to the federal civil service. Recent 
scholarship has called attention to an arguable mismatch between current 
appointments practice and the range of positions apparently treated as 
“officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause as a matter of 
original usage and early practice.456 In its 2018 Lucia decision, the Supreme 
Court confronted this question but effectively sidestepped it,457 leaving the 
door open to further waves of litigation challenging administrative actions by 
 
453. Nevitt, supra note 290, at 988–89. For other critical appraisals of the statute, see, for 
example, Derek S. Reveron & Michelle D. Gavin, America’s Viceroys, in AMERICA’S VICEROYS: 
THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, 1, 2–3 and Christopher M. Bourne, 
Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, JOINT FORCE Q., Spring 1998, at 99–100. 
454. See Nevitt, supra note 290, at 948–49, 965–67 (advancing this view). 
455. Cf. HERSPRING, supra note 264, at 372 (discussing General Wesley Clark’s ability to shape 
policy in the Kosovo conflict because “he knew he had the authority of Goldwater-Nichols behind 
him”); Stephen D. Wrage, U.S. Combatant Commander: The Man in the Middle, in AMERICA’S 
VICEROYS: THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, at 185, 185–86 (arguing 
that concerns about the combatant commanders’ influence on foreign policy are overblown because 
the commanders have limited authority and are highly accountable). 
456. See generally Mascott, supra note 65 (analyzing the original meaning of “officers of the 
United States” as it relates to current doctrine); Phillips et al., supra note 65 (same). 
457. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
majority for relying on precedents that “do not provide much guidance” rather than look to the 
original public meaning). 
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civil-service officials.458 At the same time, the Court in Free Enterprise Fund 
suggested without deciding that removal limitations may be more suspect for 
officers (whether principal or inferior) than for employees,459 and following 
the Lucia decision, President Trump issued an executive order casting doubt 
on competitive exam-based appointments for certain civil officers.460 
The military history discussed here suggests that any expansive 
inferences about removal from Lucia and the Appointments Clause would be 
overdrawn.461 As discussed earlier, the set of military positions subject to the 
Appointments Clause is generally broader than in the civil service. Whereas 
today only the most senior civilian positions are typically filled in accordance 
with the Appointments Clause, current governing authority uniformly treats 
all commissioned military officers as “officers of the United States” under 
the Appointments Clause.462 As OLC observed in a Clinton-era opinion, this 
mismatch is difficult to explain: “It is at least arguable . . . that the authority 
exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that 
their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees [rather than 
officers].”463 To the extent that is true and recent historical scholarship is 
correct, military practice may have preserved a broader early understanding 
of “officers” even as practice diverged elsewhere.464 
 
458. See Jennifer L. Mascott, “Officers” in the Supreme Court: Lucia v. SEC, CATO SUP. CT. 
REV., 2017–2018, at 305, 336 (discussing pending litigation and noting a “potential torrent” of 
further cases). 
459. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506 (2010); see 
also id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I still see no way to avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps 
thousands of high-level Government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their 
job security and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”). 
460. Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, Exec. Order No. 
13843, 3 C.F.R. 844 (2019). 
461. Cf. Mascott, supra note 65, at 548–58, 563–64 (noting that “in modern practice we seem 
to have settled on the expectation that any Article II officer appointment is necessarily a political 
one” but suggesting that this inference may not be sound). 
462. See supra subpart I(B). 
463. The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 124, 144 n.54 (1996). 
464. See Mascott, supra note 65, at 528–30 (discussing early statutes regarding the military). 
Military practice might be distinguished from civil administration on various grounds. In particular, 
one might interpret current practice as reflecting an implicit view that any authority to command 
military forces in combat, even down to the level of platoons and similar units, is categorically 
“significant” for Appointments Clause purposes. See Constitutional Separation of Powers, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. at 144 n.54 (“Even the lowest ranking military or naval officer is a potential commander of 
United States forces in combat—and, indeed, is in theory commander of large military or naval units 
by presidential direction or in the event of catastrophic casualties among his or her superiors.”).  
 OLC has also offered two other theories, though they seem less compelling. First, the Office has 
observed that “[c]ertain officials are constitutional officers because in the early Republic their 
positions were of greater relative significance in the federal government than they are today.” Id. 
This theory may have some utility in explaining why certain clerical and administrative positions 
are no longer treated as offices. In an era of electronic communications and records, for example, 
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Whatever the scope of Appointments Clause officers, however, military 
practice should put to rest arguments that an expanded definition of this term 
in civil and administrative contexts necessarily undermines civil service 
protections that currently govern the hiring, firing, and disciplining of 
administrative staff. On the contrary, as we have seen, robust statutory 
constraints on appointment, promotion, and removal have long applied to 
military officers. There is accordingly little reason to think the Appointments 
Clause precludes applying comparable restraints on nonmilitary office-
holding. 
With respect to hiring (appointments), historic Executive-Branch 
opinions have in fact suggested that precisely the same degree of limitation 
is permissible for civil and military offices.465 One treatise writer early in the 
twentieth century even defended civil-service appointment constraints based 
on historic military analogues.466 Accordingly, to the extent the statutory 
structure for military offices has successfully professionalized the 
appointment process while also preserving an appropriate degree of ultimate 
presidential discretion, the broader structure of military statutes could 
provide a model for doing the same even if courts ultimately embrace an 
expanded reach for the Appointments Clause within the civil service.467 
As a matter of fact, some civil-service statutes already require cause to 
terminate some officers and employees but treat insubordination as cause for 
 
routine bookkeeping and paperwork functions may lack sufficient responsibility and discretion 
today to warrant treatment as offices, even if under different technological conditions they carried 
greater significance. But the theory seems not to explain military practice terribly well. Even on the 
battlefield, given changes in transportation and communications technology, junior military officers 
today are probably more closely controlled and supervised than were their predecessors. Second, 
the Office suggested that military appointments reflect a subconstitutional practice rather than a 
controlling understanding of what the Constitution itself requires. Id. On this view, although 
Congress has consistently chosen to require appointment of military officers in a manner consistent 
with the Appointments Clause, it could just as well allow appointment of at least some 
commissioned military officers by other means. This view could readily reconcile military and 
nonmilitary practice, but it encounters the difficulty that neither the Executive Branch nor the courts 
have understood the military appointment process to be optional. As noted, both have instead 
defined the category of “Officers of the United States” to include all commissioned military officers, 
and Congress’s own unbroken practice supports that understanding. See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
465. See, e.g., Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 516, 520–21, 524 (1871) 
(indicating that Congress’s authority “to prescribe qualifications [for offices] is limited by the 
necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution 
vests the power of appointment”). 
466. 2 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1180 (1910). 
467. Justice Breyer called attention to removal limitations for both military officers and civil-
service officials in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 543 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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termination or other discipline through an administrative process.468 If such 
structures are permissible for the military, as I have argued, then they should 
be even more defensible for the civil service. After all, no constitutional 
provision as specific as the Commander-in-Chief Clause prescribes 
presidential command authority over civil and administrative functions. 
Indeed, insofar as civil offices are created and defined entirely by statute, 
subject only to a requirement that the President retain authority to ensure 
faithful execution of the laws, Congress should hold still broader authority to 
limit the President’s authority to remove such officers at will. 
Again, appointment and removal protections might or might not be 
appropriate or valid for all positions within civil administration. For the upper 
reaches of the civil service, as in the military, accountability concerns, if not 
hard constitutional doctrine, might support preserving greater discretion with 
respect to appointments and removals. Likewise, just as in the military 
setting, removal restrictions even for officers lower in the bureaucracy might 
be valid only if sufficiently robust alternative disciplinary mechanisms are 
available. I will not attempt to resolve all such questions here. Nor do I 
express any view on whether professionalization is more or less appropriate 
with respect to the military or the civil service. At present, concerns about 
corrupting administrative expertise through partisan appointments may 
appear paramount to some, yet at other times in the past concerns about 
degrading military competence through patronage appointments were at least 
as salient.469  
The key point here is simply that military examples warrant greater 
attention by both sides in current debates over the civil service’s 
constitutionality. While those challenging the civil-service status quo should 
grapple with the apparent acceptance of parallel constraints for the military, 
by the same token those opposing a broadened understanding of the 
Appointments Clause should grapple with the Clause’s broad application to 
military offices. 
D. Reconstruction’s Centrality 
A last broad implication of my analysis relates to Reconstruction and 
the widespread neglect, if not deprecation, of its lessons for separation of 
powers. As my analysis throughout has highlighted, Reconstruction proved 
to be a watershed for key features of military office-holding and the 
constitutional understandings surrounding it. Furthermore, despite departing 
in some ways from earlier understandings, many of these changes have 
proven to be enduring and time-tested features of constitutional governance 
 
468. For discussion of these statutes and relevant case law, see Barnett, supra note 314, at 1374–
75, 1379–80. 
469. See GOSS, supra note 177, at xi–xix (discussing “political generals” during the Civil War). 
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ever since. Nor are these changes alone in having such continuing 
importance: among other things, key limitations on military involvement in 
law enforcement,470 on spending in excess of annual congressional 
appropriations,471 and on military officers performing civil duties472 date 
from this period. 
Insofar as our current polarized era is taking on a troubling resemblance 
to the bitter politics of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, congressional 
actions and executive responses from that era may hold important lessons 
about how our separation-of-powers system can or should operate in our era. 
Any further consideration of this question would go well beyond the scope 
of this article. Yet even if Reconstruction was a watershed only for the 
questions addressed here, that fact alone would give it a central legacy 
deserving more attention not only for civil liberties, but also for separation of 
powers, the structural Constitution, and congressional control of the military. 
Conclusion 
Though widely presumed to be an area of exceptional presidential 
authority, military office-holding is in fact an area thick with statutory 
constraints. Our Constitution’s text and structure, read in light of the 
longstanding practice reflected in those statutes, supports broad 
congressional authority to allocate military duties and authorities to particular 
offices other than the President. Although the President as Commander in 
Chief holds constitutional authority to direct how such functions are 
discharged, Congress, if it chooses, may preclude their actual performance 
by the President himself or another officer. Congress likewise holds authority 
to replace the President’s default removal authority with other sufficiently 
robust mechanisms of disciplinary control, such as criminal punishment 
through courts martial for disobedience. Beyond their immediate significance 
for current proposals to vest authority over cyber operations, force 
withdrawals, or nuclear weapons in subpresidential offices, these 
conclusions, and the history informing them, shed new light on separation-
of-powers debates about the unitary executive branch, conventions of 
governmental behavior, the civil service’s constitutionality, and 




470. Act of June 18, 1878, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1385) (Posse Comitatus Act). 
471. Act of June 12, 1870, § 7, 16 Stat. 230, 251 (1870) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 1341) (Anti-Deficiency Act). 
472. Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 294, § 18, 16 Stat. 315, 319 (1870) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. § 973(b)) (Civil Office Ban). 
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Just as presidents on some accounts are properly “overseers” rather than 
“deciders” with respect to civil administration, so too may Congress assign 
them a more supervisory than dictatorial role with respect to the military. 
Under the analysis developed here, Congress holds broad authority to 
structure the United States’ military apparatus by statute, allocating duties 
and authorities as it deems best and crafting appropriate mechanisms of 
disciplinary control. The prudence or wisdom of any such structure is 
accordingly a question the Constitution leaves to political debate. For better 
or worse, the framers did not take it out of our hands. 
 
 
 
